On Facebook I recently wrote,
First rule of onto-cartography, don’t track in abstractions (society, capitalism, patriarchy, racism, environment). Second rule of onto-cartography: DON’T traffic in abstractions!
To this, a very close and old friend responded asking,
but isn’t the concrete an abstraction as well?
Good question, so here’s the response. That’s certainly an abstract way of responding! The idea is to suspend our assumptions about why and wherefore things are organized as they are, pausing instead to trace networks, relations between things, to discern how they’re linked up, how they’re organized, and so on. Rather than *beginning* with the premise that x organizes y, we should instead look at how things are actually linked and interact. Latour’s _Reassembling the Social_ is indispensable reading on this. His thesis is that these big terms do more to *obscure* than explain. I disagree with Latour on a number of his conclusions (I think he too hastily rejects Marx– not Marxism, for example –but think he’s making an important point. As Laruelle might argue, the problem with these big master-signifiers (society, patriarchy, capitalism, racism, environment) is that they seem to be saying something without really saying anything. Here it’s worthwhile to think of Hegel’s analysis of “formal ground” in the Science of Logic. When we think in terms of formal ground we appear to be giving the ground of something, when we’ve really replaced the thing to be explained with a *synonym*. You ask “why does the earth move about the sun?” The m’aitre responds “because of gravity!” (formal ground). You ask “what is gravity?” The m’aitre responds “things falling and orbiting about other entities!” You’ve replaced what is to be explained with a different set of words, that are nonetheless saying *exactly* the same thing (A = A).
So we ask “why is society organized as it is?” The m’aitre answers “because of capitalism!” You ask “what is capitalism?” The m’aitre responds, “the way society is organized!” It’s the same loop. You appear to be explaining something and, of course, everyone gets upset because, well, capitalism is bad. But you haven’t really explained anything at all. You’ve named the place where a ground should be, but have not yet provided that ground. So why is this problematic? First and foremost, it’s problematic because it transforms “capitalism” into what Derrida called a spectre. Capitalism is somehow the cause of everything, but it is also this elusive phlogiston that is everywhere and nowhere. Capitalism causes everything, without itself being a material or real agency. The whole problem with ghosts and spectres is that you can’t fight them. We thus end up in a position of theoretical and practical pessimism. We adopt the moral high-ground because we know that there’s this terrible thing called capitalism that we recognize and that is unjust, but because it is a purely formal ground we have no idea how to intervene in it.
The whole point of tracing the networks or onto-cartography is to examine how things are actually put together. Capitalism does not explain, but is what to be explained. Capitalism is the out-come explained by onto-cartographical explanation (as are many other things), but not the explanatory principle. In Hegelian terms, we are seeking real, not formal ground. And we only find real ground by tracing the networks, tracing the assemblages, investigating how machines actually interact in this historical setting and context. We investigate the work that is involved in producing this social structure– and all the entities or machines involved in that –rather than assuming it at the outset. “Society” explains nothing, but is what we’re supposed to explain. Of course, much of this goes unexplored in the humanities and social sciences because the concept of entropy is completely absent from their thought and there is almost no concept of work or energy at work in these theoretical frameworks. There are either concepts or brute material things, but no work to maintain them. No, the only agency is ideas. This is why Marx had to turn Hegel on his head– he understood fatigue –but us academics all forgot that. We forgot that everything is perpetually disintegrating, subject to entropy, precisely because things require energy and work. Who among us has written about fatigue save some spare pages in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition that no one ever notices? Everything quickly became the crystalline idea once again. We worked, the “Marxists” first and foremost, to turn Marx on his head and forget all the things he said about production, energy, work, and so on. We forgot “the working day”.
The second point is that this multiplies our points of intervention at the level of practice. This is not a surprise, of course, because those of us in the humanities would like to think that everything is an idea, a text, a meaning. Then we would be important and masters of all! We could say “everything is Shakespeare!” It’s curious how we so seldom explore our own conditions of production, our own sociological conditions for our enunciations, our own “secondary correlations”. We dream of a world, instead, where our interpretive and conceptual skills are the most important things of all. However, knowing how things or machines are linked in such a way as to produce a particular negentropic social organization, knowing what actants are involved, we are now in a position to intervene in those interconnections and feedback loops. Where, hauntological thought leads us to behave like apes who believe an intervention consists in saying “capitalism sucks!” (which really accomplishes nothing beyond the delights of a beautiful soul that can feel superior to the way in which everyone else is a dupe), we now know how things are actually linked, why they hold together as they do, why people accept them (Reich/Spinoza’s question) while knowing they’re bullshit, and we can engage in interventions that blow these things up. We might be surprised as to what leads people to tolerate this bullshit and what organizes things. We might find that the clock– yes, I literally mean clocks –plays a crucial role or that the length of the working day plays a crucial role or something else besides. But we would know nothing about this because we already know what we’re going to find at the end of analysis. We already know the answer. As a result we see without seeing.
Yet if we bothered to actually trace networks and get out of our master-signifiers, we would discover that there are sites of resistance that we never before imagined because we bothered to trace the network. Sometimes a student in the first grade doesn’t learn not because he’s stupid but because he didn’t have glasses, for example. Sometimes it’s a clock that organizes people’s lives, not a belief. Sometimes it makes more sense to intervene in clocks or glasses, but you can only know that if you actually trace the networks or the concrete. Occupy Wall Street got the idea with rolling jubilee. They realized that maybe debt plays a bigger role in perpetuating capitalism than mistaken ideology or failing to have the right moral values. They then decided to start buying up that debt and then forgiving it. How many of you 101st keyboard revolutionary commandos have participated in that?
I’ll end with a low blow, because I’m despicable like that. The third point is that these big “master-signifier” explanations just don’t display very good fidelity to Marx In other words, I think you’re a bunch of poseurs. Marx spent his time in the library, reading newspapers, exploring tables of numbers, looking at gross products, looking at living working conditions, etc. Marx was a good onto-cartographer. Oh yeah, I went there! He used a methodology that created the conditions for the possibility for him to be surprised. He didn’t have a master-theory but was in search of an explanation. What sad heirs he had. They instead had a dogma that already knew the answer and that, as a result, could no longer be surprised by the world. He didn’t already have the explanation, but understood that this is what is to be explained. He did not behave like the bad psychoanalyst that says at the outset “Your problem is Oedipus!” (or those that at least think this). No, with each new datum he was willing to overturn everything. Marxism has not followed in this path, it has not looked at the actual world, it hasn’t turned Hegel on his head, but has instead tried to turn Marx upside down. Real “Marxism” is onto-cartography.
January 10, 2013 at 7:30 am
It sounds like what you’re arguing against, to some degree, is that genre of intellectual work that goes by the name of “theory”. A lot of writing in that genre tends to arise from a particular discipline like history or sociology, but then aspire to the heights of philosophy. In attempting to aim at those heights, the writer leaves behind the onto-cartographic detail of his originating discipline — the wheat pests of 17th century rural french life, the festival rituals of recently-christianized Andean tribal groups, the lexicographical evolution of 20th century english, etc. He leaves these details behind in order to attempt the rarefied heights of “theory”, i.e. the extraction from his own in-discipline work of a set of ideas that may play upon the philosophical stage of truth and from thence become useful to scholars in other disciplines. In making this move towards the philosophic, he “ascends” into exactly these abstractions you’re complaining about. Since they’re created by removing the specific explanatory power his ideas originally had within his own discipline, it is not surprising that these abstractions lack such a power. And since they are only works of philosophy second or third, they tend to lack the rigor or poetry of the best of that discipline.
That said, how do we satisfy the desire for interdisciplinarity without falling into this trap of theory? There are certainly many areas where building a good onto-cartography would require cutting across anthropology, sociology, history, and even other disciplines not usually included amongst the sources of theory, like geology, chemistry, and geography. Where is the zone of transit that allows movement between these different onto-cartographic regions or schools? How do we construct an interdisciplinary language that allows collaboration across these borders but doesn’t simultaneously force its speakers into the diaphanous and circular abstractions of theory?
January 10, 2013 at 10:57 am
Dear Levi, I devoured your last book when it came out, but I am really looking forward to this one.
January 10, 2013 at 5:20 pm
I’m impatient for its publication, as well.
January 10, 2013 at 7:26 pm
http://davidharvey.org/2013/01/video-a-commentary-on-marxs-method/
January 11, 2013 at 1:21 pm
At what point to we determine whether an abstraction is of value because it concentrates a great number of ideas into a linguistic shortcut or is a feedback loop like those big signifiers mentioned above? Perhaps this is more a question about the role and place of onto-cartography? I suppose I’ll just have to impatiently wait for the book as well!
January 11, 2013 at 2:43 pm
I like where you’re going Levi, yet let’s call a spade a spade: the true culprit in this need to overcome ‘Abstraction’ is Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle argued that to account for knowledge it is necessary to suppose the existence of forms that can be abstracted from matter. It is precisely this idea of knowledge as abstraction that needs to be overcome.
Against Aristotle’s doctrine of substance we should return again to Democritean or Epicurean mater materia that held that form is a mere effluence or accidental disposition of matter. More toward Deleuze’s conception of virtual intensive quantities that govern individuation by implicative and serial complication, and are irreducible to actual transformations. Matter gives being to form as an eternal principle of composition.
Instead of Abstraction as a contraction of things to form we get the intensive powers of a compositional world that is immanent and irreducible.
January 12, 2013 at 7:26 am
[...] excess inscribed in the darkest particles and particulates of being. Levi R. Bryant in a new post tell us “don’t track in abstractions”. Nick Land also taught that for Bataille, [...]
January 13, 2013 at 9:36 pm
For Marx (Grundrisse 101), abstraction “rises” to the concrete. That is how thought reproduces the concrete in the mind, BUT that is not how the concrete comes into being.
January 13, 2013 at 9:47 pm
Bob,
Exactly. Unfortunately very little *Marxism* has followed him in that.
January 14, 2013 at 1:40 am
> (which really accomplishes nothing beyond the delights of a beautiful soul that can feel superior to the way in which everyone else is a dupe)
Of course, a good network analysis might very well show such a dismissal to be utterly wrongheaded as well.
It’s worth noting how easily this kind of toothless dissent is bought up, packaged, and redistributed as popularized counterculture. See: Che shirts sold in malls, etc. Last I checked, #occupy memes were being used to hype the Grammy’s.
A vibrant Capital-supported counter-culture is certainly not a benign, feel-good “nothing”. It reinforces the existing order of things as well as anything else does; it is a systematic part of the organizational dynamics of the whole.
January 14, 2013 at 4:02 am
Daniel,
All things are pluripotent and can be put to different ends. There are no pure agents. The point is to avoid disempowering abstractions that create ghosts that are everywhere and nowhere that we can’t act on.
January 19, 2013 at 5:29 pm
Levi, i just noticed that you have been using the term “pluripotent” of late, which i quite enjoy, since i have made the notion of potency a core concept in my own sketches. Where did you get it from?
January 19, 2013 at 8:24 pm
Michael,
I took the term from developmental biology and stem cells.
January 28, 2013 at 10:47 pm
Have you read Sara Ahmed?
January 28, 2013 at 10:52 pm
Latour, a poor starting point, confuses sociology with physics. In his analysis on Einstein he presumes that the ‘observers’ in relativity need to be human, or even sentient. Observes in a post-Einstein physics sense could mean anything: a rock, an electron, etc. Harman seems to go somewhat far enough here, but the science is lacking in both Latour and Harman, and you. For philosophers to analyse physics and society they must understand, as you rightfully suggest, their own position and limitations within said society. However, speculative realism seems to be a tautology of philosophy, ‘erecting’ – for it is a fairly all male (and straight) (and white) – barriers of jargon. Adorno’s work on Jargon may be helpful for you to clarify your thinking and make clear your ideas: for mysticism in philosophy, from Hegel to Heidegger to Hilter, well you know… the rest is his-story.
January 28, 2013 at 10:54 pm
Please define what you mean by ‘master-signifiers’ – Warmly, Eilif
January 29, 2013 at 7:27 pm
Eilif,
Somehow I doubt a productive discussion will be forthcoming with you given your remarks here. You’re welcome to acquaint yourself with my work and come back when you’re feeling less combative and accusational.
January 30, 2013 at 10:27 pm
Levi, perhaps you are right. I am aware of your work, and the work of other speculative realists. I just think that there are many, many holes in the framework that come from a drastic inability to understand science. Do you have any formal training in physics? In biology? In any of the natural sciences? The Sokal Affair seems to apply to you and so many others – Fashionable Nonsense. I welcome you to acquaint yourself with your work as well.
January 30, 2013 at 11:06 pm
Eilif,
Given that I don’t evoke science to defend my positions, I’m unclear as to how you could claim such a think. Who are the speculative theorists you’re referring to who are doing such a thing? Your remarks about history and the observer indicate that you’re not familiar with my work as I discuss these things and do not dismiss them.
January 31, 2013 at 4:54 pm
In your table of contents for your new book you have a section on “Topologies of Time and Space;” topology is a complex mathematical study of surfaces, and I don’t see, as Sokal points out, why a philosophical theorist would use complex natural sciences and mathematics to explain – an analogy – something that is already philosophically complex? You have titles referring to gravity, terraformation and ecology – I’d say these need a series ‘backing up’ with some formal training in those fields. I know philosopher-scientists, like Donna Haraway, who are able to merge different elements – she is a trained biologist and philosopher.
You state,
“For me, flat ontology just means that everything is material (even incorporeal entities!) and that there is nothing outside of the world that conditions or overcodes everything else such as Platonic forms, God, and so on. Flat ontology just means that there’s only the world. It’s a synonym for immanence.”
What of the ‘withdrawal’ (term Heidegger and Harman use in speculative realism) of Dark Matter (which probably makes up about 86% of the universe) – a totally unexplored ‘something’ but a something that interacts in a way with itself that we cannot comprehend (see latest addition of New Scientist). “There’s only the world” and “everything is material” are big assumptions to make when we can see that objects can exist without materiality, or our understanding of materiality.
Do you think that light is matter?
I do like what you wrote further up,
“I argue that a subject is a machine that organizes the movements, local manifestations, and becomings of other entities. Serres gives the example of the game of rugby to illustrate this point. In rugby, he claims, it is the ball, not the players that are the subject. The players are subjected to the ball. The ball brings the players together in certain relations that are constantly shifting.”
As my partner says, we don’t ‘have’ a body, a body ‘has’ us :)
Warmly,
Eilif
January 31, 2013 at 4:59 pm
Oh, perhaps this blog is the subject? :) And we the players :)
February 1, 2013 at 3:11 pm
Hi Eilif,
I confess that I find this “conversation” to be incredibly unpleasant. In this handful of comments you’ve managed to accuse me of defending white male privilege and heteroprivilege, without knowing that I’ve written quite a bit on queer theory (you can find my latest article in Identities: A Journal for Culture, Gender, and Politics) or anything about my sexuality. Based on the *title* to sections in my forthcoming book, you’ve also impugned my background and training, knowing nothing of it, nor even the contents of those sections. “Gravity” is the term I use for *power* in seeking to account for why social assemblages hold together as they do. It’s a metaphor or an analogy, not a claim about physics. I use this term because I believe the term “power” in social and political theory has become too anthropocentric and focused on the discursive, ignoring the role that nonhuman entities play in how social assemblages come to become organized and how oppression functions. In referencing “topology” I am not making a claim about mathematics– though I’ve been discussing topology since my first book and throughout my work on Lacan (I used to practice as a Lacanian analyst and did my training with Bruce Fink and Dany Nobus) –but refers to the network structure of time and space in social assemblages and ecological networks. Rather than understanding time and space as containers in which entities are housed, I treat space as structured through paths along which entities must move and time as being composed of durations unfolding at a variety of different speeds. You’ll have to read the book for the full treatment of these things and why they are significant for social and political theory and how domination functions. Taking me to task for using terms like “topology” and “gravity” is a bit like taking Harman to task for using the term “carpentry” in Guerrilla Metaphysics without being a carpenter or talking about literal carpentry.
Harman is a good friend of mine. We have published a book together (The Speculative Turn), and presented together on a number of occasions. We do not share the same ontologies, but if you’re interested in my take on what he calls “withdrawal”, you can read chapters 3 and 4 of The Democracy of Objects. I have also written on dark matter and even consulted with the scientists at the IceCube observatory in Antarctica to learn about their scientific practices and how they are formative of social relations in their investigations of neutrinos, which is part of the story pertaining to issues of dark matter and energy. My interest in their work revolves around questions in sociology of science and how scientific investigation generates particular forms of global/international social relations.
I hope this isn’t how you approach everyone for discussion. You seem to have some sort of hostility towards me for no reason whatsoever. My work isn’t an attack on the emancipatory struggles of others. There’s a rich place for social construction within it– your initial reference to Sarah Ahmed suggests that this is a concern of yours –and takes into account the way in which identities in social fields are historical, constructed, and discursive. I merely argue that domination isn’t solely a product of the discursive, but also involves all sorts of nonhuman, material entities that can’t be reduced to the signifier, how we conceptualize them, or the discursive. Moreover, I am at pains to draw attention to how societies are themselves ecologies embedded in the broader ecology of the natural world because, well, we are living in the midst of a profound climate crisis and need to become more aware of this in our political thought. Charges of being guilty of the same problems Sokal identified in Fashionable Nonsense based on a single blog post, section headings of a book you haven’t read, and when you’re clearly unfamiliar with the published work and background of another person won’t get you very far. This is above all the case when your own biography on your blog indicates that you lack the background to judge these issues yourself. Sokal, at least, had a background in physics placing him in a position to judge such issues. Then again, it’s arguable whether he even understood what he was critiquing– his critique of Badurillard for talking about media-space as non-Euclidean is particular egregious –and whether the people that he critiqued were even making the claims he attributed to them (he seems to attribute things to Lacan and Latour that neither of them ever made). At any rate, your way of talking to me suggests that you think I’m guilty of eating infants or something. I’m merely interested in understanding how power functions so that we can devise effective strategies for fighting oppressive and unjust practices. It also is extremely exhausting to explain a body of work to someone who clearly hasn’t taken the time to read any of that work– even here on the blog –and who’s just stumbled upon a post. It’s both ungenerous and rude.
February 1, 2013 at 8:36 pm
Levi,
I don’t mean to be rude, or ungenerous.
I have read your work. And you are correct, I don’t have a background in anything formally academic, really. But I have read and consulted with philosopher-scientists (Noam Chomsky, especially) and they seem to wary of the types of tropes in speculative realism because of the introjection of specific scientific terms into sociological meanings without proper translation or reasoning. I am simply inquiring about your work.
I have analysed your work, and the work of Lacan and others; knowing that you practised as a Lacanian analyst is interesting, given Lacan’s own investigations.
On a sociological front, I merely bring up these issues because they seem obvious to me. Most of the people at the ‘top’ levels of Speculative Realism who are creating the theories are white, straight men, I ask: am I right? and if so, why?
I hope that you don’t take criticism as rudeness. :)
Warmly,
Eilif
February 4, 2013 at 12:13 am
Reblogged this on Eilif Verney-Elliott and commented:
Levi Bryant & Me Debating – look at the comments, what he wrote is actually trite, meaningless nonsense, scroll to the bottom.