Scu of Critical Animal has a really interesting (and amusing) post up about certain forms of argumentation he often encounters in animal rights discussions. As Scu writes:
One of the more peculiar charges made against those advocating for the liberation of animals, particularly those who advocate for animal rights, is that we somehow hate humanity. That our desire for animal welfare, animal emancipation, etc., is based on an animus to humans.
Scu cites some pretty amusing passages from Roudinesco and Gasset, where the former tries to draw a connection between animal rights activists and Hitler’s vegetarianism, suggesting that to support animal rights is to support Nazism (Derrida, to his credit, proceeds to tear Roudinesco to shreds in this interview), and where the latter seems to argue that we properly respect the dignity of animals by hunting them.
I find all this interesting as I often encounter the same sort of argument in response to object-oriented ontology. Somehow decentering humans from the center of being, arguing that humans are among beings, not correlated to each and every being, or arguing that philosophy needs to move beyond its obsessive focus on the human-world gap or relation gets translated in the mind of some critics into the thesis that we should hate humans, that humans are of no importance, or, the claim that I find most baffling, that we’re abolishing humans.
How one arrives from such claims to these conclusions, I do not know. With all due respect to former governor Palin, there just seem to be certain issues or claims such that when people confront or encounter them they become retarded. I often reflect on this when we reach the chapter on emotional fallacies in my critical thinking courses. Here I think the Spinoza of book III of the Ethics is an invaluable guide. It would be a mistake to believe that, in most cases, people fall in to these sorts of fallacies intentionally or out of some sort of conscious malice.
Rather, when passionate attachments that organize a person’s cognition are endangered these distortions of thought seem to arise inevitably of their own accord. Here the situation is not unlike the bending of time and space that occurs in the vicinity of a massive object like the sun. You can’t approach a massive object directly– at least not without very powerful forms of propulsion –because of the manner in which the massive object curves space and time. Rather, these sorts of massive objects can only be approached asymptotically, through a curve. And the case is similar with these sorts of passionate attachments. Any attempt to approach them directly seems to encounter a curvature of thought in the audience that distorts what is being said like a funhouse mirror distorts an image beyond recognition. Thought just falls apart. Thus, at the level of form, not content, there’s no marked difference between Roudinesco’s reaction to animal rights discussions and the reaction of a conservative nationalist to criticism of the policies of his beloved nation. Just as Rudinesco equates the claim that we shouldn’t eat animals with hating people (two totally different and unrelated claims), the nationalist is likely to equate criticism of the French penal colonies with hating France.
Here the passionate attachment, the intensity of the affect, bends the structure of cognition, distorting the space of reasons and grounds, in much the same way that the massive object bends the structure of space and time. While this sort of a theory might help me to understand why thought becomes so distorted in the vicinity of particular issues and claims, I nonetheless find myself baffled as to why people have these sorts of passionate attachments in the first place. That, I think, is the real mystery. Why would a person as intelligent as Roudinesco nonetheless have such a passionate attachment to the idea of humans as being at the center of being, such that any extension of rights to nonhuman entities is seen not simply as sharing and extending rights, but as actively negating human value? As Scu remarks in his post, this line of thought is really no different than that of the person who believes that treating homosexuals as equals amounts to actively hating heterosexuals or taking away the rights of heterosexuals. What is it that leads someone to have such a passionate attachment to their nation that any discussion of the wrongs of that nation are equated with actually hating the nation? I can’t help but find these sorts of attachments bizarre.
March 13, 2010 at 2:17 am
Great post.
(1) At some point I want to study the state of the art of the research stemming from Kahneman and Taversky’s work on heuristic biases. The showed that people routinely commit certain kinds of logical and statistical fallacies. I really like your metaphor of attachment here about the issues you raise, and wonder if it would have explanatory value vis a vis the Kahneman/Taversky research.
(2) I think the really strong similarity between the stereotypical anti-animal rights response and the anti OOP response is actually very interesting in a lot of ways.
Now it may turn out that there is no such thing as an “object oriented ethics” just because OOP is metaphysics in a way that doesn’t productively bleed over into ethics. But I have an intuition that this is not so. A couple of connections- (1) At least from a Buddhist perspective the kind of idealism of western philosophy starts to look like a key case of the egoistic striving that is the cause of suffering. (2) From a meta-ethical standpoint, people who defend a really strong fact value distinction are usually naturalists of the kind that you and Graham seek to undermine. Strangely, this kind of naturalism typically is correlationist about normative concepts. Scientifically described objects really exist, but everything else is added by the human mind and this addition may be construed as a fiction of sorts or may be given some more exalted status (perhaps I should not have said “naturalist here, because I think “Cornell Realists” about ethics might consider themselves naturalists of a kind, and “ethical naturalist” means something specific and different from what I’ve said; just note that I’m not talking about them). But to really break free of correlationism is to break free of the of this picture. It’s why people think Harman and you are anthropomorphizing; because they are caught up in the mixed correlationist picture, where some things are independent but valuative and modal facts are just functions of humans doing the perceiving. (3) The meta-ethical considerations effect standard normative ethics. Kantians take human autonomy to be the only thing that is of intrinsic moral regard. With someone like Robert Brandom, this comes from not being able to admit that things in the world can be both normative and causal. So, for example, a hand that is experiencing pain cannot itself have intrinsic negative normative force. But, again, the denial that things in the world can be both normative and causal is usually at heart from the descendent of the kind of mix and match correlationism that we get from Hume (modality and values depend on people in some way, while non-modal facts don’t).
March 13, 2010 at 3:16 am
[...] Larval Subject writes a good post following up on Scu’s discussion of the treatment of animal rights (see my last [...]
March 13, 2010 at 7:29 pm
One more example that ties in to the Buddhism point above is the ethical thought of the late Heidegger. The Schopenhaurian mode of gelassenheit is *radically* incompatible with thinking that Dasein has the privileged place Being and Time era Heidegger claimed for it. Obviously, people can’t let things be what they are if those very things have no being apart from people.
I tend to read the Letter on Humanism, the technology stuff, and Building, Dwelling Thinking all in terms of this ethical imperative leading him to do the best he can to move away from correlationism.
But this stuff is obviously pretty murky, a murkiness compounded by the fact that instead of saying “I was wrong in Being and Time” he usually says “In Being and Time I never said X” even though he clearly says X in Being and Time (and extends X in the Nazi era courses that his son won’t let into “the complete works” so that the picture there is so correlationist that the ontological difference between beings and being is now equated to that between person and state!).
I’m not convinced that all of this recent emphasis on ereignis (“the event of appropriation,” “enowning,” what-have-you) in the Heidegger jet set right now does anything to clear up the confusion. Hopefully I’m wrong about that though. . .
March 15, 2010 at 4:41 am
[...] you are somehow against humans. That resulted in a series of interesting responses. In this case, Levi Bryant has a great post up, and Peter Gratton has three posts. See here, here, and [...]
March 15, 2010 at 5:48 pm
The fallacy discussed here is not constrained to accusations against animal rights and OOO (or to any position that seeks to undermine the human-world correlate as the starting point for philosophy). Such accusations go back as far as anti-humanism and anti-foundationalism themselves. The concern seems to be that unless we specify a unique set of qualities that defines “the human” we run the risk of treating human beings as, well, less or other than human. Not only is such an argument baldly question begging, it also seems to miss the fact that we deal adequately with chairs, tables, cars, and cans of coca-cola without ever specifying a final list of qualities or essences that make the aforementioned objects “what they are” and in so doing, provide a robust foundation for proper ways of acting toward them. Unless we think we need to identify “essences” to know how to behave properly toward any conceivable entity, the fact that we can’t ever specify a definitive human essence just isn’t a problem.
March 15, 2010 at 10:05 pm
Yep Ben,
What’s really surprising however is that this argument is coming from many of those antihumanists.