March 12, 2008
Chemistry, Cooking, and Non-Linear Causality
Posted by larvalsubjects under Abstraction, Assemblages, Immanence, Overdetermination, Populations, Rough Theory, problemsN.Pepperell of Rough Theory has been kind enough to plug my recent post “Social Assemblages and Agency“. A while back I wrote a rather whimsical post entitled “Of Cooking, Mixtures, and Milieus“. While the post might have been whimsical in tone– drawing on anecdotes from cooking and examples from Seinfeld –the point I was trying to make was a serious one about the nature of causality in relation to social formation. That is, there seems to be a tendency to adopt top-down models of causality when thinking about social phenomena, such that we are led to think one cause hegemonically dominating the social space. Whether we posit signifiers as determining social relations, the sovereign as determining social relations (a recent turn I find particularly irritating as, following Spinoza and Hegel, there is no such thing as a sovereign that doesn’t draw his power from the consent of the multitudes), language, structure, or more recently the biological, we posit a unilateral causality where one term serves as the explanation for the rest. This, of course, is the essence of metaphysics: to treat a part of the whole as explaining the whole.
Casting about for metaphors to interrupt this pattern of thought, I seized on cooking and chemistry:
If cooking is instructive for the social theorist, then this is because cooking teaches us to think in terms of mixtures, processes, intensive transformations, intensities, and irreversible processes. Tomato, garlic, cumin, and olive oil are not the same after they are mixed and heated. Rather, a qualitative transformation takes place… A transformation that is irreversible. Cooking is chemistry, rather than physics. Where, in classical physics we are enjoined to think atoms impacting one another in relations of force such that the atoms nonetheless retains its identity, changing only in velocity, chemistry leads us to think mixtures, temperatures, pressures, etc., that lead to qualitative transformations of the elements involved. The garlic is not the same after it is cooked and mixed. Nor can I return the garlic to its previous uncooked state. Rather, it has undergoing a qualitative transformation that now has different potentialities. For instance, if I roast garlic in tinfoil and olive oil in the oven, I can now spread it on a nice loaf of sour dough bread like butter, whereas before this would not have been possible. Under these conditions, the flavor becomes sweet, where before it was pungent.
Cooking, chemistry, requires us to think a milieu of individuation where a milieu of individuation is to be understood as the relation something entertains to other things in the world such that it would not be that thing without these other things. If you enjoy wine then you know that where the wine comes from and the year the wine was made make a tremendous difference as to what the wine is. Wine, wine grapes, always emerge in a milieu of individuation defined by the weather, the soil conditions, other plants, animals, and insects in the region and so on. Wine from one and the same vinyard can be radically different from one year to the next. The same is the case with cheese. Each individual entity is itself attached to a world, a local morphogenetic field, through which it produces itself as an ongoing process by interacting with that world.
In cooking or chemistry there is no one thing that causes the rest. Rather, we instead have to think relations of feedback and interaction where all the elements or ingredients interact. This entails that there will not be a “one size fits all” sort of explanation for social phenomena. Rather, following Freud, we might instead talk of “overdetermination”. Of course, this approach to thinking the social and political will cause some to recoil as the complexity of our object is vastly complicated. Social and political philosophers strike me as liking simple answers and schematizations of their objects (I think actual social scientists often fare much better and are much less reductive). On the other hand, an approach that emphasizes interaction at multiple levels, multiple levels of non-linear causation, and complexity might also undermine some of the pessimism (that sometimes seems almost celebratory in tone) that sometimes seems to haunt social and political philosophy (the all or nothing attitude that asks empty questions like “how do we overcome capitalism” and then finds itself impotent when it comes to doing anything at all). That is, such a view might allow us to diagnose false problems that result from overly schematic and simplified conceptions of the social. At any rate, N.Pepperell has recently written a couple of very nice posts on Diane Elson’s work, who appears to be thinking in a similar groove (here and here). Well worth the read!

March 12, 2008 at 8:26 pm
Again (as I think I commented a long time ago) I would see beauty, art and aesthetics as an even more complex and potentially appropriate framework for understanding change and formation. Are you aware of any social philosophies that this in to account? Is it rejected because it tends to evade controls and repetition? Sorry for such a thin response but I thought it should be noted.
March 12, 2008 at 8:44 pm
David, it’s difficult to answer your question without a more detailed specification of just what you have in mind. Both Deleuze and Whitehead see being in aesthetic or artistic terms as creations or inventions. This is one of the key claims of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, which proposes to united the two sundered halves of the aesthetic. Whitehead sees beauty as a central principle in the production of beings. Shaviro has done truly outstanding (and humbling) work on the intersection of Deleuze and Whitehead which you can find over at The Pinocchio Theory. You might find his article entitled “The Wrenching Duality of the Aesthetic” especially interesting in this connection. These can be found here:
http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/articles.html
Remember, one of the key issues at work in these questions is that of immanence. That is, how are we able to think the emergence of order without presupposing design or a maker. This is why I hesitate in response to your remarks about aesthetics (Kant famously argued that Beauty is a trace of design in nature in the Critique of Judgment). For Deleuze, art is to be thought on the side of production, but without a centralized designer be it God or man. Deleuze is thoroughly Darwinian, in this sense, not because he accepts natural selection as the central mechanism, but because like Darwin he thinks the emergence of forms and order without any form or design preceding these forms and organization. The forms of life, existence, society, art, etc., are thus creations in a quasi-artistic or aesthetic sense. I’ve discussed this quite a bit on the blog in relation to Deleuze.
March 12, 2008 at 8:50 pm
Sorry this will be brief again. I will certainly need to be reading more broadly on the relationship between aesthetics and immanence. However, when I read a phrase like, For Deleuze, art is to be thought on the side of production I can’t help but think that the use of aesthetics in the realm of immanence always impoverishes the actual testimony of artists. And I wonder if because the primary question is that of immanence then aesthetics must be in some way excluded or at least castrated. Sorry, I know I am not offering anything substantive here.
March 12, 2008 at 9:17 pm
In what way does the use of aesthetics in the realm of immanence impoverish the actual testimony of artists? It’s very difficult to comment one way or another if you don’t explain what this testimony is, what you take immanence to be, and how you see it impoverishing artists.
March 13, 2008 at 11:52 am
First, with respect to immanence I admit upfront that I am on a steep learning curve and I am trying to use it in the sense that you and NP have tended to use it (recognizing the nuances within your usages). I suppose I am speaking of ontological immanence or just plain materialism (are they close to the same thing?). I see the testimony of artists as referring to both their creations and to their own direct commentary as to the nature of beauty. I am sure there are several ‘naturalist’ artists (artists that hold nature to be the supreme reality) though I am not sure they would hold an articulation of reality in the way I often see developed here. What I mean is that there remains the intuitive, the mysterious and the spiritual in encountering aspects of reality to which we must submit (or at least contemplate) without being able to translate into theoretical language.
And so when I hear aesthetics being employed to explore and explain an immanent social reality I tend to feel that the actual nature of beauty is somehow being restrained.
As I write this I am beginning to see that likely my basis for critique is unjustified. There are of course intuitive atheistic artists who would like posit some sort of mystery or ’spirit’ to reality. They are simply not engaging the world through the means being discussed here. I think that speaking of strict materialism in which all of reality is ultimately passive before human scrutiny would still be fair game for my critique. And this is how I see your analogy from cooking and chemistry. We may be able to discern the various recipes and ingredients but we cannot fully explain the creative moments of the chef.
Oh and as a pastor I marvel at the type of students you get. Just about any professor at any small Christian college in Canada would be just as frustrated with your below experience (well certainly not all but you would be surprised at how many). Texas seems like such a mythological netherland to me! :)
March 13, 2008 at 12:29 pm
Doing some superficial surfing across the web it seems as though the issue of art and atheism is an active one on both sides of the fence (way too much alliteration there). There appear to be a limited number of ‘recognized’ visual artists (see the meager representation at the bottom here [could that perhaps be blamed on the taste of audience?]) but of course a broad range of authors. Kafka’s Metamorphosis comes to mind in this discussion. I have picked up a cheap copy of Camus’ Plague that I have not read. Do these authors work broadly within the type of immanent description that you are attempting? If not where would you look to for artists/creative writers that engage reality in a similar manner?
March 13, 2008 at 5:57 pm
If I am following your observations correctly, your concern seems to be that immanence somehow portrays art as being about nothing but matter and nature:
The issue of what a work of art is about is distinct from the issue of immanence. Immanence is an ontological thesis about what is and is not, and thus has consequences for what sorts of explanations are legitimate and illegitimate. In very crude terms, immanence would be the thesis that nothing is caused by beings that are not of this world. This thesis would thus exclude certain sorts of explanations: Platonic forms, anything supernatural, anything pertaining to a transcendent God outside of its creations (one could, like Spinoza or Whitehead advocate that God and nature are identical and remain within the framework of immanence, and so on).
Now, when we examine the world we see that there are many people who believe in the supernatural, the divine, various forms of God, etc., and also people who describe a variety of spiritual experiences so this would be something that the person advocating immanence would need to explain. For the person advocating immanence, what sort of explanation would be illegitimate? Any explanation positing that the person has somehow encountered or experienced God. What sort of explanation would be legitimate? Any sort of psychological, sociological, or neurological explanation that shows how these beliefs and experiences come to be. Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents provides a good example of an explanation of religious experience (what he calls the “oceanic feeling”) based on carry overs from childhood development. That is, Freud seeks to explain the psychological mechanisms by which this experience is produced. Thus, he does not deny that people have these experiences– though he confesses he’s never had anything like these experiences –but rather attempts to give a developmental account of the mechanisms by which these experiences are produced. The strategy here would be no different than the attempt to explain a paranoid delusion as in the case of someone like Judge Schreber. Freud doesn’t deny that Judge Schreber experiences all the strange things he claims to experience– http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Paul_Schreber –but attempts to explain the psychological genesis of these experiences.
Nothing about immanence requires artists or anyone else to be an atheists. Artists believes all sorts of things and give all sorts of explanations of their work. People believe all sorts of things and give all sorts of explanations for the world. These beliefs and experiences are things that exist, things that happen, and are genuine events in the world. Even fiction is something that is real in the sense that it’s written right there in a novel. The point is how we explain the mechanisms by which they come to be… Are they things that truly reflect some sort of supernatural or divine encounter, or are they results of purely immanent and materialist processes? A materialist is simply someone who argues that all things are the result of material causes and processes.
May 7, 2008 at 5:04 pm
cooking is very scienctificful, even though people may not think it is.