Ivakhiv chimes in on the relations discussion here. I won’t comment now, but I did want to address a comment Michael of Archive Fire makes in response to Ivakhiv’s post. I’ve often found Michael to be rather belligerent, combative, and disdainful in his questions, so I seldom respond to him, but while I have little interest in entering into dialogue with Michael (everything seems to be a fight or about tearing things down with him), I do think his question raises an important point that might be on the mind of other readers. Michael writes:
OOO seems to have a strong tendency towards an anti-epistemological stance, in that they seem to continually philosophize away the every-present issue of HOW we know reality ‘frames’ WHAT we can possibly know. An aversion to “correlationism” seems to justify this ‘leap of faith’ into, what i would call, a brute realist ontology.
I don’t think this is quite right. OOO does not have an aversion to epistemology and, in fact, develops a rather elaborate epistemology or theory of how knowledge is produced. What OOO objects to is the thesis that epistemology is first philosophy in that sense that questions of epistemology must precede any inquiry into being. For OOO it is ontology that is first philosophy. Moreover, there can be no hope of a coherent epistemology without ontology as first philosophy.
I don’t want to let the cat out of the bag as these arguments make up the second chapter of The Democracy of Objects. If I follow Michael’s criticism correctly, he is falling prey to the common fallacy or line of reasoning that we must first know objects in order to make claims about what they are and that therefore epistemology precedes ontology. I’ll get to why I believe this is a fallacy in a moment, but for the moment I must clarify why I advocate the thesis that ontology precedes epistemology. In The Democracy of Objects I follow Roy Bhaskar’s transcendental argument for the existence of objects. Bhaskar’s argumentation is interesting because it inverts transcendental argumentation, treating it as an inquiry into the nature of the world rather than minds knowing the world.
read on!
Bhaskar’s transcendental question is “what must the world be like in order for science to be possible?” For Bhaskar, the conditions for the possibility of science are not to be found in the mind (or, for that matter, society), but rather in the nature of the world or being itself. If science is possible, then the world must be a particular way. Roughly Bhaskar cites four ontological conditions for science:
1. We must be causal agents capable of acting on the world.
2. It must be possible for objects to be out of phase with events or actualities (Bhaskar is here very close to my distinction between virtual proper being and local manifestation).
3. Objects must behave differently in open systems than they do in closed systems.
4. Being must be stratified, differentiated, and structured.
Note that these conditions of science are strictly ontological. They are not claims about our knowledge of being, but are rather claims about the being of beings. Now why are these the conditions under which science is possible? Here I will focus on the second and third condition. Bhaskar’s thesis is that experimental practice is not intelligible in the absence of being structured in this way.
Why do we engage in experiment? Why do we conduct experiments? Precisely because objects or what Bhaskar calls generative mechanisms behave differently in open and closed systems, and this for the reason that objects or generative mechanisms can be out of phase with events or actualities. In open systems generative mechanisms or objects can be active without producing certain events or actualities due to countervailing objects or generative mechanisms, they can be dormant, producing no events or actualities at all, or they can be entangled with other generative mechanisms in such a way that they produce very different actualities. This is what it means to say that objects or generative mechanisms can be out of phase with actualities or events.
Here, then, we find the rationale for scientific experimentation, and this rationale is ontological, not epistemological. Recall that for both Kant and Hume– as well as much subsequent philosophy of science —causality is defined or understood as a constant conjunction of events. Given A, it is said, B follows. Bhaskar’s point is two-fold: First, the constant conjunction of events is the exception in nature, not the rule (indeed, he will argue that most constant conjunctions of events require the causal agency of sentient beings to occur), and second, were the thesis that causality is a constant conjunction of events true, there would be no need for experimentation because these sequences of events would occur in nature of their own accord. If experiment is necessary, then this is because objects or generative mechanisms can be out of phase with events. Experiment creates closed systems in which constant conjunctions of events can occur, thereby creating circumstances in which objects are in phase with events. Yet none of this activity would be intelligible were it not ontologically the case that objects can be out of phase with events and that objects behave differently in open systems and closed systems. These are ontological premises of science, not epistemological premises.
Now much of my ontology is built on these claims by Bhaskar, though I do believe I expand that ontology significantly and take it in very different direction. Within the framework of onticology, Bhaskar’s thesis that we must distinguish between objects or generative mechanisms and events becomes my distinction between virtual proper being and local manifestations. Moreover, it will be noted that the thesis that we must create closed systems in order to discover constant conjunctions of events implies that objects or generative mechanisms are independent of their relations. For if objects were their relations it would be impossible to detach them from relations to create closed systems.
Now, returning to Michael’s criticism, I believe that it is based on a fallacious bit of reasoning because, quoting Bhaskar, it trades on a conflation of philosophical knowledge and scientific knowledge. Philosophically we can articulate what being must be like in order for certain practices to be possible. However, the philosophical knowledge that objects must be split, that they behave differently in open and closed settings, that they must be independent of their relations, and so on does not entail we know what objects exist. To arrive at this knowledge we have to engage in the arduous work of investigation and inquiry. To be sure, we know of the existence of certain objects because they make up the familiar furniture of our entanglements with the world, but there are many other objects we are scarcely aware of. The point, however, is that ultimately the premises of our knowledge are ontological in character, such that ontology is first philosophy and required to render our practices intelligible.
Now one might object that our science is not possible, that it doesn’t really exist. That’s fine so far as it goes. I am not a foundationalist and am not making claims to unassailable foundations. I believe that this desire for unassailable foundations is what got philosophy into the correlationist deadlock. The premises of my argument are the existence of science and perception (Bhaskar makes a similar argument for perception). If one does not accept these practices and capacities as legitimate practices and capacities, then I have nothing to say. However, if we begin from the premise that we have these capacities and that science exists as something more than a pseudo-practice, then these are the ontological requirements for these capacities and practices. Having said this, I hasten to add that although my argument proceeds from the nature of scientific practice, it in no way is designed to suggest that only natural beings are real beings. Natural beings, I argue, are a subset of being, not exhaustive of being. What is important here is the form of the argument.
May 12, 2010 at 4:43 pm
[…] also agree with Levi’s following words in the POST ON IVAKHIV: “I’ve often found Michael [of Archive Fire] to be rather belligerent, combative, and […]
May 12, 2010 at 5:34 pm
Levi, I’m sorry to read that you take offence to my approach. I should indeed be more careful about how i enage the work of professional philsophers. It is selfish of me to only pursue my own interests on other poeples blogs. Unfortunatley, my respect for what you and Graham are doing doesn’t translate well into my infrequent comments.
…the Monster responds in detail: here
May 12, 2010 at 6:30 pm
Graham,
Without engaging me in serious dialogue it would be impossible for you to know what “type” of a thinker, let alone person, I really am. Don’t embarrass yourself.
Scoring points is the least of my worries.
May 12, 2010 at 6:59 pm
[…] Now in response to this line of argument, some have occasionally made the trite argument that while this observation might be granted, we are not free to use language in any way we might like. Here there are sometimes evocations of Humpty Dumpty, where Humpty Dumpty contends that words mean what he says they mean. But this is not what is going on with OOO. OOO theorists are not simply conjuring things out of thin air, but are making substantial ontological claims about what objects must be like to be coherently thought. In the case of Harman objects must be withdrawn from all relation and sensuous qualities, while in the case of myself, objects must be split between their virtual proper being composed of powers or capacities and their local manifestations. I outlined some of the philosophical reasons I believe this to be the case in my last post. […]
May 12, 2010 at 7:06 pm
I think Graham’s point is that it makes little sense to engage in dialogue with a person who starts by claiming that one posits objects when they don’t exist, or that ones concepts are idiosyncratic. This begins any discussion with a fundamental air of contempt and disrespect, suggesting that everything will go downhill from there. The well has already been poisoned from the outset. Nor is this an instance in engaging in “criticism”, unless right-wing talk radio amounts to criticism. Criticism carefully articulates the positions of others and then either engages in immanent critique (i.e., shows how the position itself undermines itself) or metacritique (shows where a position is missing some fundamental element of reality). This is just rejecting things from the get-go. And where a person is genuinely interested in dialogue and discussion they don’t begin by poisoning the well as those sorts of rhetorical gestures undermine the possibility of dialogue. Ergo my remarks.
May 12, 2010 at 8:19 pm
LEVI: I think Graham’s point is that it makes little sense to engage in dialogue with a person who starts by claiming that one posits objects when they don’t exist, or that ones concepts are idiosyncratic. This begins any discussion with a fundamental air of contempt and disrespect, suggesting that everything will go downhill from there. The well has already been poisoned from the outset.
MICHAEL: I agree Levi, that was probably his point. The problem, for me, is that his type-casting and dismissal of me as a person was based solely on the form of my comments (which I will admit is less than congenial, and for that I apologize to you both) rather than the content.
If that’s how he wants to react and present himself that’s perfectly fine as far as it goes, but I would suggest that what someone interprets as the tone of my comments might not be solely my responsibility. And I am willing to grant that this internet posting/blogging as a medium of communication leaves a lot of room for this type of miscommunication.
My fumbling of approach notwithstanding, my criticisms of OOO (as I hope will be exposed in my follow-up blog post tomorrow) are far more than the mere ramblings of an inexperienced troll
LEVI: Nor is this an instance in engaging in “criticism”, unless right-wing talk radio amounts to criticism. Criticism carefully articulates the positions of others and then either engages in immanent critique (i.e., shows how the position itself undermines itself) or metacritique (shows where a position is missing some fundamental element of reality). This is just rejecting things from the get-go.
MICHAEL: Fair enough. But I don’t think ever rejected your work “from the get-go” Levi. I have read your blog for almost a year, and I am working my way through your archives, and so I would like to think I have a fairly good sense of what you are working towards. Now my interpretations of your ontology may or may not be totally ass-backwards, but I can assure you my “rejections” (which are more superficial than substantial since I take the majority of your framework to be sound and stimulating) are carefully considered.
My real fault is that I don’t take the time to first “carefully articulate the positions of others” before offering critical comments. I acknowledge that in my reply to your initial remarks. This approach is both rude and selfish. It is selfish because I tend not to be too interested in the internal coherence (immanent arguments) of a particular model or with issues of ‘internal’ disciplinary relevance. I’m far more interested in what your (for your example) theory or ontology or framework can do for me – and in terms of my own praxis. Again, this is both rude and selfish.
Part of the problem is that I am unencumbered by the need, and therefore the subsequent requirements, to differentiate and situate myself within either a particular discourse tradition (e.g., continental philosophy) or an academic/institutional apparatus. And such ”freedom” can quickly lead to transgressions in etiquette and formality. This, combined with a need for expediency, often prevents me from gaining legitimacy within the circle of those you and other refined academics consider relevant enough to debate with. I get that.
LEVI: And where a person is genuinely interested in dialogue and discussion they don’t begin by poisoning the well as those sorts of rhetorical gestures undermine the possibility of dialogue. Ergo my remarks.
MICHAEL: Indeed and your point is well taken. I would suggest, in addition, that you might want to consider that had I been deemed by you as a legitimate interlocutor ‘from the get-go’ your reaction to my comments would probably much different, and based more on the content of my comments rather than the form. Than again I could be wrong.
May 12, 2010 at 11:36 pm
[…] and Epistemology Levi Bryant is up with a lengthy post that basically shows the Heideggerian heritage of object oriented ontology. That is, the move that […]
May 13, 2010 at 7:55 am
@michael: In response to “I would suggest, in addition, that you might want to consider that had I been deemed by you as a legitimate interlocutor ‘from the get-go’ your reaction to my comments would probably much different, and based more on the content of my comments rather than the form.”
I can’t say I have deep insights into Levi’s psyche, but I have rather thin academic philosophy credentials myself (and what I do have is mostly in the analytic camp), and I have no complaints about how Levi’s responded to my occasional queries. As far as academic philosophy bloggers go, I’d say Bryant and Bogost are amongst the most egalitarian.
May 13, 2010 at 12:52 pm
No hard feelings from me, Mike. I like what you’re saying in the comments above, and will even remove the comment about you from my blog. Looking forward to your contributions, especially if I misunderstood what you were up to.
May 13, 2010 at 2:55 pm
@Mark N.
I think the key here Mark is that you had “occasional queries” where my original comments were pointed criticisms (albeit without the requisite supporting ‘evidence’ to support). Had I cautiously asked questions I’m sure the response would have been more egalitarian. Whatever the case, I take full responsibility for my hasty approach and I don’t blame Levi for how he responded – I may have done the same.
May 13, 2010 at 4:56 pm
Grant,
That is very noble of you. To clarify further: I know I may come off as abrasive and combatative sometimes, and that I will own, but I am genuinely interested in OOO. I think your work is making important points about the relative stability of objects that need anchoring in an academic setting and then diffusion into the wider world of ideas. Along with an important respect for relations (understanding the ontic character of relations), an adequate ecological perspective will only be possible if we take into account of the integrity, or as you say the‘withdrawal’, of real objects. And it is this movement towards a more sophisticated and immanent ecological sensibility that I am exploring in my own thinking.
All the best,
m-
May 14, 2010 at 9:35 pm
A question on the purely philosophical end of things: Levi, can you explain a little more fully what you mean by a pseudo-practice? This issue came up in a comment to the long post I made on the matter, and I realized that I was a bit at sea. This comes up when you demur from any foundationalist project. I think I see what you mean by arguing that foundationalism is heavily implicated in the motives that got correlationism its purchase, but I lose you when you distinguish your own aim (minimal ontological commitments for such-&-such a practice) from this. Is it just that you sort of cheerfully send the correlationist on her merry way if s/he doesn’t want to understand science as it understands itself– so long as s/he knows s/he can’t have it both ways? (This was the best I could do in my response). Thanks in advance.