In Irreductions, or perhaps it’s elsewhere, Latour says that we’ll never do better than a politician. Presumably when Latour evokes this aphorism, his point is that we always have to navigate the world in such a way that we have to deal with resistances, assemble other actors to form coalitions or assemblages, and so on. The point would be that the purity of a stance is impossible to maintain, but that compromise is always necessary. Here it’s important to note that for Latour, the figure of the politician is an ontological category, not primarily a political category. What we call politics is a subset of a more general ontological condition. Take the example of the wood carver. If the carver is a politician, then this is because in working the wood, the carver must work with the flow of the grain, the knots, the shape of the wood, etc. The final product is a sort of compromise between the singularities of the wood and the aims of the carver.
Latour is right, but the worry that arises with respect to his aphorism is that it comes to function as the thesis that we should abandon certain aims and goals, thereby pre-emptively compromising. In this connection we hear terms like “pragmatic realism”, where the idea is that we must settle because the so-called “mature realist” understands that certain things just aren’t possible. Of course, in having pre-emptively declared that certain things are not possible, the pragmatic realist insures that they aren’t possible by virtue of never pursuing them and re-structuring the social space by creating popular consensus rendering them possible. It is here that I think Zizek and Badiou are on the right track. Their politics continues the aphorism written on the walls in Paris in Spring of 69, saying “be realistic, demand the impossible!” The only realist position is to demand the impossible and to refuse all pragmatic realism or compromise.
We can thematize this point in terms of Latour’s theses about realism. Earlier in Irreductions Latour also makes the claim that reality is resistance. While I do not share Latour’s view here– whether or not something resists something else has nothing to do with whether it’s real –I certainly would agree that how we come to know reality involves resistances. In this regard, the person or group that aligns herself with a politician (in the political, not ontological, sense) withdraws herself from the domain of social reality. This is precisely because she creates no reality that the politician must navigate and therefore becomes invisible. She presents no singularity that must be navigated. In this regard, the goal of the political activist should be to be like a knot of wood. The goal should be to occupy the position of a singularity that must be navigated. This would be the case regardless of whether or not one is sympathetic to the politician or shares her ideology. It is only in this way that the political subject can play a role in forming the social space. By contrast, in aligning oneself with a politician, the subject ceases to be a political subject insofar as they have become invisible, a smooth space, that requires no navigation.
February 24, 2011 at 3:43 pm
Levi- ‘While I do not share Latour’s view here– whether or not something resists something else has nothing to do with whether it’s real-’
isn’t it the Real that is being resisted in reality formation? if so, how does Latour differ?
February 24, 2011 at 3:45 pm
Isn’t it more often the case that, rather than preemptively ceding the ground for change, politicians preach about incremental change? To those demanding radical change there may not really be a difference, but to those who are not sure if they want radical change or what it would mean, it seems like a safe way to hedge their political commitments.
I agree with you though. I also like the way the preemptive clearing/forming of social space for change lines up with the “leaving room for faith” that Adam Kotsko derides in Kant.
February 24, 2011 at 3:45 pm
Excellent post, Levi. See my full comment here.
February 24, 2011 at 3:49 pm
Hey Ted,
I have two reasons for this. First, an entity can be completely unrelated, thereby providing no resistance for anything else, yet is no less real for that. Second, two entities might exist in such a way that they are unable to interact, thereby producing no resistance in one another, yet they are no less real for that. An example of the latter would be the neutrino which passes through most matter without producing any effects. For these reasons I place resistance in the epistemological register, not the ontological register.
February 24, 2011 at 3:51 pm
Joe,
Could you expand a little bit? I’m not sure what you’re getting at. I get your point about incremental change, but from what I’ve seen forms of activism premised on incremental change tend to produce no change at all, but rather push things in the opposite direction. At any rate, my point is that incrementalism should be left to the politicians. The role of the activist or the political subject is to make life difficult for the politician so that they have to compromise in our direction. In this respect, I tend to think political subjects should work outside of political parties. By all means vote, but one’s political work should be independent of party apparatus.
February 24, 2011 at 4:57 pm
I guess you are already making my point for me, that the political work of the politician and everyone else is different, agonistic even.
What perplexes me is just how people change from believing in their representatives to believing in themselves (i.e. as the agents of political change doing their political work independent of parties or the State even), while also avoiding regressing into the libertarian mysticism that is really a covert way of believing in oneself through yet another representative (i.e. value and profitability, if not businessmen). What you say about the political subject’s jobs being to make life difficult for politicians is exactly what people are saying unions do for business, though this comes out of their mouths and off their pens as condemnation. How can this be turned around, and how when people see their interests directly represented by politicians and the movement of capital can they be persuaded to actively thwart them.
What that has to do with incrementalism is, I guess, that since people so directly identify their political subjectivity with those who represent them, they convince themselves that they themselves can’t demand too much. It’s not, to use neoliberal parlance, a safe investment. This is a lot like the position of the unorganized worker, who feels they can’t make too strong of demands on management or even the owners lest they be denied or worse.
February 24, 2011 at 5:29 pm
Levi, I’m confused somewhat. Doesn’t your post have to do with ‘entities’ that perceive, politician and activist, and isn’t perception related to the ontological register?
February 24, 2011 at 6:42 pm
Ted,
Ontology is concerned with the nature of existence or being. You existed before I perceived or encountered you. As a consequence, your existence isn’t dependent on resisting me. Latour says that “reality is resistance”. In this way he confuses two distinct issues: how we come to know something versus what something is.
February 25, 2011 at 2:22 am
“but from what I’ve seen forms of activism premised on incremental change tend to produce no change at all, but rather push things in the opposite direction.”
I wouldn’t be so hasty to dismiss the power of incremental change and moderate politics. Consider the case of the Russian and French revolutions. The aristocracy clearly knew the desperation and anger of the masses, yet chose to ignore/resist the situation (for various reason I could list). The result was violent and radical revolutions that largerly ruined the French and Russian societies and reduced powerful empires to second-rate countries. Change in these societies was so radical and fast that tyrants had to step in to stabilize the situations. On the other hand, if we take a look at post-WWII Europe, we see nations that slowly transitioned towards democracy, human rights, and soft socialism while letting up on monarchial absolutism. This allowed a bloodless and peaceful revolution that did not destroy society as whole. In this sense, I am convinced that moderate snail-paced politics is a key contender where radical politics spells destruction.
February 25, 2011 at 7:16 am
Levi- Ontology is concerned with the nature of existence or being.
does that not have to do with relations, one to an(other)? As with Politics?
February 25, 2011 at 9:09 am
I haven’t yet read the book, but this review of Eric Hobsbawm’s history of Marxism claims that Hobsbawm sees the revolution/reform distinction in Marx as having been overblown:
Revolution was to be seen not simply as a sudden transfer of power but as the prelude to a lengthy, complex, unpredictable period of transition. From the late 1850s onwards, Marx did not consider any such seizure of power either imminent or probable. Much as he cheered on the Paris Commune, he expected little from it. Nor was revolution to be simplemindedly opposed to reform, of which Marx was a persistent champion.
I’m not enough of a historian to say whether that’s accurate or not, but reading the lists of demands from the early Internationals in which he participated, a large proportion of the effort does seem to be directed towards reform (laws on work hours and conditions, women’s suffrage, abolition of censorship, reduction of militarization, etc.).
February 25, 2011 at 3:16 pm
Isn’t a Politician, in Latour’s point of view, questioning in effect what exists? Could Latour be mixing the two, ont. and spist., as opposed to doing one or the other?
February 25, 2011 at 3:47 pm
Ted,
I’m not sure how to make things any clearer than I have. The point is that whether or not something exists has nothing to do with whether it produces resistance in other things. My disagreement with Latour here revolves only around the criteria he’s providing for reality or what makes things real. You’re repeating the same question over and over again. Whether or not a politician questions what exists is entirely irrelevant to whether something does exist. The former is an issue for epistemology or how we come to know, the latter is an issue for ontology or what does, in fact, exist. You’ll also notice that nowhere do I disagree with Latour’s thesis that one of the primary ways we come to know existence is through encountering resistances. I only deny that this has anything to do with the reality of a thing.
February 25, 2011 at 5:08 pm
a via-medium (psychopomp?) between those of us committed to (limited by?) pragmatic experimentation and those more given to wild-psychoanalysis/speculation might be found in a revival of Guatarri, Ian Buchanan’s excellent Is Anti-Oedipus a May ’68 Book, in Deleuze and History, may be a good starting place.
February 26, 2011 at 5:37 pm
[...] By lukasverburgt Over at Larval Subjects one finds an interesting post on a topic that has been of some importance for me in the last few weeks. The post discusses, [...]
February 26, 2011 at 10:18 pm
“Latour is right, but the worry that arises with respect to his aphorism is that it comes to function as the thesis that we should abandon certain aims and goals, thereby pre-emptively compromising.”
Lizzie Holtzman telling’ it on the mountain with respect to Bush/Cheney impeachment on March 28, 2008, around the 3:28 mark.
February 27, 2011 at 3:00 am
I never really understood the obsessive fixation many people had with George Bush. After some 9 trillion comparisons to Hitler and calls for impeachment and giant worldwide protests, it seemed kind of fake and toolish to be anti-Bush. His policies weren’t significantly different than those of the presidents before him (apparently everyone collectively forgot Clinton bombed Iraq too) nor did he do anything substantially more evil than any other world leader. I don’t know, I still don’t get it.
February 28, 2011 at 11:14 am
Drew:
#9
You think that without the threat of revolution next door, concessions toward democracy would have been carried out in much the same way? Or that the slow collapse of social democracy in western europe after 1989 is a matter of coincidence? To the (highly limited) extent that capitalism grudgingly reformed itself a little in favour of people over raw money was in order to protect itself against revolution – not as an alternative path to the same ends.
#17
I see it in reverse: the problem is not anti-Bush-ism but pro-Clinton/Obama/etc.
February 28, 2011 at 1:38 pm
http://www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/huron.html
March 1, 2011 at 11:35 pm
Joshua,
I see where you are getting at and I agree. It’s not so much that the threat of revolution doesn’t add pressure and incentive for change (indeed, who would argue otherwise?), but rather what I should have clarified earlier is that slow change and moderation slow down the break-neck pace and destructive elements that come with many violent revolutions. France fell into totalitarian violence and anarchy that claimed thousands of life and ruined society, while the UK slipped quietly into a reduced role for its monarchy without a drop of blood. See the difference? Slow and easy maintains stability and integrity.
March 2, 2011 at 3:29 am
“#17
I see it in reverse: the problem is not anti-Bush-ism but pro-Clinton/Obama/etc.”
#whybushwaselected
March 2, 2011 at 3:46 am
Frances, here is Van Jones, the Latour of the Obama administration. You will see his position is not about compromise, but about doing something, anything rather than nothing
[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmXeisnAfgA&w=320&h=195