It looks like some debates about Derrida are emerging once again. I don’t wish to ignite that fracas all over, but I was interested in something James over at Critical Animal says. James writes:
But still, this idea that Derrida was never invested in creating his own philosophical positions seem to either come from too narrow of a reading of Derrida, or too narrow of an idea of philosophy, or both. If you look at the ‘late’ Derrida, he is clearly trying to work out ideas of cosmopolitanism, friendship/fraternity, and hospitality. Frequently in a non-anthropocentric register. He did so both through recourse to other texts, but also through a profound number of insights of his own that were not mere textual glosses.
I haven’t read most of the posts in the current round of Derrida debates, but I was surprised by James’ remarks here. Are people really claiming that Derrida develops no philosophical position or that he only gives textual glosses? I’ve never thought such a thing. It’s always seemed to me that Derrida is making rather strong philosophical claims. To me it seems that Derrida’s core thesis is that reality is structured by the signifier for humans. At the heart of this claim are the two central theses of structuralist linguistics that 1) signifiers are differentially constituted (hence all the stuff about differance and the trace), and 2) that signifiers only refer to other signifiers. As Lacan articulated the latter point, “the signifier represents the subject for another signifier”. Within this framework, then, the referential function is undermined as language only refers to language, never to world. Derrida constantly explores the limits of language– hence his interest in Levinas –but only, it seems to me, as opening on to an Other that exceeds all possibility of being articulated in language.
Methodologically, the conclusion that follows from this is that talk about the world can only ever be talk about talk or language. This can take the form of the analysis of texts, of speech, of the semiotics of clothing, etc. But working in the background is always the thesis that reality is a signifying construction. To talk about an object such as the telephone on my desk is thus not to talk about my telephone, but about a signifying construction (here reference should be made to Derrida’s discussions of manifestation and phenomena vis a vis Peircian semiotics in Of Grammatology). So sure, Derrida talks about hospitality, cosmopolitanism, friendship/fraternity, etc. (whoever suggested otherwise), but isn’t this always on the horizon of a nominalism where reality is linguistically constructed and where we are inextricably trapped within language? Put a little bit differently, of course Derrida talks about objects all the time (coins, cats, dogs, weapons, etc), but he can do this because all of these objects are texts. His dialectic thus unfolds perpetually around a play between the trace of an Other perpetually withdrawing from language and unreachable and the text of being that’s a signifying construction. One operation consists in demonstrating how attempts to fix reference or presence are always undermined by the play of the signifier (“Parergon”, his reading of Kant’s third Critique is an exemplary example of this), while the other operation consists in marking the place or site of the always undetermined Other (the gift might take place, but if it does it will always be an event that takes place behind our backs, that can’t be anticipated, that can’t be known if it does happen, and that can’t be pinned down). The former operation ceaselessly reveals the manner in which signifier refers to signifiers, rather than a transcendental signified (a concept, form, essence, or universal apart from language) or referent (entities that exist independently of language). As a consequence, manifestation or phenomenality is an effect of this differential play of language or the signifier, not a being apart from language itself. The caveat, of course, is that there is always the possibility (which is simultaneously impossible) of a withdrawn Other. This really isn’t what Derrida is arguing?
January 26, 2011 at 8:26 pm
Just in case it explodes all over the place: #Derridagate
January 27, 2011 at 4:51 am
I never really thought that Derrida was saying that reality is structured by the signifier. It seems to me that his core thesis is that reality is structured by differance–and I don’t think that’s a distinction without a difference. On your take, it seems that Derrida is saying that we can’t get out of language, and that any time he talks about objects he is talking about them as linguistically-constructed, as textual in the narrow, literal sense.
It’s a plausible reading, but I think it derives from placing undue emphasis his early work on language and in particular his (in)famous “there is nothing outside the text.” On my take, which is probably controversial, I don’t take Derrida to be granting ontological primacy to language/signifiers over things/matter. Instead, I take him to be using language as an important and illustrative thing to examine if we want to understand differance. In this way, we can study and write about objects/material things in a Derridean way, and this doesn’t have to involve letting the linguistic side of things elide or otherwise take primacy over their material reality. Instead, this would involve understanding materiality in a way that privileges the relations among objects through differance. And differance need not be seen as something pertaining to language over and against material objects, despite the fact that Derrida was a guy who lived and worked in a world of books.
January 27, 2011 at 5:03 am
[...] in a Time of Error then responded to that post. Then Larval weighed in on this discussion here, a post on which I also commented (again, comment awaiting moderation as I write this [...]
January 27, 2011 at 5:20 am
I would say signs, not signifiers per se. Hence the reference to Peirce. Signifiers are only one species of sign. A narrow reading of Derrida’s remark about texts would restrict it to books and newspapers. There’s nothing narrow or literal about suggesting that rocks, trees, clothing, etc are texts.
January 27, 2011 at 12:31 pm
[...] at Larval Subjects Levi Bryant has reasserted his contention that Derrida is some kind of linguistic idealist. [...]
January 27, 2011 at 12:45 pm
Here’s my response over at enemyindustry.
http://enemyindustry.net/blog/?p=770
January 27, 2011 at 5:04 pm
Rather than saying everything is structured by language, I think Derrida can be read as saying everything is structured LIKE language. This is basically a pithy gloss on what deconstructioninc just stated.
January 27, 2011 at 5:18 pm
Chris,
Does that distinction make a difference in practice or is akin to Christians opposed to gay equality saying the hate the sin but love the sinner?
January 27, 2011 at 5:47 pm
I don’t really care if this is or isn’t what Derrida is saying (maybe I should), it seems like a legitimate reading (as in, you could be wrong, but there are strong reasons in his writing to assume you are right).
What I am curious about, to get away from Derrida, is what does this critique do to your thoughts on translation? Or, to try to be more specific in my question, how is that viewing the relationships between objects as translation does not replicate issues of the play of signifier, etc?
I know you have written a lot of this issue (including in your The Democracy of Objects, which I still want to read), so if there is already some post out there I missed that answers this, feel free to just point it out to me.
January 27, 2011 at 6:59 pm
Scu,
I’m pretty sympathetic to the implications of Derrida’s thought for theories of translation. Also, I don’t begrudge others for finding Derrida useful and for drawing on his thought. I just don’t find Derrida particularly helpful in thinking about the sorts of things that I’m trying to think about, that’s all. Derridean style analysis, while one tool in the toolbox, gets in the way of doing the sorts of actor-network style analyses I’m interested in. Additionally, as a Lacan guy I’ve never found much in Derrida that I hadn’t already found articulated better, more deeply, and more thoroughly in Lacan… But that’s just me. This might be a matter of taste too. I’m a pure theory person and tend to have little patience for close textual readings of literature or philosophy unless I’m trying to understand a particular philosopher. As a consequence, texts like Of Grammatology or Speech and Phenomena feel like time drains to me. I would prefer to see Derrida simply articulate his claims and positions rather than go through a lengthy discussion of Levi-Strauss, Rousseau, or Husserl. If I want to understand Husserl, I don’t turn to Derrida, but to someone like Lawlor. When I read Zizek I read him despite his analyses of film, literature, pop culture, etc., not because of his readings of these things. The value of his readings is that they illuminate Lacanian concepts in ways that allow me to understand those concepts and use them myself. With Derrida I just never feel like I’m getting much payoff for the effort.
February 3, 2011 at 11:38 pm
Dang I have no time to really comment on this. Sorry.
But one objection might be to question whether we can only refer to other signifiers or whether Derrida’s actually saying we can only refer by signifiers that tie to previous signifiers. A subtle but important difference. I think it’s similar to Peirce’s notion of the difference between the dynamic and immediate object part of a sign. The original object (the ultimate reference) of a sign is always absent and all we have is a semiotic chain of signifiers hinted at by way of a guess. This doesn’t mean we suspend reference though (for Peirce, although I think this is true of Derrida as well – clearly not everyone agrees though)
February 3, 2011 at 11:41 pm
BTW – I really, really like Derrida. But I agree that immanent critiques can be a drain. Which is why I tend to see Derrida as being most useful for my thinking about Peirce or Heidegger. To confess I rarely read Derrida much anymore but he really did transform how I think about a lot of things. Whether the realist reading of Derrida is the historic Derrida isn’t ultimately that interesting. I think it a very fruitful way of thinking.
February 8, 2011 at 4:32 pm
Derrida in this fashion, or as he would say, he returned to fashion. Hauntology …
February 9, 2011 at 8:54 am
Of Grammatology has it that:
“The history of writing will conform to a law of mechanical economy: to gain or save the most space and time possible by means of the most convenient abbreviation; hence writing will never have the slightest effect on either the structure or the contents of the meaning (the ideas) that it
is supposed to transmit.”
Derrida is not a textual idealist; on the contrary he is trying to demonstrate how a certain “logic” of writing, or graphematics, also, and this is where it gets really interesting, involves extra-textual things. But sure, Derrida got caught up in too many projects to ever really elaborate adequately upon the real-world imports of this logic. Let me cite something that is rarely reflected, something Derrida said back in 1994:
“All I have done […] is dominated by the thought of a virus, what could be called a parasitology, a virology, the virus being many things. […] The virus is in part a parasite that destroys, that introduces disorder into communication. Even from the biological standpoint, this is what happens with a virus; it derails a mechanism of the communicational type, its coding and decoding. On the other hand, it is something that is neither living nor non-living; the virus is not a microbe. And if you follow these two threads, that of a parasite which disrupts destination from the communicative point of view—disrupting writing, inscription, and the coding and decoding of inscription—and which on the other hand is neither alive nor dead, you have the matrix of all that I have done since I began writing.” (Brunette & Wills, ed., Deconstruction and the Visual Arts, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 12).
(I’d also like, if you allow me, to greet my old friend Scu. Robin here.)