Still marking, though the end is in sight.
In light of suggestions that Spinoza is not a materialist and somehow remains tied to theology, I’ve decided to switch gears and jump back to the appendix to Part I of the Ethics, where Spinoza outlines the consequences of his metaphysics. Readers are invited to substitute the word “nature” for every reference to God and are asked to focus special attention to how Spinoza characterizes God’s action in the world. For Spinoza all events occur through natural causes, God is not indepedent or transcendent to creation, and God has no will that selects among different possible events or that acts miraculously. These points are underlined with even greater force in the Theological-Political Treatise, where Spinoza gives a naturalistic interpretation of Scripture, showing that there are no miracles only poorly understood events, and because most humans lack well developed abilities to reason clearly, ethical principles are taught mythologically rather than according to causes that promote the conatus, health, or perseverence of the body. This was a book that led to the imprisonment and execution of a number of Enlightenment figures that endorsed it due to how deeply it challenged the power and authority of the Church. You can find it online here. Now on to the appendix to Part one of the Ethics:
In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are pre-determined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion offered, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.
All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it ? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows first, that men think themselves free, inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them to wish and desire. Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in their search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, etc., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers ( having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honors. Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e., nothing which is useless to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result: among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc.: so they declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done them by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that God’s judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to their final causes. There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might have caused men’s minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge of the truth.
I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollaries of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versa: it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that that effect, is most perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God: for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between the object of want and the object of assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he desired them.
We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their theory–namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a roof on to some one’s head and kills him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for, if it had not by God’s will fallen with that object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. “But why,” they will insist, “was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very time walking that way?” If you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: “But why was the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?” So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last you take refuge in the will of God–in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt another.
Hence any one who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority would vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my third point.
After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that they are free agents arose the further notions praise and blame, sin and merit.
I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature; the former I will briefly explain here.
Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good, everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are ill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion–as though there were any order in nature, except in relation to our imagination–and say that God has created all things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected, though they are considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion whose objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid; it through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid, if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.
Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony–all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have witnessed and finally skepticism: for, although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known. It is commonly said: “So many men, so many minds; everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates.” All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as mathematics attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I have urged.
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, etc. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
May 12, 2007 at 1:25 am
“”””Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, etc. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Hallelujah! er Hallelujah-stein!. That could nearly be Locke on Design, if not Newton. An important passage: yet it’s a type of Deism, and still “religious.”
May 12, 2007 at 7:05 am
Deism posits God as a creator at the origin of time that sets the laws and puts things in motion, and then has no further intervention. For Spinoza there is no moment of creation, there’s only the immanent principles/laws of nature and cause and effect relationships. In this view, there are no first causes at the origin of time, nor an final or teleological causes functioning as a goal towards which nature moves. Moreover, there is no mind/body dualism or separation of body and soul in Spinoza. These principles/laws just are the basic laws of physics, chemistry, the dynamics of biology, neurology, social systems, etc. Consequently, if you think the investigation of these things is “religious”, then so be it. When Spinoza speaks of God “creating”, this really should be taken as a tongue and cheek statement. For Spinoza, God creates in the same way that a river like the Colorado River cuts away at rock. There’s no intentionality or agency in this “creation”, just cause and effect relations slowly producing the Grand Canyon. Similarly, there is nothing inconsistent in Spinoza’s conception of reality with, say, Darwin’s principles of evolution or the emergence of life from matter. One of Spinoza’s key theses– one that caused the most trouble in his historical context –was the thesis that motion is immanently intrinsic to matter, thus requiring no agency from the outside to set it to work in producing what it produces. It makes as little sense to ask why the Colorado River “creates” the Grand Canyon as it does to ask why earth “creates” life. I see Spinoza’s reference to God as basically being a rhetorical ploy to turn the meaning of the term inside out and undermine any belief in miracles, transcendent causes, a grand purpose, or salvation in another life after death. In short, you can drop the word God wherever you like and simply replace it with nature.
May 12, 2007 at 2:44 pm
Thanks. I agree the anti-teleological point does seem quite modern and Darwinist-physicalist (what did Nietzsche say of Spinoza? A spider or something). Nonetheless Spinoza continues to use the older scholastic terms (perfection being of the most puzzling). Bricmont, hardly some wild-eyed postmodernist (he’s a Belgian physicist and philosopher of science) often makes reference to Spinoza’s determinism. The postmods however don’t seem so interested in that determinist, mechanistic aspect of Spinoza, as far as ah can tell; that’s a bit contra-humanism, is it not (Spinoza does seem close to denying intention as well in a few sections of Ethics I). Spinoza, additionally, does not doubt there’s a world out there that language can map, describe, denote: that’s what he does, largely.
May 12, 2007 at 7:19 pm
As always it’s important to read carefully and not to treat words abstractly. You write:
The question to ask is not whether he uses older scholastic terms, but rather what does he do with these scholastic terms? Under Spinoza’s pen their meaning entirely changes and they become something very different. Look at what Spinoza writes:
This is a stunning statement from the standpoint of the scholastic theology that Spinoza is combatting and seeking to overturn. What, in effect, Spinoza is saying is that everything in nature is perfect. Compare this to the theological view that holds that nature is corrupt and imperfect, and that there are different degrees of perfection. Such a view supposes that there are transcendent standards outside of time and history– like Platonic forms –against which everything that exists is measured in terms of how well it approaches conformity with these ideals. These could be Platonic forms or they could be ideas in God’s head. For Spinoza all this disappears. There are only the cause and effect sequences, producing what is, without any standard against which they are measured. As Spinoza will go on to argue in part 3 of the Ethics, statements about better or worse, good or bad, the perfect and the imperfect are just psychological evaluations pertaining to how a particular body interacts with another object and whether that object or outside influence promotes the conatus of the being in question or diminishes it, i.e., Spinoza has naturalized ethics and abolished transcendent measures.
Incidentally, I do not consider Bricmont a credible source on postmodernism, nor share your hostility to postmodernism. Sokal and Bricomont’s view that postmodernism is somehow anti-science or seeking to undermine science demonstrates a pretty poor understanding of those texts that might loosely be called “postmodern”.
May 13, 2007 at 1:33 am
Spinoza is saying is that everything in nature is perfect. Compare this to the theological view that holds that nature is corrupt and imperfect, and that there are different degrees of perfection.
And, again, that sort of naturalist and immanent perspective is not so far from traditional design arguments. You are correct that platonic and catholic tradition generally held the natural world to be fallen, evil, amoral, etc. But there were naturalist theologians for centuries, and however unhip, Locke and Newton were suggesting nearly the same sort of clockwork-like order in nature as Spinoza was. But they are from England, and sort of suspect.
Bricmont refers to Spinoza as a determinist. That is the key point: that natural processes and events are not as chaotic and random as some quantum physicists or postmodernist-indeterminists and subjectivists had suggested: there is order, and predictability, though that doesn’t necessarily imply some Designer. LaPlaceanism is not prima facie mistaken for Bricmont, and I suspect Spinoza was more fond of physics, statistical mechanics, probability issues, than of, well, metaphysics, tho’ those sciences were still in their infancy. The quoted passage supports a somewhat Bricmontian reading as well. Additionally, I do think that Spinoza (as you suggest) does not doubt the reality of his perceptions. That is a key difference between him and Descartes (and subsequent idealists). The natural world exists, apart from his perceptions. But most postmods want it both ways: they want amoral objective nature, drives, instincts, etc. and then they shift gears and seem to uphold a more platonic or Kantian doubt about the reality of appearances (and the inability of language to describe those appearances). Bricmont correctly perceives Spinoza to be opposed to idealism, of whatever variety. I don’t think Spinozaism should be read as pure scientific materialism, but it’s closer to that than to idealism, or psychology (though I find his psychological speculations somewhat vague and obscure)
May 13, 2007 at 2:57 am
Well once again, I do not think Bricmont is a credible source in philosophy of science, sociology of science, or postmodernism. Indeed, I think of Sokal and Bricmont as crypto-Platonists, tied to their own theological vision, by virtue of their ahistorical, non-sociological conception of science. That aside, I suspect that you wouldn’t have your science in its extant form at all without Spinoza and other like-minded theological thinkers.
May 13, 2007 at 4:51 pm
In other words, Bricmont/Sokal are not approved by french marxists; and only french marxist readings of Spinoza are viable (regardless if Bricmont {or say Bertrand Russell}, knows Spinoza backwards and forwards).
TO be honest, man, I don’t understand how your love for Marxism (or the even stranger marxism of Althusser, or Lacan) squares with your love of the “Aufklarung.”
May 13, 2007 at 7:49 pm
TO be honest, man, I don’t understand how your love for Marxism (or the even stranger marxism of Althusser, or Lacan) squares with your love of the “Aufklarung.”
This is because you know nothing about Lacan or Althusser, yet still feel compelled to speak about them for some reason. The thought of all of these thinkers grew out of the critiques of the Enlightenment. Some of us are intelligent enough to recognize that the critiques offered by figures like Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, Spinoza, etc with their analysis of the human passions were woefully inadequate, requiring a far more nuanced and sophisticated psychology, sociology, anthropology, and understanding of how history informs thought and social practices. Figures such as Lacan, Freud, Marx, etc., make significant contributions to this project. That aside, I’m not sure where you got the impression that I’m an Althusserian or that Lacan was a Marxist.
My view that Bricmont and Sokal are not credible sources has nothing to do with Marxism or French Marxism (incidentally, Sokal is a Marxist and one of the primary reasons he undertook his critique was that he believed postmodernism is undermining leftist political engagement), and everything to do with the fact that they attribute claims to others that those thinkers are not making and are generally very poor readers of the texts they seek to criticize. I’d go one step further and say that Sokal, despite being a scientist, has a rather facile understanding of what science is and what is at stake in science studies, confusing analysis of the social practices and history of science with a nihilistic skepticism that somehow denies the reality of scientific findings. Quoting things out of context and not taking the time to determine what the author himself is attempting to argue are not good reading practices. Sokal and Bricmont read the texts of their targets a bit like fundamentalist Christians read the Bible by quoting selective passages and never paying attention to the context in which these passages occur and the history of the text and how it was produced. They find something that vaguely says what they want it to say, quote it out of context, and say “see how full of nonsense these philosophers are and look at how they’re trying to undermine science!” There are plenty of critiques to be had of postmodern thinkers. If you had eyes to see you would discover that this blog often offers such critiques and that you’ll find them all over the blogosphere on blogs devoted primarily to French thinkers and Critical Theorists, but the manner in which Sokal and Bricmont proceed is neither honest, nor accurate. Now if you wish to have a serious discussion about these matters you can sit down and do the requisite work and read these figures, acquaint yourself with their arguments, and then we can talk.
I’m sorry that I disappoint you by not swallowing your simplistic and inaccurate reductivist readings of a figure like Spinoza or having knee-jerk reactions like yourself whenever a word like “God” is used. Some of us take the time to actually pay attention to how words are being used and how concepts are being deployed, rather than twitching the moment we hear a word that we’re accustomed to hearing used in a different way. Some of us take the time to read what is actually said, rather than assuming we know what is being said from the title of a chapter.
May 13, 2007 at 10:31 pm
Sure, Serious. Like, confirmable statements about perceivable events/objects/situations? Or propositions at least capable of being confirmed inferentially, or assigned a probability value. Or do you mean Truth in Kantian terms: synthetic or analytical. (a priori or a posteriori?) Psychoanalysis is neither. Nor is most marxist dogma (and a bloody effective dogma it is)
You seem to think there is some magic conceptualism whereby the obscure theories of Freud, or Lacan, or Marx just become true, because some academic leftists chant the jargon all the time. (and I have read enough of Lacan’s Ecrits to realize that he was a more f-ed up quack than Freud was).
AS far as Spinoza goes, there are few if any substantial arguments in the Ethics, other than something along the lines of a type of Aristotelian determinism, once the theological terms are stripped away. Propositions with terms and premises which cannot be defined or really even shown to be true or false (ie claims about thinking/love/the will, etc.) are themselves meaningless; or at best valid, but unsound: e.g. “God is a thinking thing” is meaningless, except by assuming that God exists. Even with your substitution (“Nature is a thinking thing”)—it’s meaningless, or trivial, in the sense that humans think, and they are part (a small part) of nature. The neighbor’s cat may be smarter than the birds she hunts, but I don’t think she is “thinking.” Perhaps if we put some of Spinoza’s “propositions” out by her catbox, and she starts to offer some exegesis of the texts, I shall change my mind.
May 13, 2007 at 11:04 pm
I strongly suspect you’re Dejan in another guise given the strange coincidence that the two of you almost always post at exactly the same time. But that aside, you seem to have a strong penchant for dismissing things a priori in sweeping gestures without discussing any specific claim you’re rejecting or any specific argument you find to be lacking. You just wave your hands and say “hocus pocus, Freud, Lacan, Althusser, and Marx are all nonsense on stilts!” Unfortunately saying doesn’t make it so. This does not speak to a high degree of reason or enlightenment ideals on your part, though it does suggest a quasi-religious dogmatism. Yes yes, I know they’re hard to read and to really argue with someone you first have to read things carefully.
We’ve already discussed a number of aspects of Spinoza and I’ve shown, point by point, how you mischaracterize his position. For me the issue isn’t whether or not Spinoza is “true” that interests me. What interests me is a number of concepts that he contributed, such as the idea of a single immanent substance, a certain conception of naturalistic critique of religion, his psychology, etc. As for Lacan and Freud, it isn’t simply a matter of “academic leftists” repeating their views. I both have been through Lacanian analysis and have practiced as a psychoanalyst, and therefore have clinical experience that convinces me of the validity of this therapeutic practice.
Again, the amazingly poor level of your reading skills is evinced in the following remarks:
What could this mean for Spinoza? It means that there are things that exist within substance such as human beings, animals, perhaps someday computers, that think; nothing less, nothing more. Do you disagree that there are material things such as humans that think? Perhaps if you took the time to sit down and carefully read the text you would see these things.
I don’t completely endorse any thinker I work with. If you wish to discuss specific claims about a specific thinker I’m happy to do so. Honestly though I’m not really clear as to what your motive is in frequenting this site. Clearly you have absolutely no respect for me and you believe that most of the thinkers I talk about are completely worthless, so you’re really wasting your time hanging about.