These days I’m going through a lot, so I stutter and my thoughts are impressionistic, like a pastiche. I return to the question. Why the perpetual forgetting of matter? Is there perhaps a material unconscious of the world of academic theory that isn’t the unconscious of the signifier? An unconscious composed of something so close that it is perpetually and necessarily forgotten? This would not be the Lacanian unconscious that is “structured like a language” (though I’m convinced this exists). This would not be Leibniz’s unconscious that is composed of tiny perceptions (though I’m convinced too that this exists). This would not be Jameson’s political unconscious (though I’m convinced this exists as well). Nor would it be Deleuze and Guattari’s unconscious of desiring-machines and a body without organs, though that too exists. No, this would be an unconscious that is a priori forgotten because, while serving as a necessary condition of all thought, it is independent of and anterior to any correlation. It can disrupt correlation and drive– yes, drive –towards conceptual and signifying creation, but it would be that that must be necessarily forgotten and repressed within every framework of thought. Let us confess that thought is necessarily correlational, even where we don’t yet know what this means.
But first sociology. I take it as an axiom– which is to say, I take it in the modern mathematical sense as a working hypothesis or “rule of the game”, not in the sense of antiquity as a “self-evident truth” (do these exist anymore?) –that philosophy in particular and the humanities more broadly cannot subjectivize or integrate their own sociological and ethnographic conditions of production. These too are a priori forgotten. Everywhere us “humanist”– meaning academics working in the humanities –apply sociology and ethnography to everything else without applying it to our own discursive practices. We authorize ourselves to point out the bad faith of every other practice, their odorous sociological dimension, without looking at our own status as a sociological phenomenon. Yes, there are exceptions. As always, it’s a matter of what’s statistically dominant. So as an axiom, we can begin from the premise that the university, the academy, or intellectual production can only exist in societies where there is a certain distribution of labor. University knowledge is only possible where there are people other than academics that produce food, that make technologies, that run governments, that build houses and roads, and all the rest. The university and academic discourse can only exist where time is freed up for a certain sort of labor we know as intellectual labor.
This is not without consequences. There is a whole sociology and ethnography of academics to be written, one that would be more corrosive than any critique we’ve ever witnessed, one that would call into question a whole series of theoretical assumptions, and that would present a mirror that we don’t want to look into. Some have already begun to write this critique: Marx in some moments when critiquing Hegel, Bourdieu in works like Pascalian Meditations and The Logic of Practice, Luhmann in his analysis of the autopoietic closure and production of functional subsystems, Lacan in his analysis of the university discourses. Other names could be given. At any rate, to be an academic, regardless of how “Marxist” one might be, is to be a bourgeois subject. It is to be a subject divorced from a certain mode of production and practice. It is to be divorced from a mode of practice that engages with things. As Heidegger argued– and on this he was right, no matter how despicable and tiresome he was in so many other respects –this entails that things become invisible. When things work, they become extensions of our own body and therefore indiscernible. As a result, we don’t recognize the contribution that things make and, because our work is primarily concerned with ideas and texts, we are led to see the world as held together by ideas, norms, signs, signifiers, forms, the intelligible. We are comfortable, even when living in poverty, and thereby do not recognize the infrastructure upon which our comfort relies. Some of this work has been done, but there’s far more to do.
We even end up talking about monstrosities like “discursive practices”. Why is the idea of “discursive practices” such a monstrosity? Because the concept of practice involves the notion of the resistance of things. Oh sure, when we engage in the interpretation of a text there are ways in which it resists our interpretations. Oh yes, I’m well aware that there are leaky spots in my interpretation of the relationship between Deleuze and Guattari and Lacan. But this is a very different sort of resistance than we find in a material practice. Recently as I was putting together chairs for my dining room table I found that they had given me two left legs for one of my chairs. That was an encounter– to use a Lacanian formulation –with the real. No amount of interpretation, conceptualization, signification, or hermeneutics could enable me to put that chair together correctly with two left legs. And for this reason I knew that the chair was real. In its obstinence, the chair announced itself as real, as something beyond linguistic structuration, conceptualization, “social construction”, discursivity, and all the rest. In its bruteness, it evaded my conceptual mastery. There was a way that it would work (if it had a right leg and a left leg) and a way that it wouldn’t work (with two left legs). While entangled with conceptuality and signification– yes, there was a blueprint and human projected telos (not an ontological telos belonging to the things themselves) –this deadlock was a matter– matter! –of the things themselves, not my conceptuality. There you have it, a bit of the real.
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno provides us with the structural schema of every possible correlationism or idealism. There he writes that [ideology]:
…lies in the implict identity of concepts and thing, an identity justified by the world even when a doctrine summarily teaches that consciousness depends on being. (40)
“Ideology” can here be treated as a synonym for “idealism” or “correlationism”. Correlationism, idealism, is that philosophical framework that reduces thing to concept, to the intelligible, to what is thought. Synonyms for concept would be signifier, text, sign, notion, form, essence, etc. In each of these instances we evoke an identity of thing and concept, where thing is erased and concept reigns supreme. That moment of resistance disappears and everything becomes the smooth space of the concept, text, sign, signifier, or form. Everything becomes that which can be domesticated or mastered because thought traffics in the concept. And where thought traffics in what is itself– concept, signifier, form, essence, sign –is it a surprise that thought finds only itself? The erasure of matter and nature– though everything is nature, including thought –follows of its own accord. A priori hylephobia.
Yet as Adorno continues elsewhere in his lectures entitled Metaphysics: Concept and Problems,
The fact that, just by talking about matter, one endows this matter with form– that is, conceptual form –should not be confused with the meaning of the form itself. The peculiarity of the concept of hyle, or matter, is that we are using a concept or speaking of a principle which, by its meaning, refers to something which is not a concept or a principle. We only correctly understand what a concept such as hyle means if we realize that its conceptual meaning refers to something non-conceptual. (67)
Matter refers to that which is non-conceptual and, I would add, to that which evades and escapes all conceptuality and signification. Matter is a-semiotic, a-conceptual. This is quite different, I add, than saying matter is formless. The suggestion that matter is formless, that it is a liquid stuff awaiting intellectual/conceptual form to form it, is a superficial form of conceptual of thinking that simply treats matter as what conceptuality is not. To be sure, matter disrupts conceptuality, but it doesn’t follow from that that it is formless. Rather, it is a-conceptual form that provides a spur to conceptuality in search of its structure; a search that can only proceed, as Adrian Johnston has recently remarked (pdf), empirically (empiricism being anathema to all pure theory and the humanities).
Perhaps, then, it’s possible to carry out an archeology of materialism. Matter would be found in each and every theory or philosophy where that philosophy encounters a chair with two left legs. It would lie in those deviant moments of a philosophy where it’s conceptuality stands in ruin in the face of an obstinence that can’t be domesticated in the correlative identity of thing and concept. For example, in Kant it would be found in that moment of the Prolegomena (and elsewhere in his writings on natural science) where he discusses enantiomorphs, or mirror images where nonetheless two entities can’t be exchanged for one another. However, while such an archeology be interesting, we would probably do well to spend more time attending to encounters with things like chairs with two left legs and natural disasters, as such an archeology would again plunge us back into endless hermeneutics which, paraphrasing Nietzsche, is “academic, all too academic”.
July 19, 2013 at 8:25 am
Reblogged this on syndax vuzz.
July 19, 2013 at 12:38 pm
is it really a puzzle why folks drawn to, rewarded by, and socialized into the practices of humanities overvalue/overemphasize the role of hermeneutics?
July 19, 2013 at 7:36 pm
“Matter refers to that which is non-conceptual and, I would add, to that which evades and escapes all conceptuality and signification. Matter is a-semiotic, a-conceptual.” = the wild terrain of being and becoming as non-thetic structural (corporeal) conditions of possibility? The wilderness…
I keep wondering how to think about and, more importantly, from and as the wilderness, when it is so apparent that signification is at base the cognitive-associative deployment language – useful and affording imagination, but also obfuscating and prone to alienation? Demarcation as the will to symbolic expansion often distances us from affecting a deeper sensual engagement and wisdom in-the-world. If cognition is really just a capacity for coping (for acting and adapting), and associative meaning is mostly projective phantasy, can we ever (re)orient human-being/becomings to be capable of sense-able thought? Which is to say, can language/meaning/thought ever be fully materialist?
THIS:
“Cognition is both social and material, rooted in the ring-fenced metacognitive resources we have acquired, the embodied capacities it recruits, and the resources and subjective possibilities our world supplies (Johnson, 2007; Tolman, 1994; Vygotsky, 1962)”.
July 19, 2013 at 10:07 pm
[…] enact it in our general practices and orientation. Indeed, as Levi Bryant recently suggested (see here), there is an entire sociology of what I am calling “Glue” still to be rediscovered, […]
July 20, 2013 at 8:20 am
A few points:
Why is the unconscious ‘the unconscious of the signifier’? This wasn’t Freud’s unconscious and he did have a sense that there was a material or organic aspect to the unconscious. Also, Lacan speaks (obscurely) of ‘the materiality of the unconscious’, so this rather contradicts the idea of ‘the unconscious of the signifier’ as it is represented here. I suspect this is Lacan’s contradiction, not yours.
“Ideology” can here be treated as a synonym for “idealism” …but it isn’t, unless one reduces the latter to the former. Adorno does do this, as does Marx, but there’s no a priori reason we should accept that they’re right.
I agree with you about ‘The Humanities’. Perhaps Bourdieu is an exception.
July 20, 2013 at 8:36 am
Apologies, I meant ‘the materiality of the signifier’ not ‘the materiality of the unconscious’. It was a slip of the key.
July 20, 2013 at 2:41 pm
Martin,
In his ecrits on science, Lacan equates the signifier with the material cause. I’ve always found this to be odd, thinking it would be more appropriate to equate it with the formal cause. It seems to me that in certain orientations of theory there’s almost a superegoic command to call oneself a materialist. This leads to all sorts of idealist propositions being portrayed as materialist.
Could you say more about what you’re getting at with ideology? I think the “ideo-” of ideology is there for a reason and we see it constantly reflected in ideological analyses. Part of the problem here is that “materialism” has dual significations in the world of theory. In philosophy it denotes physicalism descended from the Greek and Roman atomists. In cultural theory descended from Marx, it denotes a focus on real social practices rather than idealized political theories such as those found in Plato, Locke, Rousseau, etc. Ideological analysis would then be an analysis of what people really believe. Marx’s characterization of his thought as materialist made sense as labor and production as he conceived it was a transformation of physical entities. Unfortunately, with subsequent critical theory, the physical came to be more and more lost and instead the analysis of ideal meaning formations came to dominate. As a result, it’s hard to call contemporary critical theory materialist.
July 21, 2013 at 9:03 pm
Levi, is it possible that this straining for the material unconscious is a sign that the concept of matter isn’t doing any work for us anymore? Can we continue to theorize about objects and physical systems without recourse to it ? Physics doesn’t seem to have any kind of ultimate matter, or most basic, solid stuff, whether in the form of atoms or some kind of flow. Biological systems make their own elements out of energy and (bio)chemicals. Why not talk about all of this without raising any ultimate concept of matter? There are objects of many different kinds, none more real than any other, whether we’re on the scale of neutrons, chairs, or cells. Its seems like there’s a certain convergence around this kind of materialism without matter in Luhmann, Sloterdijk, and Harman, among others. Heisenberg has been called idealist for his critique of substantialism in Physics and Philosophy, but isn’t he doing something more like physics sans the concept of matter?
In media theory, it’s clear that discursive practices are always bound up with the resistance of things. They can’t get away with just being abstract or conceptual, taking place in some immaterial space of language or thought. And then in feminist theory, there’s been the focus for decades now on how embodiment affects discursive practice.
The idea that matter is a-semiotic and a-conceptual seems to require an immaterial ontological plane, which seems to work against a naturalistic meta-philosophy.
So the three questions would be, isn’t there already a lot of work in the “humanities” that takes resistance of things seriously?
Do we need the concept of matter for a naturalistic philosophy of objects and practices?
Doesn’t the passion for the real of matter and things resinscribe the matter/form distinction in spite of best intentions against hylomorphism, by reaching for an ultimate, most real substance–and then, conversely, doesn’t it make the conceptual or linguistic realm seem all the more immaterial, which it can never really be (especially if we’re avoiding logocentrism)?
July 22, 2013 at 3:52 pm
I think Levi’s point (and he can correct me if I’m wrong) is that some people need to get their feet wet. It’s one thing to have discursive practices that account for the resistance of objects, and another to be the one who actually encounters that resistance.
July 22, 2013 at 4:14 pm
[…] response to my last post, Wherewithal […]
August 14, 2013 at 4:55 pm
How in the world does a poorly crafted chair reveal a brute form of the real when you clearly still understood the entity AS a chair? It clearly does not disrupt your pre-ontological understanding, or the as-stricture, to a point of utter failure, leading to a sense of wonder regarding what lies “presencing” before you. In your example, you are simply understanding the chair AS poorly crafted, not as point of resistance; it’s still conceptualizable, and makes a good degree of SENSE in relation to the network of signification that is your dining room. What should be questioned is not the entity but the practical relationship between the craftsman & the finished work. Why wasn’t the craftsman able to bring the chair into its “ownmost” & vice-versa? It obviously wasn’t the material, in-itself. The issue is the relational whole between the craftsman, the material, and the set of practices (which would be understood by way of care/ecstatic temporality). The “miscommunication,” the calling & responding between the three, resulted in said chair, which in no way points to a form of material resistance. What reveals itself is the fragility of practices that are based upon temporality, and since miscommunication is always-already a possibility, it’s more likely the operating form of time is not even ecstatic but something like a postal system.
August 14, 2013 at 5:17 pm
Adding one more thing: It seems clear that the practices leading to your “breakdown” experience of the familar feel of a chair, are not anything at all, but a loose spectral “framework” made possible (& to a degree impossible) by temporality. I would argue that you take a wrong turn on the woodpath when articulating the phenomena of “breakdown” situations. Your pointing to the material is no better than the pointing to man that occurs in any various anthropocentric theory. In your “circumspection,” you walk right past the realtional “whole” & its constituitive source: time or temporal delay. Thanks….these were just some thoughts and questions.
August 15, 2013 at 4:22 pm
Simple. The broken chair discloses something other than discursivity at work, a bruteness of materiality that is neither concept, nor signifier. The point about anthropocentrism is neither here nor there as in this context the issue is epistemic and will therefore involve reference to some sort of sentient agent. It’s a mistake to suppose that post-correlationist thought involves erasure of any reference to sentient beings.
August 17, 2013 at 8:40 pm
[…] to the sociological setting of the academy that strongly encourage a trend towards this sort of idealism). As always, the point here is not that the discursive, meaning, signs, language, etc., are not […]