Ian Bogost has a post up commenting on the relationship between his own work and speculative realism. He proposes a “pragmatic” speculative realism. I think this is one of those cases where all of the good words are already taken. Just as “constructivism” is a perfectly marvelous word that has been all but destroyed by the social constructivists, pragmatism is a perfectly good Greek word for “things” (pragma, pragmata) that has been hijacked by the pragmatists. This is not, of course, to say that there aren’t all sorts of riches to be found among the pragmatists (I’m especially fond of Peirce and Dewey, and Jame’s two volumes on psychology are classics).
Rumor has it that Bogost has also floated the possibility of designing a metaphysics or ontology video game. I think this is an absolutely brilliant idea and would definitely be on board to assist with ideas should someone take it up. It would be terrific to see, as Graham recently put it, such a tool that would genuinely assist in philosophical thought– a sort of simulator not unlike a cross between SimEarth and Myst –that could function as a “thought experiment generator” writ large, creating wild new universes. Really this is one of the most brilliant ideas I’ve ever heard and could potentially be a real innovation in how theory is done. Simulated modeling is, of course, common practice in evolutionary biology, epidemiology, complexity science, chaos science, meteorology, etc. It would be intriguing to see whether it could not similarly be put to work in the humanities.
In addition to Bogost’s post on pragmatic speculative realism, a discussion has erupted about the possible relationship between object-oriented philosophy and object-oriented programming. Thus, over at Bogost’s blog we find this post, while over at Harman’s blog we find these posts (here and here). In my view, the fact that there exists something like “object-oriented programming” is one of those happy coincidences that allows for all sorts of productive sparks and cross-overs. Orchid meet wasp!
Speaking of Graham, he’s back from his whirlwind world tour and is, in his usual frenetic fashion, writing up a storm (really, when does this guy sleep?). A couple of points here. First, while it’s obviously clear that Harman loves travel, it’s worth noting that what he is doing is important. Philosophy does not simply reside in ideas, but is also a material activism. In other words, ideas do not simply persuade by the value of the arguments, but require material work and a labor of seeding the world with their presence. Those who do not present their ideas, who do not render them available, who do not link, lose. Period. In this respect, Harman is a phenomenon. Indeed, one might even characterize him as homo networkus, as he seems to be all over the globe at once, presenting his ideas, forming relations, publishing, and blogging. Regardless of whether or not one agrees with his ontology, this has effects. Indeed, one wins a debate not simply by bringing others to their position, but simply by creating an environment where others begin to respond pro or con. In other words, shifts in discourse are governed as much by opposition as by the formation of consensus.
Second, I wonder how we are to classify Harman’s work. Is Harman an American philosopher? Is he a Middle Eastern philosopher? Santayana– a tremendously underrated and unjustly ignored philosopher –was, of course, a European immigrant, but is classified as an American philosopher. Should we classify Graham as a Middle Eastern thinker? I don’t know. In certain respects this would be an affront to our other Iranian rising star, Reza Negarestani. On the other hand, we enter into becomings by falling into different milieus of individuation, and that is certainly what is going on with Harman. It would also be nice to see a mainstream– i.e., non-historiographical –expansion of the field of philosophical discourse, more centrally including Middle Eastern thought. After all, it helped to kick off the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and continues to be a vital force in the present. Always define structures by that which escapes them or their tendencies of becoming.
At any rate, Graham has a particularly interesting post up on what he calls “ontography”… A term which I am kicking myself for for not thinking up myself. I suppose I’ll have to oppose my “onticology” to Graham’s “ontography” (why does that sound like a line from Tarantino’s Kill Bill Vol. II?). In addition to this, he has a couple of great posts up dissecting standard rhetorical maneuvers of Heideggerians (here and here). I confess I’m sympathetic to Paul Ennis’ position… One of the more frustrating things about academia is the manner in which debates about ideas tend to get converted into debates about figures. Focus on the issues folks! Finally, Harman has been writing a whole slew of posts on philosophical composition. For those who are either anxious grad students or suffering from writers block, read this advice!
Finally, last but not least, my dear friend Melanie has a brilliant post up responding to my post “Realism and Speculative Realism“. Mel proposes an object-oriented, self-reflexive, realist account of literary production as a material object that also somehow creates meaning. As she puts it,
What I find most appealing here is your attempt to categorize his work as a sort of literary example of speculative realism: Truly, all literary production is a hybrid of object and network in itself. If one applies your central thesis of onticology, “There is no difference that does not make a difference.” (Setting aside my constant urge to poke at and tease out the compelling double-negative at the core of your philosophical construction for the moment–grin), the literary production, Baudrillard’s “book-object”, is an object in circulation in social and cultural networks–it’s very physical presence like a stone in a river, able to change the nature of those networks. Yet also, as Barthes argued, it is a holographic textual network in itself, intertextually linked beyond its own boundaries and physical covers.
When I shift from analyzing fiction to writing fiction, I’m always struck by how the fundamental building block of any literary creation–metaphor–is in its simplest description the use of objects to convey some nebulous and fleeting experience of human consciousness. What is it about the well-turned metaphor that at once feels so familiar, yet is in actuality so alien when its mechanics are further unpacked? Here we have a description of a mute object, separate from both the consciousness of the writer and the reader, the sender and the receiver, and yet it comes alive, frankensteined to life by the writer to make an idiosyncratic experience somehow a shared and recognizable experience. (Not unlike Marcus’ vacuum cleaner orgasmically revving to life.) I often find myself battling a sort of autistic feeling when I write fiction, overwhelmed by the “thingness of things,” especially words on the page. It always amazes how any communication takes place at all via metaphor. We see this in the Marcus quote, where household appliances can somehow express the failure of being at once a societal placeholder and an individual; in this case, the fundamental failure of any individual to fully and successfully inhabit the concept, “wife”.
I find that William Burroughs’ cut-ups and Kathy Acker’s prose, or even Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, all underscore similar questions as Marcus: What are all these strange textual objects, these chunks of other texts, that somehow network themselves into the fleeting and contrived wholeness of “a literary work”? How do they form any sort of meaning? Also, what is this strange chimera, the literary narrator? Acker’s prose in particular delights in parasitically inhabiting the uber-texts of patriarchal culture and deconstructing, in a Derridean sense, the singularities and lacunae in culturally familiar texts, as well as received assumptions surrounding the false normativity of psychological narration. Similar to Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons or the OuLiPo poets’ mathematical functions as generators of literary text, these are all works that manage to take cold formulaic structures and render them alive to the reader, at times poignantly so.
The post is far too rich to summarize, so read the rest here. I have to say, Mel drives me up the wall. In the five or six years that I’ve known her she has been a decisive impact on my thought. She introduced me to Latour, Ong, Kittler, Haraway, Ben Marcus, Acker, and countless other thinkers, novelists, and artists. She has brilliant ideas about the relationship between science, technology, information technologies, writing, and art. She constantly challenges my own ideas– often much to my dismay –but usually in a way that is very productive. Yet strangely she thinks she has nothing to say. Oh how I’d like to shake her and tell her to “shut the hell up!” This post, I believe, proves otherwise. Maybe she’ll overcome her ridiculous anxieties and post more or blog more over at her blog. Anyway, give her some love!
Oh, and I could not refrain from more narcissism in this post.
July 17, 2009 at 2:46 am
LS, speaking of video games, you should really check out Spore:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spore_%282008_video_game%29#Gameplay
As it is a mixture between The Sims (except with creatures), Sim-Earth/City, and Civilization. You start with a single cell organism and work (evolve) your creature till you can conquer land, cities, planets, and eventually the universe. But the great thing about it is that the creatures are generative, meaning that if you give them claws or spikes instead of fins or feet, they will become a “naturally” aggressive species.
July 17, 2009 at 2:47 am
Awesome, Nate! Thanks for the reference! I wasted many hours on all three of those games.
July 17, 2009 at 2:52 am
Incidentally, I forgot to tell you I got a beautiful little Acer netbook.
July 17, 2009 at 3:40 am
Thanks for the comments, Levi. I always believed you were forging exciting interconnections here, but it’s affirming to hear that my own input has been quietly involved along the way. As far as my ridiculous anxieties are concerned, what can I say except that not all of us are as adept at being narcissistic cats as you.
Nice shirt, by the way.
July 17, 2009 at 3:52 am
Welcome to the club! I love my Aspire One.
July 17, 2009 at 4:20 am
This one is better. The sexy Texan top smile comes out, the hair looks sleek and the kaka brown is blissfully covered up by the book.
On second thought I am happy you didn’t get the idea to mix the military olive of your blawg with that particular nuance of brown.
July 17, 2009 at 4:25 am
I guess after my prodding over object-oriented p*, it’s my turn to endure the wrath of the terminology stick. I’m aware of the issues, although I don’t think they’re all without merit. The idea of a speculative realism of action has some appeal, and that’s certainly a classically capital-P Pragmatist understanding of the term. These things might quickly devolve, and it’s meant to be a provocation rather than a primary term, in my case. In any case, I couldn’t very well use the word “materialism.” And as I said in my post, I really took to “ontography,” but I’ve been primarily culturing the nascent notion of “alien phenomenology” I discuss in the post.
I guess we’ll see what happens.
July 17, 2009 at 4:36 am
I meant to say something about the hypothetical metaphysics videogame.
Graham and I first talked about this shortly after our very first conversation, so it’s been in the ether for years now. There are many reasons to find this appealing — and also frightening, given the tremendous exercise in concretization necessary to construct a good videogame, one about ideas that are all normally very abstract.
Let me throw out a question. Presuming there were to exist such an artifact, what do we think it would most interestingly and usefully include? Would be best serve as a historical or pedagogical tool, one that might serve as an introduction to ontology? Or would it best serve as an argument (of the sort that I describe in my book Persuasive Games), for example a demonstrative statement-system against correlationism? Or would it best serve as a toolkit, a sandbox for the manipulation of new ideas, such that it might serve as a sort of “Simetaphysics” itself? Or something else entirely?
I’ll probably copy this question back into my blog at some point soon.
July 17, 2009 at 8:13 am
[...] 17, 2009 You’re too kind, Levi. But it’s a very rich [...]
July 17, 2009 at 2:25 pm
One experiment worth checking to think about how to develop those tools you mention might be “emergence architecture” developed at AA in London. The AD (Architectural Design) magazine has published a lot on the topic and was one of the pioneers in pointing out to the potential connections and collaborations between new sciences (non-linear mathematics, molecular biology…etc.) and architecture. By destroying the cult of subject and creator-oriented profession of architecture, emergence architects and their variants strive for enabling computers to generate best possible forms (compatible with the future ecological communities) via complex algorithms, in a process of morphogenesis. Greg Lynn (influenced by Deleuze, amongst others) is another interesting figure in this field, who come both from an architecture and philosophy background.
One reason why I love to think in social sciences “with” architecture is that they constantly have to come to terms with a set of constraints while designing and building; and good architecture becomes almost always a way to transform constraints into opportunities. How to reflect the “souple” and “pliant” in concrete fixed forms? They push the limits of new materials in nature and advanced computer techniques to construct the most supple and fluid buildings.
Thinking with architecture becomes a useful exercise to tackle an intriguing question: how to build the relevant vocabulary and narrative if I talk about a non-linear, complex, uneven processes, about emergent properties in my own empirical research? That is also why I value so much the contributions and debates in this blog which try to go beyond the existing vocabulary of structures, forces…etc.
July 17, 2009 at 2:45 pm
My thoughts:
http://anotherheideggerblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/metaphysics-videogame.html
July 17, 2009 at 3:31 pm
Demet – Okay, that is just way cool. Have you got any links to experiments? Google is really struggling with “emergence architecture”….
July 17, 2009 at 3:41 pm
though the right-hand side of the beard is still missing
July 17, 2009 at 5:25 pm
Sorry, I should have put some links – getting used to blog posting only very recently.
Here is the edited volume on emergence
http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470866888.html
Here is a blog which gives lots of good info and examples about emergence.
http://sneault.blogspot.com/2009/07/emergent-material-methodologies.html
I have a lot of pictures showing the projects and experiments by students at AA -Architectural Association School of Architecture (http://www.aaschool.ac.uk/) in another computer (which we had downloaded from Architectural Design). I ll post them as soon as I have access.
And next time I ll remember to be more accurate in what I am saying. They use emergent technologies, emergence, morphogenetic design but not “emergence architecture” as such. Apparently I made up the term, which is not very … professional.
July 20, 2009 at 2:41 am
Goddamn you’re good looking. Two for two. Would it be too much to ask for your address (again)?
July 20, 2009 at 4:09 am
Joe,
You’re a brat! We all know you’re the good looking Deluzian! Or, at least, the charismatic, happy and truly Nietzschean Deleuzian. I’m looking forward to Salt Lake. What do you think of Deleuze and the Event? We gotta take back Badiou!
July 20, 2009 at 9:22 pm
Salt Lake is going to be great. I’ll switch your title to “Deleuze and the Event” for now. It’s certainly better than “My Life as a Speculative Realist Sex Icon.” If you want to switch back, let me know by Aug. 1. As far as taking back Badiou… do you think it’s possible? I tend to read Deleuze as still critical, and Badiou as resolutely post-critical. What’s your take? Where do you see the infinite in Deleuze, and how does one gain access to it?
July 20, 2009 at 10:22 pm
Hi Joe,
I think the issue of where Deleuze stands vis a vis critical philosophy is vexed. While there can be no doubt that Kant plays a crucial role in Deleuze thought, it is no less true that Spinoza and Leibniz play a central role in his thought as well. I detect nothing like a discourse on finitude in his thought, so it doesn’t seem to me that questions of access are front and center for him (not a surprise given his critique of recognition and truth). Rather, like Whitehead, for Deleuze the central point of emphasis in Deleuze seems to be on synthesis as something creative and productive. I take it that he reads Kant’s thought backwards, starting from the Critique of Judgment where something like creative intuition becomes thinkable and reworking the first Critique in these terms. That said, with Leibniz and Spinoza, Deleuze begins situated in the infinite like a pre-critical or a post-critical philosopher. How we have access to this, according to Deleuze, I really don’t know. In Difference and Givenness I tried to argue that Deleuze tries to show how the whole critical/dogmatic binary breaks down because we can’t even meet the requirements of discussing our own minds or language needed to distinguish the critical from the dogmatic, i.e., claims about the structure of mind are every bit as speculative or dogmatic as those about objects in the world as we don’t have direct access to our minds. As such, restrictions to immanence where immanence is understood as immanence to mind, language, history, etc., are every bit as dogmatic and speculative as pre-critical philosophies.
To my thinking, for Deleuze the real issue is not one of how it is possible to ground our knowledge claims (the critical project), but rather is how creation is possible. Thus, on the one hand, you have the conservative dimension of any organism while on the other you have those lines of flight through which it is becoming. The whole discussion of the encounter in chapter 3 of DR is not designed to account for knowledge, but rather for how it’s possible to depart from established models of recognition and form something new.
I think I mean something more modest when I talk of taking back Badiou. I do not intend to claim that Deleuze is Badioian or that Badiou is really Deleuzian, but rather that there is a Deleuzian theory of the event that is available that could be a strong competitor with Badiou’s theory of the event. Events are something like bifurcation points within a structure where new attractors emerge. The whole idea of “counter-actualization”, I think, promises a strong alternative to Badiou’s account of the event and what that account is trying to do, without falling into the idealist cul-de-sac and anthropocentrism that besets Badiou’s thought. However, I haven’t worked all this out yet.
July 21, 2009 at 4:44 pm
If I were you Mr. Bogost, I would take a look at the fishing game on Jaimie Cloud’s site. That would be the Cloud Institute for Sustainability Education. Her other content there could also be useful and you might be so lucky as to engage her as a consultant collaborator. Skål.
July 21, 2009 at 5:44 pm
Hi Levi,
That’s an interesting argument. I don’t remember it from DG, but I like it (although I’d still put the access question to it!). Here’s what interests me. You say finitude is not a problem for D and that in any case the question of synthesis shifts the center of the debate. I could just as easily say, however, that the very existence of synthesis in the first place is an index of our finitude. And what is the volcanic line which traverses the faculties if not the successive encounter of each faculty with its own limit? Deleuze even says as much with regard to the imagination: its contractile range marks its concrete ‘finitude’. In either case what I think is interesting is that we could go on for a long time pulling quotes, etc.. without really getting anywhere. We have to leave Deleuze’s thought in order to make progress.
I think this is exactly the problem with Deleuze: we constantly confront the problem of dogmatism on two fronts: metaphysical and textual. We can only say that Deleuze begins in the infinite (or that he doesn’t) as though that were not a problem. It’s not something to be questioned. Either you accept it or you don’t. This is no doubt why most arguments in Deleuze studies proceed by virtue of very annoying verbs (which I use religiously): ‘Deleuze says X’ or ‘Deleuze argues’ or ‘Deleuze insists.’ We never know why he says, argues, or insists on X, Y or Z–so we are reduced to a textual dogmatism in addition to an ontological one. These two, of course, are closely related.
But I think it is on this level–that of the almost metaphilosophical nature of the project itself–that we are going to have to decide how we bring Deleuze and Badiou together or apart. Sure, the word ‘event’ appears in both of their works. But say, for the sake of argument, that Deleuze is critical, Badiou post-critical. Can the two concepts of event then even have the possibility of ‘competing’? Would they not function in two entirely different contexts or even in two different domains or regions of being?
Joe
July 21, 2009 at 9:59 pm
Hi Joe,
I draw the argument from Deleuze’s analysis of the eternal return in the first chapter of DR. There Deleuze argues for a cracked subject that is other to itself. From this I draw the conclusion that he doesn’t think mind can be treated as a privileged domain of immanence separated off from the object. Where this idea of a privileged domain of immanence, the core assumption of the critical project is undermined. The subject of the faculties, I think, is difficult. On the one hand, the case can be made that Deleuze shifts back and forth between different ontological registers, sometimes analyzing the structure of experience as in the case of his ethological analyses. On the other hand, I think there’s a marked tendency for Deleuze to ontologize things that we normally treat as belonging strictly to the domain of the psychological. Thus, for example, in his analysis of memory, memory is treated as a dimension of being itself, not as a region of mind. This is not the thesis that minds are and therefore memory must be counted as a dimension of being. Rather, to put the issue starkly, I take Deleuze to be claiming that even if no humans or animals existed, being would still have this dimension of memory. In this regard, my strategy has been to understand the faculties not as dimensions or structures of mind, but as structures of being… Certainly a strange thesis.
In many respects DR is a very strange book. I think where one comes down on these issues, very much depends on whether one focuses on the first two chapters of DR or the last two chapters of DR. If emphasis is placed on chapter 2, then it is likely Deleuze will be seen as developing a new variant of idealism. If the emphasis is placed on chapters 4 and 5, then Deleuze shakes out as a realist. The account of individuation, the pre-individual, multiplicities, the virtual, and intensity is, as I argued back in Reno, designed to account for everything from crystals and gold to minds and social systems. Although there are a whole range of psychological intensive differences such as intense affects like love, hatred, terror, and anxiety, he also emphasizes intensive differences like temperature and pressure. It’s difficult to see how these could be mind dependent. Likewise, he cites atoms and genes as examples of virtual multiplicities in chapter 4. It’s as if DR were not one book but two books.
I agree that Deleuze doesn’t provide much in the way of arguments for his position, suggesting the sort of dogmatism you suggest. However, as I tried to argue in the previous post, is the so-called “critical stance” really as critical as it claims to be? Take the example of Kant. Do we get an argument in Kant that isn’t already circular, reflexively assuming the framework that it sets out to defend? A lot of Kant’s– and “critical” argument in general –resemble the sorts of arguments creationists make: “the eye is too complex to have randomly evolved so it must have resulted from a designer”. “I can’t see how cause and effect judgments are possible based on experience so it must result from the structure of mind.” One issue here would be that of how strong the claims Deleuze is making are. Deleuze is pretty up front about adopting an experimentalist and constructivist approach to philosophy. By contrast, critical projects measure claims before the throne of certainty. Is that a reasonable or desirable measure? Or is it better to explore and experiment with certain concepts and see what new questions they generate and what new research they open. Finally, does it make a difference that the focus is shifted from knowledge to problems and questions?
For me the question isn’t one of bringing Deleuze and Badiou together, but rather of arguing that Deleuze has a more adequate model for theorizing change. Badiou wants a pure rupture that escapes all constraints of the situation. Deleuze, by contrast, is a continuist who seeks a model of change through systematically transforming elements of a particular field of actants. What is interesting about Deleuze’s concept of the event when understood as a singularity or bifurcation point is that it provides the resources for theorizing social and political change as a strategics of pushing particular forms of organization into new basins of attractions.
July 22, 2009 at 3:47 am
Levi,
It’s dangerous to ask you for your adress. Not only do I get pulled into a difficult conversation, but I suddenly find myself playing the conservative role: yes, I absolutely think the critical stance is critical (although I’d argue it is more of a project than an achievement); and further you know as well as I that the kantian subject–and every critical subject after it–was itself already split, so this is nothing new at all and certainly doesn’t bear on the possible priority of the subject. I’ll definitely re-read your pages on the eternal return, but here’s an immediate reply: The question is, to what does the concept ‘eternal return’ apply? I think you have to take DR as a whole. And when you do that it’s not a question of emphasizing this or that chapter but of figuring out how each of the major concepts relate to one another. Eternal return appears in the third passive synthesis (i.e. it is an operation carried out by the faculty of thought). Specifically, it is a transformation of thought after its failed attempt at a synthesis of recognition. At the very last moment of the third synthesis, in the third time of the series, thought raises itself to the eternal return, it becomes the child-player of the ideal game. In other words, eternal return = the ideal synthesis of difference. What is actualization/idividuation if not the return process, the schematism: a dynamism through which the transcendaental ideas produced in the eternal return are applied to the passive subject, making it active/regulating its syntheses so that an object can be produced? So eternal return is a moment sandwiched between the two sides, passive and active, of a fitine subject.
I don’t think rocks imagine, remember and then have problems recognizing. I don’t think hammers confront a split in themselves that cause them to experience the eternal return. Bees might, and hyenas certainly do, but definitely not hammers. Further I don’t think that claiming these faculties/sytheses are ontological structures (as you do brilliantly in DG) in any way means that they aren’t specific to (or productive of) certain types of being and in particular to a transcendental subjectivity (cf. Heidegger, for example).
In terms of the stuff on individuation/actualization, as far as DR is concerned I’m pretty sure Deleuze is clear that he’s using mathematics, biology, and physics metaphroically. For example, it’s not a question of emphasizing intensive differences like temperature and speed as though D were talking about those things in particular. For him ‘intensity’ refers to a certain relation (in particular to a difference established upon two separate series of differences) that thermodynamics helps him think. It’s that relation that he takes in order to describe something that is neither speed nor temperature nor pressure: sensation.
Thus I could say that I agree that Deleuze has a more adequate model for theorizing change, but for an entirely different reason: I’m not totally sold on Badiou yet whereas I find a Deleuzian radicalization of phenomenology closer to convincing.
joe
July 22, 2009 at 4:02 am
Yeah, I guess all I can say is that I don’t think Deleuze is speaking metaphorically, but is genuinely making realist claims. However, I should add that I’m not a Deleuzian or interested in doing commentary on Deleuze. I take from him what I find to be valuable, but that’s it really. I’m not particularly interested in the question of what Deleuze thought he was doing.
July 24, 2009 at 3:01 pm
The Metaphysics Videogame…
Part 1: Why a Videogame?…