Nathan Brown over at Speculative Heresy has an interesting response to Peter Hallward’s critique of Meillassoux’s After Finitude. I have not yet read Hallward’s critique of Meillassoux in Radical Philosophy, but Nathan summarizes the points as follows:

In his recent review… Hallward charges Meillassoux’s work with four major flaws:

1) An equivocation regarding the relation between thinking and being; or epistemology and ontology.

2) An equivocation between metaphysical and physical or natural necessity.

3) A confusion of pure and applied mathematics.

4) An inability to think concrete processes of social and political change.

To the fourth charge I would add an inability to think concrete processes of natural or physical change. Nathan attempts to show how these charges come up short against Meillassoux. It seems to me that these criticisms apply equally to Badiou and Meillossoux, bringing the two perilously close to idealism. Meillassoux, I think, fares a bit better but still runs into similar problems. I confess that I’m sympathetic to all of Hallward’s critiques here, as is evident from my posts on this blog years ago grappling with Badiou’s ontology.