Increasingly I am coming to feel that Continental social and political theory– especially in its French inflection coming out of the Althusserian, Foucaultian, Lacanian, and structuralist schools –woefully simplifies the social and therefore is led to ask the wrong sorts of questions where questions of political change is concerned. The problem here is that these theories are often so abstract, in the Hegelian sense, that they end up with overly simplistic schema that then make any change seem like it is either an all or nothing proposition, or in the worst cases impossible and hopeless altogether. This point can be made clearly with reference to Althusser’s famous essay “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus“. In reading Althusser’s essay, we get the impression that the individual, the social subject, is completely formed by the ideological state apparatus to such a degree that his thoughts, beliefs, bodily attitudes, and so on are simply iterations of that social structure. As Althusser writes,
Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed with an ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus. It therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideology existing in a material ideological apparatus, describing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief.
Although their theoretical positions are very different, similar observations could be made about Foucault’s conceptions of power and subjectivization, Bourdieu’s conceptions of power and habitus, and even Lacan’s conception of the agency of the signifier (during his middle period, at any rate). It is clear that if we accept this thesis, issues of social and political change become extremely problematic and we immediately find ourselves in a nearly impossible situation. On the one hand, if change takes place, it takes place through agents. On the other hand, agents themselves, according to Althusser, are simply products or iterations of social formations or the ISA’s. As a result, any change that a group of agents attempts to produce is itself already predelineated by the social structure such that it is no real change at all. The consequence of this conception of how agents are individuated and social formations is that we have to engage in all sorts of theoretical contortions to explain how change might be possible. No doubt it is for this reason that the Lacanian conception of the subject as a sort of void or lack in the symbolic chain has become so attractive, or that thinkers like Badiou have had to imagine an event, a rupture, to explain how any sort of change takes place.
Read on!
At the heart of what I will call the “Althusserian model”, is the old Aristotlean conception of individuation based on the distinction between form and matter. While Althusser’s social structures are historical in the sense that they come to be and pass away and are thus unlike Aristotle’s forms which are eternal and unchanging, social structure is nonetheless conceived as forms imposed on passive matters, giving these passive matters their particular form or structure. The passive matters in question, of course, are human individuals. I am formed by social structures tout court and without remainder. In response to this conception– and I realize that I am unfairly simplifying matters –we should ask if this is an accurate conception of either agency or the social. Does not Althusser and other structuralist inspired Marxists severely simplify both social dynamics and the social itself? When Badiou speaks of the “state of the situation” “counting-multiplicities as one”, has he not severely simplified how the social is in fact organized, creating the illusion that there’s a monolithic structure at work in social formations? Do not Lacanians and Zizekians severely simplify the social by reading all social phenomena through the lens of the symbolic and formations of sovereignity (Lacan’s masculine sexuation)? Perhaps, in these simplifications, we create the very problems we’re trying to solve and end up tilting against monsters of our own creation.
Given that questions of change are today the central question of Continental social and political philosophy, I am stunned that most social and political thinkers have not paid more attention to evolutionary theory. Indeed, it is not unusual to find Lacanians disparagingly rejecting evolutionary theory, claiming to be “creationist”, and denouncing evolutionary theory for being teleological and premised on harmonious relations with the world, thereby revealing their tremendous and shocking ignorance of what evolutionary thought actually argues (Alexandre Leupin and more recently A. Kiarina come to mind). No doubt this hostility, in part, is probably motivated by a superior and arrogant hostility (phobia?) many Continental philosophers have towards all things pertaining to the natural sciences (there seems to be a similar and unwarranted rejection of neurology and cognitive psychology, closing ourselves off to vast bodies of findings, coupled with a deep hostility towards hard sciences like physics). Often this hostility is motivated by well-founded political concerns (in the case of neurology and cognitive psychology worries over the medicalization of mental disorders), and perhaps the influence of Heidegger’s famous meditations on technology. On the other hand, it is likely that there is a well founded suspicion of biology and evolutionary science due to inflated claims coming out of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and, of course, theses surrounding natural selection (with the way in which Social Darwinism odiously picked up and distorted Darwin’s thought).
I certainly have no wish to “biologize” social and political thought or adopt a socio-biological standpoint. Nor am I making a case for applying the principles of natural selection to social formations. Rather, what interests me about evolutionary theory is that it provides a robust and well developed theory of change which might provide fertile analogies for thinking social formations. Moreover, evolutionary theory might also provide far more nuanced ways of thinking about social formations, allowing us to side-step crude oppositions between agents and social structures premised on an implicit opposition between form and matter. In his brilliant (and lengthy) Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Stephen J. Gould provides a sorting of the different levels at which natural selection takes place that I believe provides useful analogies for thinking the nature of the social. There Gould remarks that,
Selectionist mechanics, in the most abstract and general formulation, work by interaction of individuals and environments (broadly construed to include all biotic and abiotic elements), such that some individuals secure differential reproductive success as a consequence of higher fitness conferred by some of their distinctive features, leading to differential plurifaction of individuals with these features (relative to other individuals with contrasting features), thus gradually transforming the population in adaptive ways. But the logic of this statement implies that organisms cannot be the only biological entities that manifest the requisite properties of Darwinian individuality– properties that include both vernacular criteria (definite birth and death points, sufficient stability during a lifetime, to distinguish true entities from unboundable segments of continua), and more
specifically Darwinian criteria (production of daughters, and inheritance of parental traits by daughters). In particular, by these criteria species must be construed not only as classes (as traditionally conceived), but also as distinct historical entities acting as good Darwinian individuals– and therefore potentially subject to selection. In fact, a full genealogical hierarchy of inclusion– with rising levels of genes, cell lineages, organisms, demes, species and clades –features clearly definable Darwinian individuals, subject to processes of selection, at each level, thus validating (in logic and theory, but not necessarily in potency of actual practice in nature) an extension and reformulation of Darwin’s exclusively organismal theory into a fully hierarchical theory of selection.”
(Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, 71-72).
Now what I find interesting in this passage is Gould’s postulation of different levels at which natural selection occurs, each with their own immanent organization. According to Gould, the various processes by which evolutionary change take place occur not only at the level of the individual organism– many variants of evolutionary theory are “organism-centric” in the sense that they take organisms as the basic units of selection –but rather selection processes take place at a variety of levels, including genes, cells, organisms, demes (local populations of organisms of one species), species, and clades (taxonomic groups sharing a common ancestor). Gould proposes to treat all of these levels as individuals, with a history, functioning as a constellation.
To draw the parallel to Althusser and similarly minded theorists– emphasizing once again that I am not seeking to apply natural selection to social formations, but to think the organization and levels of social formations –where the Althusserian form/matter social model postulates two thing (social structure and individuals), where one thing, the social formation, hierarchically imposes form on another (individuals), Gould’s model envisions a number of different levels in which distinct processes take place. As Gould goes on to say, “…[A]djacent levels my interact in the full range of conceivable ways– in synergy, orthogonally, or in opposition” (73). That is, among the different levels processes taking place can reinforce one another, they can be independent of one another, or they can be in conflict or opposition with one another. Were such a nuanced and multi-leveled conception of the biological carried over into social theory, we would no longer engage in endless hand-wringing as to whether or not agency is possible, nor would we need to postulate theoretical monsters like the Lacanian subject or subjects of truth-procedures. If such moves would no longer be necessary, then this is because we would no longer postulate hierarchical and hegemonic relations among the various strata or levels of social formations. Instead, we would engage in an analysis of these various levels and strata, examining the relations of feedback (positive and negative) that function within them, their relations of synergy, orthogonality, and antagonism, and the various potentials that inhabit these relations. Here we would need to look at the variety of different social formations from individuals, to small associations like groups (the blog collective for instance), to larger groupings and institutions, to global interrelations, treating none of these as hegemonizing all the others, but instead discerning their varying temporalities, organizations, inter-relations, points of antagonism, and so on. This, I think, is far closer to Marx’s own vision– or at least the spirit of his analyses in texts like Grundrisse and Capital. Neo-Marxism, it seems, has abjured any empiricism, instead adopting theoretical a prioris that ignore situations. The entire constellation of questions and problems would change, and we would no longer employ abstract reifications like “structure” or “capitalism” (“structure does x”, “structure is x”, “capitalism does x”, “capitalism is x”), instead approaching structure as dynamic and ever changing structure like an ecosystem, and capitalism as a heterogeneous multiplicity with a variety of different levels, often at odds with itself, spinning off in a variety of different directions, calling for nuanced and local analyses and strategies. That, to me, is a breath of fresh air with respect to a number of debates that strike me as, I hate to say, academic.
March 12, 2008 at 12:57 am
[…] remain slow for a bit. I did want to point to a very nice recent post over at Larval Subjects, on “Social Multiplicities and Agency”. This post continues Sinthome’s recent reflections on the problem of how to thematise agency, […]
March 12, 2008 at 9:00 am
I think E.P. Thompson’s critique of Althusser in The Poverty of Theory (1978) hangs in the air here — and rightly so. It is still a wholly relevant account: empirical, local and humanistic (and I know that that is a bogey word!)
With regard to evolutionary theory highlighting the possible ways that change can occur, I’m with you (again) that this has wrongly been ignored by many thinkers. The work of Chris Knight (“Blood Relations: Menstruation and the Origins of Culture”) should be flagged-up here. Knight argues that we became human via a revolutionary sex strike … you’ll learn more from http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org
March 12, 2008 at 11:24 am
Hi there, very interesting post. I think you may be tiptoeing up to the subject a bit timidly when you should, in my opinion, just dive in and embrace it. You say:
“I certainly have no wish to “biologize” social and political thought or adopt a socio-biological standpoint.”
Well, why not? Give it a try, see what it’s like. Take it as far as it goes. You quote Gould, like many with left sympathies, but although Gould is wonderful in so many ways, I think he and his fellow travellers have had a poisonous intellectual influence. Far better, I think, to embrace the orthodoxy, ie, “reductionist” selfish-gene Darwinism. I’m currently reading Steven Pinker’s “The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature”, and I’m more convinced of this than ever. True, Pinker gets out of his depth when discussing politics and Marx; he contradicts himself; and he’s got all the blindspots you’d expect from a Western, bourgeois liberal. But on the science and all the broad issues, he’s more right than wrong.
So I agree with you that if we want to think about social and political change, then we need evolutionary theory and cognitive science and so on. But you need the hardcore stuff from Pinker and Dawkins, not the wet left polemics of Gould et al.
March 12, 2008 at 12:55 pm
Stuart, I have no dog in the fight between the reductionists and those who discern a variety of different mechanisms for evolution on way or another. The reason that I’m opposed to biologizing social and political thought is because I believe that the social has its own distinct form of organization that can’t be reduced to the biological. Just as biochemistry can’t be reduced to chemistry, but describes distinct processes and relations, similarly social phenomena embody distinct relations, organizations, and processes. Thus, while it is indeed true that the social supervenes on the biological it can’t be explained in terms of the biological.
March 12, 2008 at 2:34 pm
I used to agree with you, now I’m not so sure. Societies and social processes are made up of flesh and blood individuals. If it’s legitimate to study, say, chimpanzee society and politics using sociobiological methods (eg, behavioural ecology), why not humans? If there is something special about human society as opposed to that of chimpanzees (and there surely is!), then how is this to be explained in sociobiological terms? Indeed, given your concern in this post, in evolutionary terms?
March 12, 2008 at 3:00 pm
As I said, the social supervenes on the biological without being explainable in terms of it. This doesn’t mean that the biological has no influence or role to play. Again, attend to the relationship between Organic Chemistry and Chemistry. The Organic Chemist does not reject Chemistry or say that it is of no relevance, but rather claims that the domain of the Organic has distinct principles that can’t be explained in terms of standard chemistry. Organic phenomena need to be studied in their own terms. At some point socio-biology might have something to contribute to the social sciences, but at present socio-biological work is woefully inadequate because most socio-biologists have zero knowledge of sociology, anthropology, economics, etc. As such, their own work tends to be riddled with their own social prejudices and blind spots and is unaware of precisely the things that need to be explained. As an added caveat, this post was not about evolution, nor was it an attempt to import biology or evolution into the social sciences. This post, rather, made a call for a more nuanced understanding of social relations, allowing for a variety of different levels and feedback relations, and drew a metaphor from evolutionary theory to illustrate the point by making reference to the different levels that biologists talk about with respect to life. One of the central questions that would emerge from what I’m talking about here would be “what constitutes a unit in the social sciences”. Here I’m inclined to go with Luhmann and argue that societies are not composed of “flesh and blood individuals“, but communications. These communications, of course, supervene on individuals but are distinct from them (just as genes supervene on proteins and other elements, but are not identical to them and make up the object of genetic studies).
March 12, 2008 at 3:19 pm
Interesting exchange, but isn’t it a mistake to lump Bourdieu in with Althusser? Here is an excerpt from an interview that he gave.
Kevin Ovenden: How do your sociological ideas influence your political stance? You developed your ideas when structuralism was the main influence on French intellectuals.
Bourdieu: I was not a structuralist. That approach saw the world as composed of structures which strictly determine the way people act. There was no scope for human agency. As the structuralist Marxist Louis Althusser said in the 1960s, human beings were merely the ‘unconscious bearers of objective structures’. The results of my anthropological work in Algeria in the 1950s did not fit into this structuralist framework.
Of course people are structured by society. They are not, as free market theory holds, isolated individuals each deciding a course of action by making individual economic calculations. I developed the concept of ‘habitus’ to incorporate the objective structures of society and the subjective role of agents within it.
The habitus is a set of dispositions, reflexes and forms of behaviour people acquire through acting in society. It reflects the different positions people have in society, for example, whether they are brought up in a middle class environment or in a working class suburb.
It is part of how society reproduces itself. But there is also change. Conflict is built into society. People can find that their expectations and ways of living are suddenly out of step with the new social position they find themselves in. This is happening in France today. Then the question of social agency and political intervention becomes very important.
March 12, 2008 at 3:58 pm
I’m pretty sure that chemistry, organic chemistry and biochemistry all work on the same principles, but I know what you mean: we can’t explain World War I in terms of quarks and protons. Fine. I also agree that at least some work in sociobiology is inadequate because it fails to engage with sociology and anthropology. (This is changing however. See ‘The Evolution of Culture’, eds Robin Dunbar, Chris Knight and Camilla Power, Edinburgh University Press.)
I don’t know anything about Luhmann or what his or her point is, but communication takes place between flesh and blood individuals, and is also the subject matter of behavioural ecology. I understand that your post was not about bringing all this in to the social sciences. My point was merely that you should! Or that in my opinion it’s worth pursuing if you’re interested.
All the best, Stuart
March 12, 2008 at 3:59 pm
K, Thanks for this. I agree that Bourdieu fares much better than Althusser and Foucault (I’m not certain whether Foucault is entirely guilty here either). As I understand it, Bourdieu sees the relationship between structure and agency as one of feedback, where agents simultaneously produce structre and are influenced/produced by structure. As such, structure isn’t strictly determinative for him. This is much closer to my own view.
March 12, 2008 at 4:02 pm
Stuart, I would agree that a lot of social science has been reactionary when it comes to discussing these things at all, I just think socio-biology ends up going hog wild in the other direction. Luhmann argues that communication only takes place in relation to communications such that individuals are outside of communications. This is a strange thesis on the surface of things, but he gives very compelling arguments (which I won’t get into here) for it.
March 12, 2008 at 4:07 pm
Well, I shall just have to check him out at some point. Thanks for this fascinating intro to your blog, I shall be reading regularly in future.
March 12, 2008 at 5:17 pm
[…] of Rough Theory has been kind enough to plug my recent post “Social Assemblages and Agency“. A while back I wrote a rather whimsical post entitled “Of Cooking, Mixtures, and […]
March 13, 2008 at 2:39 pm
Very interesting post– for me the most provocative part is the way you link the layers of the borrowed evolutionary ‘structure’ to Marx’s own thought. I very much agree with you here– the whole post, I was thinking that this sounded like a nice Marx/Gramsci corrective to Althusser.
I too wonder about Bourdieu here. He’s very evidently trying to avoid structuralism and post-structuralism (if those can be presented as two distinct poles). I wonder if his deployment of habitus becomes a bit more ammenable to you if we consider it as a different kind of concept than, say, Althursser’s ISA’s. Habitus, despite some of the diagramming in Logic of Practice, never seemed to me to be a very schematic concept– and not as ‘aprioristic’ as the concepts you rightly take issue with. It seems more like a shorthand for the product of ‘structuring and structured structures’– the operations of feedback and cocreation mentioned in the post above– and , at the same time, a flag marking the social theorist’s reflexive awareness of her epistemic position. Whereas ISA’s *exist*– and can be taken over, as sites and stakes of politics– habitus is always at least partly the theorist’s way of talking about processes in a social world that is ‘also will and representation,’ in conjunction with her own theoretical imposition on that world.
So, if ISA’s are ideological material that present themselves as anything but ideological (thus the critical effect of naming them as such), it seems that habitus is admittedly ideological, while emphasizing the material, political importance of ideological stuctures (esp in Bourdieu’s reflections on the ‘theory effect’). I wonder if thinking of habitus this way makes it more compatible with the levels you’re borrowing from evolutionary theory; it seems to me that they are concepts of a similar order– descriptions of the social world that admit that change occurs, not only within the phenomena described, but also through the descriptions imposed upon it.
March 13, 2008 at 6:14 pm
Matt, Thanks for this, these are great observations. I have a bit of a love/hate relationship with Bourdieu for no good reason (I get frustrated with his writing, which I often find to be very dry… A testament to his precision and carefulness). Maybe one way of thinking about the diagrams in the Logic is as maps of vectors rather than structures. That is, what he’s mapping here are movements and interactions rather than fixed blueprints. These vector fields would have to be produced and reproduced. In the context of these discussions, I’m particularly interested in how new niches or group relations emerge and diverge within fields of established practices and relations.
March 13, 2008 at 11:32 pm
That sounds like a great way to view the Logic. (By the way, since the writing *is* dry, you can always check out the… movie: Sociology is a Martial Art).
Your interest in the emergence of new relations, within an established field, connects well with my own interests (in political philosophy). I’m glad I stumbled on your blog– I’ll keep reading!
March 29, 2008 at 7:38 am
This post and the ideas in it are interesting enough, and I will go through and read all of it. It’s odd that it should have worked out this way, but I suspect that it is through the processes of Modernist rigour that we have mechanistically accounted for all parts in the machinery of society, thus that the principle of agency has become a perplexing question of much skeptical prevarication.
This problem seems to relate to a deeper issue or metaphilosophical issue that pertains to how ideologies of rationalism create and develop their own consequences of irrationalism. Paradoxically, the allowance of a certain amount of irrationalism within the machine of “society” might actually serve to make it more rational. Whereas “agency” may be hardpressed to do that job, especially since we don’t know where it makes its entrance or its exit from the exactitude of the machine, I have found lately, in my study of shamanism, that the capacity to dream might be the peculiar aspect that can introduce a measure of the irrational that can disrupt the practical determinism of the machine.
On the other hand, the machine is strong because we actually believe in its determinism, and dismiss the dreams we have as being extraneous to “reality”. First world cultures thus perpetuate themselves at a relatively impoverished level, compared to the vitality that is regularly injected into third world cultures, by their citizens, through their capacity to make much of a dream.