Students shuffling out of the classroom after a discussion of Platonic realism and the possibility of transcendent, objective values independent of culture, history, and individual determination.
STUDENT: “This class is impossible.”
ME (Alarmed): “Why?”
STUDENT: “We come in here thinking we understand the world and now we discover that everything we think might be mistaken.”
Larval Subjects . 
February 2, 2008 at 4:03 pm
I wonder how many of those who have that thought go on to think after finishing a philosophy class, or perhaps an undergraduate degree in it, that they learned they were mistaken about the world and now they’ve got it right.
February 2, 2008 at 4:33 pm
I think what was most important in the comment was the statement that “everything we think might be mistaken”. That is, the conditional. The world becoming questionable or mysterious is a condition, I think, for practicing philosophy. In the philosophy classroom– especially at the introductory level –I believe the production of this space of the question is the most important and significant thing to be accomplished. That is, the teaching of philosophy shouldn’t be about demonstrating a particular doctrine, nor is it simply about acquainting students with a variety of different philosophical positions (though that’s important), but is rather about opening the space of questionability as such.
February 3, 2008 at 8:25 pm
I agree with this a lot..
“the teaching of philosophy shouldn’t be about demonstrating a particular doctrine, nor is it simply about acquainting students with a variety of different philosophical positions (though that’s important), but is rather about opening the space of questionability as such”
and in many ways the deepening of this process, through 2nd and 3rd year material (I’m speaking from a position of teaching existentialism to 2nd years and Klossowski/Deleuze and Heidegger to 3rd years) is a curious exercise, pushing the conditional through the simple process of knowledge claims and into the very sense of existence or identity the students have, beyond a scepticism and into something more ethical (or ethico-ontological). I do however try to emphasise a liberatory dynamic to this process, even if it’s a slightly crude ‘don’t be fooled again’ type approach.
February 3, 2008 at 8:47 pm
Razorsmile, could you say more about this:
“pushing the conditional through the simple process of knowledge claims and into the very sense of existence or identity the students have, beyond a scepticism and into something more ethical (or ethico-ontological). I do however try to emphasise a liberatory dynamic to this process, even if it’s a slightly crude ‘don’t be fooled again’ type approach.”
I go back and forth on the question of whether anything should be pushed in the classroom. In part I think about Socrates and how you can never pin down what his position might be or if he even has one. In part I think about the nature of the analyst’s position in the analytic setting, where the analyst sets his own desire to the side so that the analysand might discover his or her own desire. It seems to me that this opacity of the professors own positions can function as a sort of productive principle where the students progressively discover their own thought as they try to figure out what it is that the professor thinks or wants. I guess in my own teaching I try to advocate fully for whatever material it is I’m teaching. One moment I’ll be vigorously defending Kierkegaard or Augustine, only to shift to Lucretius or Nietzsche. I’ll bring critical tools to bear on one tradition from another tradition, and so on. I can’t decide whether there’s a principle behind this or not. I would like to think that part of the aim is to undermine attachments to the professor as “master”. Here I always think back to Deleuze’s remark that “the best teachers are never those who say ‘do as I do’ (representation), but who invite to ‘do with me'”.
February 4, 2008 at 6:57 pm
“That is, the teaching of philosophy shouldn’t be about demonstrating a particular doctrine, nor is it simply about acquainting students with a variety of different philosophical positions (though that’s important), but is rather about opening the space of questionability as such.”
Do you think this is a prescription for a psychoanalytic approach to pedagogy? That is, an approach to teaching that puts the weight of learning on the students, while the teacher stands back and makes strategic injections of interpretation.
February 4, 2008 at 7:00 pm
Gah, if I read your response to razorsmile, I might not have made that last comment.
February 5, 2008 at 4:57 am
these are all very interesting observations, i can see how a student’s comment about a possible change in the understanding of reality could be encouraging in some contexts and discouraging in others – allow me to elaborate: i think my own approach is very similar to yours in that i also attempt to present the author’s position in a comprehensive way as to present it to a class in all its complexity (thus when teaching Leibniz, i defend Leibniz even if it is extremely difficult in some cases etc) – however, i think that when i ask myself a simple question about my final goal, i wonder if this “opening the space of questionability as such” is truly a goal in my classes or it is a general goal of philosophy as i see it. in other words, not to sound elitist or anything, there is a clear distinction between the way i (would) do philosophy and the way i teach it – i wonder if, although a clearly effective way of demonstrating philosophy’s relevance, making students question their assumptions is a true aim of teaching philosophy (after all, that could be done in other disciplines in a very successful way)? i wonder if we should aim at producing something positive in the students (not just a somewhat mechanical critical skill or a historical overview of what many other philosophers have thought before us)? what would be an ideal result of a class or a series of classes of philosophy? skill? body of knowledge? ability to philosophize?
i find that teaching, for example, Plato is not always a great experience for me (vis-a-vis reading Plato myself) precisely because students are not interested in such intricate arguments but are concerned with larger issues such as happiness or justice or success or love etc. and find Socrates to be a waste of time because of his essentially representative role as a “philosopher” – “that is all philosophers do, sit around talking to people and disturbing them with questions – maybe it was a good idea for Athenians to kill Socrates, he was corrupting the youth, wasn’t he?”
February 5, 2013 at 1:26 am
Reblogged this on Sri Aurobindian Ontology.