From Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns.
But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after: and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom. (“On the Different Species of Philosophy”)
“Abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon mixed up with popular superstition”, saying exactly the same thing as that superstition, but clothed in fine fabrics in much the same way that a con artist disarms his mark through a nice suit and a plainly displayed crucifix.
April 8, 2009 at 7:21 am
Although the fact that Hume mitigates his scepticism by appealing to common sense when reason becomes unpalatable means that he’s a fine one to complain about ‘popular superstition’.
April 8, 2009 at 7:30 am
Perhaps, although in Hume’s defense we can certainly evoke his frustration in dealing with the “erudite” scholastic (and Hume was no slouch where classical erudition is concerned) and all their distinctions, arguments, and concepts in defending superstition. Hume, at least, elicits a certain humility and a naturalistic attitude in explaining these phenomena. We can very well imagine a debate between Hume and such a scholastic, where the scholastic is perpetually attempting to put him in a corner with a complex scholastic apparatus, telling him how he needs to read his Aristotle more carefully or consult Thomas. Here it comes as no surprise that one would evoke “common sense” or their lying eyes against the scholastic ignoring all of the exciting things taking place in maths and physics. Graham Harman recently wrote a post about “getting the point” of a philosophy rather than the arguments of a philosophy. I think this sort of criticism misses the point about breaking from a very oppressive and willfully ignorant institutional setting.
April 8, 2009 at 7:47 am
Hume’s reaction to his own scepticism:
These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.
I would suggest that seeing Hume purely, or mainly, in relation to Scholasticism as opposed to the history of non-conformism in British theology and philosophy; particularly the likes of as it arises from Locke. Is definitely to miss the point of what he’s up to.
April 8, 2009 at 7:49 am
Sorry, that should read: ‘particularly as it arises from Locke’.
April 27, 2009 at 6:36 pm
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