Since Graham has announced it, I might as well announce it here as well. I have finally begun reading Latour’s Irreductions, which is a short little treatise that can be found in the second part of The Pasteurization of France. About a year ago I finally got around to reading Latour’s Reassembling the Social. At that time I thought I was simply taking up a pleasant diversion from serious theory during the Summer, occupying my mind with something different for a time, by picking up something outside my usual neighborhood of thinkers. However, as dramatic as it sounds, Reassembling the Social had a dramatic and fundamental impact on nearly everything I believed about both the nature of the world and the social, both helping me to articulate things I had been groping towards before and challenging me to give up deeply cherished assumptions and ways of posing problems. I continue to be haunted by that book to this day, hounded by its declarations and challenges, and anguished by a number of the familiar coordinates it has required me to gradually sacrifice. I am still digesting this book to this day.
Irreductions promises to provide a similar challenge. Those loosely familiar with Latour will immediately think of “science studies” and elaborate discussions of the interconnection of actors of all sorts, ranging from natural entities like genes, discourses, ozone holes, signs, collectives, etc. In picking up a book such as Science in Action, We Have Never Been Modern, or The Pasteurization of France, your first thought might be “all of this is very interesting, but it is restricted to the domain of science studies or the sociology of science. While fascinating, this really doesn’t connect to my own research.” Texts like Reassembling the Social and Irreductions are different. Both are philosophical treatises. Reassembling the Social is not simply an introduction to Actor-Network Theory, but presents an entirely new conception of the social that includes both humans and non-humans building the social through various alliances and assemblages. The motto of Reassembling the Social is that “the social does not explain, but must be explained.” Think about that for a moment and you will see that it fundamentally displaces a number of questions in social and political theory, all of which presuppose the social as a sort of substance that explains rather than as something to be explained.
It is difficult to describe Irreductions as anything other than a metaphysical treatise. What Latour presents here is an entire ontology that heroically affirms that nothing can be reduced to anything else, nor that anything is irreducible to anything else. Rather, the universe becomes populated by trials of strength where actors, human and inhuman, vie with one another, striving to enlist allies to advance their own aims. Written in a style that simultaneously recalls Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Leibniz’s Monadology, Nietzsche’s Gay Science, and Epictetus and Epicurus, it unfolds as a series of gnomic propositions ambiguous in their sense, but also ripe with all sorts of realist implications. As Graham observes in his marvelous Prince of Networks, Latour claims that this short treatise is a sort of master-key or ground of all his subsequent thought. It is also a work that resonates deeply with Whitehead, Stengers, Nietzsche, and Deleuze and Guattari. I have had others tell me that they find “no there there” with Latour and actor-network theory– no doubt grumbling about the descriptivism of actor-network studies –but I simply don’t see how understanding of objects and the social cannot come away transformed after reading these works. I suppose I am doing my part here for Latour’s trial of strength, trying to enlist others to read these amazing works so that I might have someone else to discuss them with.
January 14, 2009 at 2:09 am
Bruno Latour is to be praised for providing a tractable realist model, of the non-naive variety. The fact that all objects are on the same ontological level for Latour, and are considered real only so long as they can be shown to pull their own weight (in terms of their traceable associations with other actors which they effect and are effected by) is for me deeply refreshing. Finally we can set aside the stale human / nonhuman split and put all actors on the same level.
I agree with Graham Harman however, that if we accept Latour’s relational ontology and accept the idea that all objects are solely defined in terms of their relations, then we are left in a rut. For two objects to enter into a relation they both need to exist, and to partially resist their falling into relation. I think Harman is right to point out here that objects entering into relation need to partially withdraw from this relation, for among other reasons, if objects were totally relational and had no autonomy, we would have just one big homogeneous web of relations melted into each other, rather than the singular objects we do in fact encounter.
All that aside, I think what Latour does in terms of setting all objects on an equal ontological footing is a much-needed potion for the common philosophical error of drawing some fateful split between humans / nonhumans. The fruitfulness of Latour’s approach is evidenced simply by the fact of the massive increase in the objects we can talk about with his approach, such as NASA, the ozone hole, and geological rifts. As we all find ourselves more and more having to deal in particular with growing environmental problems that can only be understood in terms of large networks of actors which aren’t totally societal or totally natural (“quasi-objects” in We Have Never Been Modern), Latour’s approach is going to come to seem more and more attractive.
(I’m looking forward to Irreductions and Reassembling the Social- We Have Never Been Modern and Pandora’s Hope, as well as Harman’s wonderful manuscript on Latour, have been deeply stimulating.)
January 14, 2009 at 2:16 am
Thanks for the comment, Mike. I think you’re right vis a vis your remarks about relation. However, I do wonder whether Graham’s way of solving this problem is the right way to solve it. I do think, however, that he’s formulated the proper way of posing the problem. Of course, I have to say this so I have something to do!
I will also say that it is tremendously odd that here we are, living in the midst of revolutions in science, art, mathematics, technology, etc., yet our philosophers can see fit to only discuss our access to the world and forecast impending decline. It’s jaw dropping really. Here we are in the middle of some of the most exciting times in history and yet we have a dominant contingent in the humanities that reduces everything to constructions of one form or another (and certainly not the right form of construction as described by someone like, say, Stengers). One wonders if the attractiveness of philosophies of access and correlationism isn’t more about disciplinary insecurity than philosophy and theory.
January 14, 2009 at 1:07 pm
[…] My apologies for accidentally forcing Levi’s hand– but he responds gracefully with a fascinating post on Latour’s Irreductions. Mike’s comment and Levi’s response are also […]
January 14, 2009 at 5:29 pm
[…] 14, 2009 This one is easy, because I AGREE WITH EVERYTHING LEVI SAYS IN THIS POST, and can simply forward you to it as if it were one of my own […]
January 16, 2009 at 1:33 pm
Thanks so much for introducing me to Bruno Latour. I read the Introduction to “Reassembling the Social” on Google Books, loved it and ordered it.
I also found his website (www.bruno-latour.fr) and have been downloading a number of articles.
However, I must admit that trying to keep up with everything you are writing these days (four more posts since this one) is difficult.
For now I think I will focus on reading some Latour. Thanks again.
Jeff
January 18, 2009 at 6:04 am
I don’t know if this is up on Latour’s website, but he participated in a recreation of the debate between Tarde and Durkheim that I thought you might be interested in if you were not already aware of it: http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=d2606td