Perhaps one of Zizek’s central contributions to the theory of ideology is his account of belief. Previous critiques of ideology had targeted the intentional states of subjects, what they say, or how they explain their own positions. The thesis was that if one can just debunk these propositional attitudes then the subject in question will disidentify with the ideology. For Zizek, matters are quite different. As he puts it quite early in The Sublime Object of Ideology,
In feudalism, as we have seen, relations between people are mystified, mediated through a web of ideological beliefs and superstitions. They are the relations between the master and his servant, whereby the master exerts his charismatic power of fascination, and so forth. Although in capitalism the subjects are emancipated, perceiving themselves as free from medieval religious superstitions, when they deal with one another they do so as rational utilitarians, guided by their selfish interests. The point of Marx’s analysis, however, is that the things (commodities) themselves believe in their place, instead of the subjects: it is as if all their beliefs, superstitions and metaphysical mystifications, supposedly surmounted by the rational, utilitarian personality, are embodied in the ‘social relations between things’. They no longer believe, but the things themselves believe for them.
This seems also to be a basic Lacanian proposition, contrary to the usual thesis that a belief is something interior and knowledge something exterior (in the sense that it can be verified through an external procedure). Rather, it is belief which is radically exterior, embodied in the practical, effective procedure of people. It is similar to the Tibetan prayer wheels: you write a prayer on a paper, put the rolled paper into a wheel, and turn it automatically, without thinking (or, if you want to proceed according to the Hegelian ‘cunning of reason’, you attach it to a windmill, so that it is moved around by the wind). In this way, the wheel itself is praying for me, instead of me– or, more precisely, I myself am praying through the medium of the wheel. The beauty of it all is that in my psychological interiority I can think about whatever I want, I can yield to the most dirty and obscene fantasies, and it does not matter– to use a good old Stalinist expression –whatever I am thinking, objectively I am praying.
This is how we should grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs, even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter, can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity. (34)
For Zizek, belief is not to be located in our interiority, in our thoughts or theorizations of the world, but rather in what we do. As Zizek puts it a few pages earlier,
…ideology is not simply a ‘false consciousness’, an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological’– ‘ideological’ is a social reality whose very existence implies the non-knowledge of its participants as to its essence— that is, the social effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individuals ‘do not know what they are doing’. ‘Ideological’ is not the ‘false consciousness’ of a (social) being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by ‘false consciousness’. (21)
Thus, to give a few examples, if you truly wish to know what a person believes concerning patriarchy and the equality of men and women, or about homosexuality, you look not at what they say about these things, but what they do. It is in this sense that belief is objective, “out there”, rather than something to be located in ones head or conscious thoughts. Chances are a number of people will have very elaborate things to say about the necessity of overcoming gender inequality. Rather, to know what such a person believes, you look at what they do. How is such and such a person’s domestic life organized? How does such and such a person relate to the homosexuals he works with? It is there, in the doing, that the genuine beliefs are disclosed. Imagine, incidentally, this principle consistently applied to political theorists. Perhaps this is the reason I find myself so impatient with theological discussions. All too often the person presents a beautiful, intricate, intellectually sophisticated, philosophically stimulating account of their religious beliefs that has little or nothing to do with a sacred text like the Bible, Koran, or The Egyptian Book of the Dead. Yet strangely, this same person still appears in the pulpit on Sunday, engaging in all the rituals, engaging in confessional, etc, despite the fact that nothing in the traditions and sacred texts resembles anything in their theology. Even more disturbingly, one and the same person ends up participating in an institution and a set of collective practices that are diametrically opposed to their own expressed (interior) beliefs. Where, then, does this person’s belief genuinely lie? In what they say, in their propositional attitudes, or in what they do? Rather than asking whether or not people agree with the doctrines of their church or find them all plausible, one should instead investigate how they vote, what sort of social relations they form in their friendships and professional relationships, what their domestic life is like, where their money goes, etc. It makes little difference, for instance, whether someone believes in the apocalyptic narratives propounded by the leaders of their church if they consistently give money that then goes to political campaigns, placing people in office sympathetic to these views. Does not the expressed belief in these circumstances function as a lure that keeps the subject attached to a set of basically idiotic and often very oppressive social practices? Have we yet had a study of theology based on what people do? I believe we have: it’s call ethnography and sociology. Of course, some will say that these things shouldn’t be worried about, that they are not genuine concerns, and that they constitute mis-spent energy that could be directed to other more pressing political issues. First, this is based on the absurd assumption that political struggles aren’t fought on multiple fronts at once. Second, it is a variant of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning, as it fails to take into account that the very struggle against these movements is what has so far kept them in check. Finally, this is a bit like telling GLBT folk, women, and parents concerned about whether genuine science is taught at school that they should just sit back and wait until a later day for their struggles and concerns to be engaged with. “If only those uppity negros would quit causing such a ruckus, always complaining and making people angry at them. If they weren’t constantly speaking up about how bad things are, the natural course of progress would eventually bring about equality many years hence.” This has forever been the call of the crypto-reactionary: it’s not time, people aren’t ready for you to be free yet, just sit put and remain patient. One wonders what could possibly motivate an otherwise intelligent person to advocate such an absurd position.
Larval Subjects . 
May 22, 2007 at 7:56 pm
“One wonders what could possibly motivate an otherwise intelligent person to advocate such an absurd position.”
One does wonder, though I think Zizek, and by extension Lacan, is really asking us to consider the trickier inverse of that question: what (good) is intelligence when it can lead or at the very least fail to deter one from taking up such an absurd position?
May 22, 2007 at 8:25 pm
This is a great observation. I like to think that minimally there’s feedback loops between propositional attitudes and concrete doings. This is, perhaps, my residual Hegelianism, where there’s always a tension between the Concept and the thing-itself, placing the two in a relation of unrest. I think some of the issues N.Pepperell and I have been discussing have been about this issue.
May 22, 2007 at 8:27 pm
I am having trouble following this analysis…is Zizek’s greatest contribution really such a simple twist on the (rather more witty) cliche of ‘do as I say not as I do’? This language of “locating belief” seems to imply a more complex deduction being performed, but all I can find is the contrast between speech and action, which are really just two modes of communicating what is generally known as belief, the former being arguably more reliable.
Or is that the real point, that Zizek is renaming action belief, claiming speech to be so unreliable as to be effectively useless for describing the phenomenon. However, if that is the case I prefer Aristotle’s analysis, which seems more…upfront?
May 22, 2007 at 8:34 pm
I didn’t say “greatest contribution” just “central contribution”. I think there’s more to it than the mantra “do as I do”. Rather, Zizek consistently attempts to show how ideology is not to be located in our heads or thoughts, but in actually existing social institutions out there in the world. For instance, he gives a striking analysis of the ideology embodied in French, German, and American toilets in The Plague of Fantasy, showing how each of these toilet designs indicates a particular ideology pertaining to waste. Elsewhere he shows how the modern bourgeoise is, philosophically, a good nominalist, knowing perfectly well that money, for instance, is simply paper and a representation. However, this same nominalist behaves towards money as if it were a sublime and magical object. For instance, many would gasp and be shocked were you to light a hundred dollar bill on fire. Ideology is thus not to be sought in our heads, but in the world out there.
May 22, 2007 at 9:17 pm
Then ideology means very roughly whatever you say to someone about the details of “stupid or absurd” things he believes, he won’t change his mind. whatever he learns at school or even practices (if he is a biologist or a teacher for example), it won’t change his ideological coordinates. Persistence. He is stuck to his heliefs, is not belief meaningful when you can persist to change it whatever happens in the world?
In this sense, where does the separation line stand for the subject that believes the Badiouian “event” and the subject of ideology.
There comes Althusser’s famous statement into play: “Ideology subjects its subjects to the Subject.” Lacanian Big Other.
But this does not give me enough clue about what can potentially undermine the idelogical position of the subject. In the streets, may be?
May 22, 2007 at 10:01 pm
Then ideology means very roughly whatever you say to someone about the details of “stupid or absurd” things he believes, he won’t change his mind. whatever he learns at school or even practices (if he is a biologist or a teacher for example), it won’t change his ideological coordinates. Persistence. He is stuck to his heliefs, is not belief meaningful when you can persist to change it whatever happens in the world?
This seems a little bleak, no? We do see people and social configurations change in the world. The question is simply one of whether we should privilege what subjects say and espouse about their beliefs– as well as what they believe about themselves –as a measure of what their beliefs are.
May 22, 2007 at 10:35 pm
“We do see people and social configurations change in the world.”
Of course, they change. But when you consider the non-historical, eternal character of “Ideology”, that change does not apply at all.
If the subject can change his belief, then he does not believe anymore. (I consider Belief as not to be separated from the practical activities of course.)
For instance, one does not pray once, he prays repetitively. It is something ritual. He may sound scientific when it comes to speaking but this does not change the repetitious character of his ideological stance.
In Sartre’s Nausea I remember the “sad repressive” character saying he cannot change the habit of shaving or brushing his teeth despite his downfall. I think ideology functions in a similar way, you cannot change it, you keep brushing your teeth.
May 23, 2007 at 12:55 am
You appear to me to be missing a crucial point here: it isn’t simply the cliched notion that “actions speak louder than words,” such that if we want to find a person’s “real beliefs,” we have to look past the person’s verbal claims. Zizek is not giving us a clue to the person’s “real” beliefs. The beliefs aren’t “in” the person at all! They’re “in” ideology, “in” the big Other.
You’re missing the crucial aspect of the “subject supposed to believe” — in Christianity, that will often be the priest/pastor (or, from the perspective of the priest/pastor, the congregation themselves). Talk to virtually anyone involved in some kind of religious community — invariably they’ll say that of course they don’t believe everything, they have their own nuanced views, but they go along with it for the sake of others.
The mechanism is of course even more forceful in things like the economy, where if you decided to really act like money was valuless (and hence refuse to accept it in exchange for your labor), you would soon starve to death.
But the point in Zizek’s analysis is not to decode individuals’ “true beliefs” that they obfuscate with their stated beliefs. Rather, it is precisely to decouple ideology critique from individuals’ beliefs and show how “belief” operates autonomously on its own level!
May 23, 2007 at 1:01 am
Thus, your examples of “objective” patriarchy and homophobia fall flat. It’s not simply that a person claims to be a good feminist but still secretly harbors misogynist attitudes — that’s actually a fairly negligible insight. Rather, what makes patriarchy so insidious is that even the fully sincere feminist (assuming for a moment this is even possible) still takes it into account as “common sense,” as when offering advice to a younger feminist — “Even though we know very well that women are equal and that the expectation to (for example) wear make-up is oppressive, I still think you need to wear make-up as a way of getting ahead.” It’s not that there’s necessarily some person out there who fully believes in patriarchy — the unspecified “they” out there believes in patriarchy.
May 23, 2007 at 1:08 am
A bit rough around the edges this morning, but wanted both to say that I like this a great deal. Your final comment in particular:
I also agree with the importance of focussing on what a person or a group does – and, on the level of immediate political or ethical intervention, the points you make will be more important that the issue to which I’m about to draw attention, so please take these comments in that sort of self-relativising light.
However :-) What someone believes or how they express the rationalisation for what they “do”, is itself part of what they do. In other words, it is also an action, a practice. And the form of the belief or rationalisation is often non-arbitrary or sits in a determinate relationship with those other dimensions of practice to which you contrast belief above.
This can be important for various reasons – first, as the forms of belief can often provide a point of leverage for the criticism of the sorts of practice you are trying to open to criticism; and second, as there is often a collective/practical dimension to the qualitative form in which beliefs or rationalisations can be expressed – and an analysis of this form can often be productive for an understanding of dimensions of collective practice of which social actors can themselves remain unaware.
But I say all of this, recognising that it to some degree sits askew to the point you were trying to make, which sits more on the level of arguing that someone’s expression of explicit belief should not be accepted as some kind of defense or mitigating factor, when there behaviour is objectionable. I’m not contesting this point in any way – but just suggesting that the formulation of the point seems to treat beliefs or rationalisations as though these things are somehow different from “practice” – and that, if this formulation were taken over-seriously (which I don’t think you personally do), it could have negative impacts both on the ability to theorise a situation, and on the ability to work out how most effectively to intervene.
May 23, 2007 at 1:13 am
Larval,
A good essay to follow up on this post would be one that I am told occurs in “Mapping Ideology,” though I found it in “The Zizek Reader.” It’s called “The Specter of Ideology.” It’s very thought provoking, and recalls an issue of the fantasy character of reality (as opposed to the realness or non-realness of fantasy) that I think is key to appreciating Lacan/Zizek’s contribution to the theory of ideology. More than the location of beliefs, I think Zizek’s thesis that (social) reality exists as a fantasy structure making the Real bearable is much more interesting.
In this sense, we can take my curious inversion of your question and push it to its limit. It’s not a question of how is such an absurd position possible despite people’s intelligence. Rather, Zizek asks how the intelligible world is possible when here exists this absurd position/belief/behavior. The fact is, he seems to have concluded, that it does not exist; the absurd position is not an anomaly of the intelligible world, but the intelligible world is a fiction structured around (you could say, but I’m not sure I do, for) the absurd position.
May 23, 2007 at 1:14 am
Adam, I’m tired of your rationalizations. Your recent post on religion and the subsequent comments speak very clearly about what you’re doing. I wanted to give you the benefit of the doubt and thought I was missing something, but clearly I wasn’t. You are an apologist for such movements in your constant calls to silence any criticism and engagement with these groups. Yes, Matthew Shephard should have remained silent as he died on that fence. Do you believe that the bigotry of fundamentalists had nothing to do with his death? You have little understanding of the mechanisms by which the things you denounce reproduce themselves and are unwilling to take a strong stand to denounce and change those things. Our current administration would not be in power at all, were it not for the rabid groups you’re claiming are not a real danger. I could really care less what you say, and the nature of how you suddenly become an idiot when reading arguments such as this speaks very clearly about the contours of your desire.
For instance, when you write:
You seem to miss that this is exactly what you do with fundamentalists. You are a fundamentalist. Until you cease suggesting that these aren’t important or real political struggles, I cannot say otherwise and cannot help but suspect that you secretly harbor sympathies for these movements. It certainly would come as no surprise given your upbringing and career choices. Adam’s remarks can be found here for whoever is interested:
http://www.adamkotsko.com/weblog/2007/05/reflections-on-religious-right.html
Clearly he repeats a long tradition of reactionary ideology suggesting that oppressed groups are themselves the problem and should just remain silent lest they arouse the ire of the “mainstream”. The comments are especially worth the read, given the irrational reactions to both sympathetic and well-founded criticism of a number of the points made. Why can’t we fight both the battles you mention in your original post and battles against these egregious activities? What is your motive in striving to silence disssent and outrage on these matters?
May 23, 2007 at 1:30 am
It’s sad that your misguided polemic against me is distorting your very presentation of the theory you’re deploying here — as though Sublime Object of Ideology is valuable because it allows us to… unmask personal hypocrisy! Surely we didn’t need Hegel and Lacan for that!
May 23, 2007 at 1:35 am
It’s sad that your misguided polemic against me is distorting your very presentation of the theory you’re deploying here — as though Sublime Object of Ideology is valuable because it allows us to… unmask personal hypocrisy! Surely we didn’t need Hegel and Lacan for that!
Yet another brilliant response from Adam when unable to respond to a criticism of his sympathies for fundamentalists. Your interpretation of my remarks and reduction to a mere accusation of hypocrisy speaks a good deal to your own thought process here. The issue is not one of whether or not a group is hypocritical, but of determining what the nature of a group is.
May 23, 2007 at 1:42 am
I don’t respond to your “criticism of [my] sympathies for fundamentalists” because nothing I wrote in that post suggests I have sympathies for fundamentalists. I have said over and over and over again that I’m staunchly opposed to the religious right — being skeptical about the amount of power that is attributed to them counts as apologetics or sympathy? I said they’re more pathetic than frightening! Is that sympathy? Does that sound like a movement I identify with? I think they’re beneath contempt! I can’t even make sense of this accusation that I “am” a fundamentalist due to my career choice — by publishing a paper on Bonhoeffer’s reading of Hegel, I’m oppressing gays? What is the mechanism here?
You’re as bad as the right-wingers who shouted down anyone who viewed terrorism as anything less than a total existential threat against America. Anything less than total panic seems to be capitulation in your mind.
And you seriously are getting Zizek wrong here in my opinion. Instead of responding on the theoretical level, though, you launched into the personal attacks! Why am I supposed to take this seriously?
May 23, 2007 at 1:54 am
I don’t respond to your “criticism of [my] sympathies for fundamentalists” because nothing I wrote in that post suggests I have sympathies for fundamentalists. I have said over and over and over again that I’m staunchly opposed to the religious right — being skeptical about the amount of power that is attributed to them counts as apologetics or sympathy?
First, I do not argue in this way in my day to day life. You evoke this sort of argumentation in your dismissive attitude. In Lacanian terms you’re creating the very thing you’re reacting against.
I said they’re more pathetic than frightening!
This statement is an example of the sort of dismissiveness that I’m referring to. They are both pathetic and frightening. They are extremely well organized and funded and have significantly impacted the politics of this country.
Is that sympathy?
Yes, it is a sort of sympathy in that it dismisses legitimate criticism and engagement of these groups.
Does that sound like a movement I identify with?
Your constant calls to cease criticizing these groups sounds like an unconscious identification. It sounds like you’re protecting these groups. Stop making such calls and there will be no doubt that you don’t identify with them.
I think they’re beneath contempt! I can’t even make sense of this accusation that I “am” a fundamentalist due to my career choice — by publishing a paper on Bonhoeffer’s reading of Hegel, I’m oppressing gays? What is the mechanism here?
This is because you think that identifying with a group means endorsing their beliefs. The suggestion that you are aligned with these groups comes from your attempt to silence any engagement with these issues which functions as a way of protecting these groups. You functionally promote, for instance, homophobia by advocating a position of not squarely struggling against these groups which are promoting anti-homosexual agendas. You’re making it more difficult for homosexuals to struggle against these groups. As such you’re a part of the problem. Similar things could be said about educational issues and womens issues.
You’re as bad as the right-wingers who shouted down anyone who viewed terrorism as anything less than a total existential threat against America. Anything less than total panic seems to be capitulation in your mind.
I don’t see you giving nearly as interesting a critique of common criticisms of the war on terrorism as the sort that the rightwinger is shouting down. This is a poor analogy, though a satisfying and not surprising one for you to give.
And you seriously are getting Zizek wrong here in my opinion.
You are correct that one element of Zizek’s thought is what you describe. He speaks to other issues such as what I describe.
May 23, 2007 at 2:08 am
I’m just trying to argue against a total panic mode in response to the religious right. Perhaps I’m exaggerating the degree to which your position represents a “panic mode.”
Aside from my nefarious blog posts, however, I will quietly note that I am attending the most liberal seminary in the country, and working as a research assistant for the LGBTQ Religious Studies Center there, for a professor who has done two books on counter-homophobic readings of the Bible and is now working on a kind of “genealogy” of homophobia. I plan to teach in either a liberal arts setting or a seminary, and if the latter, my degree from CTS will effectively blacklist me from even a moderately conservative institution, much less a religious-right type of place — so I’m really not going to be equipping religious-right people to go out and take away your freedoms.
A more convincing “personal” explanation might be that I’m simply sick and tired of hearing about and talking about the religious right. I left my evangelical church at age 18, but felt pretty well stuck at my evangelical university and lived in the same town for a couple years afterward — you have no idea how constantly angry I was at the religious right people, particularly during the 2004 election. I now live in Chicago and finally have some distance. Anger is valuable, but it can also be debilitating.
Perhaps you’ll accuse me of staying at Olivet and then living in the surrounding area because I love fundamentalists so much. But it could also be because I came from a small town and was afraid of moving away from what was familiar, even if I did hate it.
I’ve made myself vulnerable here. I’m trying to extend an olive branch. Please pause before responding in anger again.
May 23, 2007 at 2:11 am
It sounds to me from previous things you said that you might actually have some idea of how angry I was — you seem to be living in a pretty conservative area, and doubtless you feel really isolated, just as I did. (If you go back to the archives from the years I lived near Olivet, you’ll see a whole lot of polemics against the religious right.) I hope you’re able to get out of that situation. It is not good for one.
May 23, 2007 at 2:14 am
A more convincing “personal” explanation might be that I’m simply sick and tired of hearing about and talking about the religious right. I left my evangelical church at age 18, but felt pretty well stuck at my evangelical university and lived in the same town for a couple years afterward — you have no idea how constantly angry I was at the religious right people, particularly during the 2004 election. I now live in Chicago and finally have some distance. Anger is valuable, but it can also be debilitating.
I’m sick of this discussion too! Please, please, please, let’s stop! I’m glad to hear of the work you’re doing and appreciate it. When I hear you say don’t talk about these things, I feel that you’re making it more difficult to engage with these issues. Clearly, from these remarks, this isn’t your intention, so I must be reading you wrong. Honestly, I’d really rather be talking about Deleuze and Whitehead and process theology and assemblages and all those fun things. I HATE these disputes, but can’t resist responding to them when I feel I’m being goaded. My apologies.
I do feel we’re making a lot of progress in understanding one another, regardless of how frustrating and painful that process is. Or at least I’m coming to understand you better and where your coming from, and to better appreciate your position.
May 23, 2007 at 2:20 am
If you really do start talking about process theology, that’s when the real fights will begin. Be forewarned.
May 23, 2007 at 2:30 am
Could you say more about previous *intentional* theories of ideology? I ask because it doesn’t seem correct to say that pre-Zizek ideology theory was focused on beliefs or intentions. Indeed, The German Ideology is pretty clear on this point, that post-Hegelian idealism is not only a theory about how ideas drive history, but one that results from the particular material conditions and social relations of the bourgeois philosophers who give rise to it. The ideas and beliefs, in this, are kind of beside the point–since it’s division of labor which, ultimately, determines (to some large degree) the content of their thinking. And this is Lukacs claim, too. And Althusser’s on ISAs. Debord also. Perhaps Sartre fits the intentional model, in his attempt to square Marx with Heidegger/Nietschze. Is there anybody in particular that you were thinking of?
May 23, 2007 at 2:34 am
Wait a moment, I’m genuinely confused here, largely because subjective possibilities are being universalized. I really love that moment in The Sublime Object of Ideology, and when I read it, I associated it with “ironic” forms of consumption.
You could apply it to religious belief. It could be the case that a critique of religion or a critique of evangelical religion was being used to justify conservative practices or worse. Just as, in Adam’s example, disparaging the makeup helps it go on more easily, the critique of the church could go like this: “Well, we all know that this church is corrupt and supports backwards politics, but it’s the only church we have, so you should go to church rather than rejecting it.”
On the other hand, it is certainly possible to go to reform churches, Unitarian churches, or to practice religion in other ways that do enable consistency of practice and belief. It’s also possible to be very outspoken within a given church or tradition; it’s different from consumer items, where the fact that I’m buying a given record or SUV doesn’t put me within an intellectual tradition, or enable me to advocate for change.
In other words, while I’m not expressing any support for Adam’s post about laying off the laity, I’m also not sure that this kind of hypocrisy is a necessary consequence of religious belief.
Lastly, intricacy, beauty, and philosophical rigor do not necessarily pull a thinker away from a religious text; to claim otherwise would mean vastly underestimating traditions like midrash, and thinkers like Aquinas.
May 23, 2007 at 2:34 am
Oh, and lastly, just to make sure I’m clear. Other than the introductory remark, I agree with this account of ideology completely. It’s well put.
May 23, 2007 at 3:19 am
Right, this is the direction I was moving in.
I fully agree. I, in no way, believe that all religious manifestations are the same or can be painted with the same brush. When I speak of these issues I’m focused on fundamentalist variants of belief and that alone.
Right, I don’t disagree. It’s not my view that religiosity necessarily entails hypocrisy.
May 23, 2007 at 3:21 am
I’m probably exaggerating a bit. There is a set of practices that seem focused on persuasion, implicitly assuming that ideology consists of propositional attitudes. I take it that this tradition was what motivated Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari to reject the category of ideology as the object of critique. I’d agree with most of your observations here.
May 23, 2007 at 7:38 pm
I’d like to read Adam’s paper on Bonhoeffer’s reading of Hegel, even if it doesn’t oppress gays. (Assuming that wasn’t a made-up example.)