Over at the sublime Frames/Sing, Kevin has an interesting post up on philosophical dialogue. I have been hesitant to link to this post as I’m directly implicated, but I think his observations are worth posting here as they go straight to the heart of what I would describe as a sort of philosophical sickness or disease. Kevin writes:
In the comments section of Larval Subjects attempt to deal again with Kantian normativity, 8&$@## [name redacted as a gesture of friendship] repeats the authority of his reading of Kant, after the claim that someone simply is an embarassment:
You either don’t get it, or your pretend to not get it – you don’t understand such simple matters as “form” vs. “matter” in Kant’s philosophy in general – are you serious? For such a great reader of Kant, you seem to be spewing nonsensical readings of him right and left, I mean you’ve become a joke around the pub with “Have you read this latest comment by Levi about Kant?….I interpret my Kant the way most of Kant scholarship does, I’m not a genius with innovative ideas, I’m dull and boring – if you knew your Kant, you would see how regular and annoyingly mediocre my views are.
It is not particular to Kant that I want to speak, but to simply the way that philosophy is discussed. I suppose we all feel this way. If someone disagrees with us (or “us”), they simply do not understand us (it is not that we are wrong). When they show us that we were wrong, if ever, we realize that we didn’t understand us. We all grow frustrated when disagreement cuts to the very roots of our suppositions. And the same may be said when it cuts the very roots of a thinker we greatly admire.
Personally, I find it difficult though, in the particular case of the Kant Krew at *#$$%##$# [redacted out of friendship], is that the appeal is ultimately to a kind of “you are an idiot”, “you don’t even understand the very basics of Kant” when Kant is criticized to the root. All this, while they also fall back upon the idea that they themselves are not even Kantians, that they are just telling the world the orthodox position of Kant, in fact regurgitating it in a fashion. It is not so much the entrenchment of such a position I am troubled with (”I am simply repeating Kant Orthodoxy to you, if you question it it is merely that you do not understand him”), but the unengaged nature of this kind of talk. It is as if one is no longer even actively thinking about Kant, taking a critical view, pulling the threads apart, running it through your fingers. If the thought is dead in your hands, and one is simply repeating Orthodoxy stuff you read in commentaries (and how much of philosophy is done like this, wherein one talks like one knows because one repeats what someone “who knows” says), what is the point?
I think Kevin is right on the mark here in his analysis of why this mode of discourse is so troubling. Somehow every contestation of a philosopher’s position is transformed into a misreading or misinterpretation of that position. In a manner not unlike how Torah is read, the text is treated as unquestionable, and instead we are required to engage in endless acts of interpretation with respect to the text. As a result, what you get are “competing species” in Continental philosophy where one sides with the Deleuzian text or the Foucaultian text or the Husserlian text or the Heideggerian text, etc. We have all of these various textual ghettos and the rule is that none of these texts ever directly confront one another.
read on!
In this connection, I remember my experience of graduate school. Now undoubtedly graduate school was one of the happiest times in my life. When else, in your life, are you given the opportunity to congregate with brilliant, interesting people, take three courses a term, and spend your days doing nothing but reading while getting paid for it? Such is a truly blessed state. However, while grad school was a blessed time of intellectual discovery, it was also accompanied by a profound sense of disappointment and loathing of academic philosophy.
I had first discovered philosophy some time between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. As many of these stories go, my discovery involved a woman or broken heart, coupled with a period of deep personal upheaval where I failed a year of school, became heavily involved in drugs, and was homeless. Philosophy literally saved me and gave my life an entirely new direction. Where prior to this I had thought school to be some grand ideological conspiracy, I now found a value in what I was pursuing. If I turned to philosophy it was because I wished to discover how I should live my life, what is worth pursuing, what is right and wrong. However, I did not think these questions could be answered without first knowing my own nature, the nature of being, and the nature of the social world. It was Spinoza, in his Ethics and Theologico-Politico Treatise who first pointed the way for me, even though Husserl’s Ideas was the first work of philosophy that I ever read.
However, here’s the deal. In studying these philosophers– by the time I had graduated I had read Being and Time, James’ Pragmatism, Husserl’s Ideas, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, The Critique of Pure Reason, Whitehead’s Process and Reality, Spinoza’s Ethics and Theologico-Politico Treatise, Schopenhaeur’s World as Will and Representation, various works by Ortega y Gasset and Unamuno, and many more works besides –my aim was not to understand these philosophers, but the world. I was interested in these philosophers not for their own sake, but with respect to how they could help me to understand the world, my self, society, and what the “good life” might be.
I think this, in a nutshell, is the problem with Continental academia. While it is certainly an eminently reasonable proposition that we must understand a philosopher to critique that philosopher, continental philosophy programs never seem to get to that moment of critique. The very idea of evaluating a text in terms of its truth claims is a scandal, and any disagreement with a text or philosophy– so long as it’s coded as “continental” (the continentals know all those Brits and Anglo-American philosophers are just batshit crazy insane and wrong) –is scandalous. But at the end of the day, did we begin studying philosophy and pursue studies in philosophy to understand philosophers? Or are the great philosophers rather fellow travelers who might help us to understand the world around us but whom, the study of which, should never be an end in itself? At a certain point it seems to me that we should be able to cease the work of interpretation, agree that there are certain root claims and positions, and that these root claims and positions are susceptible to critique and disagreement without being based on misinterpretation. I cannot help but feel that 90% of the time, charges of misinterpretation are, in fact, an acknowledgment that one does not have a counter-argument, but still wishes to maintain their position. Socrates is turning in his grave.
April 23, 2009 at 3:11 am
How are interpreting a text and understanding/critiquing the world opposed? Isn’t it possible that a misinterpretation of, for example, Kant, might mean that some ability to critique the world has been foreclosed, one might even say in the Lacanian sense?
April 23, 2009 at 3:28 am
It’s possible, the problem is that the practice of philosophy has largely become the activity of interpretation. From a Lacanian perspective, we’ve become trapped in the discourse of the university… And you know what that produces. We should also affirm the value of misinterpretation.
April 23, 2009 at 3:37 am
Sadly, these kinds of disputes don’t only take place within the confines of philosophy departments. I’m in political theory, and the problem is no less pronounced. What compounds the problem and turns most conversations into a mess is that no one ever decides in advances what kinds of claims are being made. I wish that we could devise a system in which we raise our right hand when we’re making an “analytic” claim (e.g. “sovereignty is indivisible”) , and our left hand when we’re making a “hermeneutic” claim (e.g. “Machiavelli was an anti-democrat”). I feel this would eliminate a lot of confusion and futile haggling. The problem with that, of course, is that I somehow think that schools of interpretation would still find ways of raising their left hand when they should be raising their right hand. And so disputes of this sort are likely ineliminable. But this doesn’t mean that we can’t straightforwardly ask our colleagues: “Are you making a claim about the political world as such, or are you trying to expand our knowledge of a particular thinker?” Socrates should really be turning in his grave because a question of this sort tends be taken as offensive. I’ve gotten looks that suggest that the person is thinking, “How dare you?” As if I’m using my leaf-blower way too close to the house of cards.
April 23, 2009 at 3:46 am
Excuse the double post, but I thought I’d add something from a pedagogical perspective. One of the problems with remaining in an interpretive mode is that what we end up constructing there is usually completely uninteresting to everyone else. I know that there have been times when I’ve really dug in to Hegel or Deleuze or someone like that, only to find that I have nothing to say when people ask me about it, because I haven’t even framed my OWN thought in terms of basic philosophical questions. Thus, I never crystallize my thought into actual propositions, one of whose functions is to provide something for students to talk about….
April 23, 2009 at 4:18 am
One other thing to affirm while we’re at it is the value of examining – and even discussing – one’s motivations in making the arguments we make. They are not always a matter of just wanting to figure out what’s true. If we’re willing to lay our motivations on the table, we avoid all of the good/bad faith stuff.
April 23, 2009 at 9:00 am
This is definitely a point well made by larvalsubjects. “Continental” scholarship is, for whatever reason, seemingly afraid to expose its subject matter to some external standard of validity and move beyond assessments of the internal coherence of each individual thinker’s system. There seems to be a lot of sycophantism, with self-professed “Deleuzians” or “Heideggerians” or “Derrideans” tirelessly defending their chosen prophet without sufficient critical engagement. This is why I found Peter Hallward’s book on Deleuze so satisfying: it was clearly engaged in detailed exegesis of Deleuze’s thought whilst also challenging that thought. We need to get over this uncritical hero worship and it’s a good thing to have flagged up.
April 23, 2009 at 2:48 pm
When we study the poets, are we to study them as poets ourselves?
When we study the sciences, are we to study them as scientists ourselves?
Or…when we study the prophets, are we to study them as prophets ourselves?
April 23, 2009 at 3:18 pm
Another great post Levi!
I think one of the wisest thing Richard Rorty said was that disagreement in meaning is really nothing more than an agreement not to debate any more. So rather than there being a robust analytic-synthetic distinction descriptively cutting the set of sentences at the joint, there are norms of conversation. As long as we take the conversation to be profitable we “agree to agree” on meaning, even when in fact what is in both of our heads is quite different. This is true at the most trivial level, for example discussing the merits of Szechuan Cuisine. So what’s really there are just norms of conversation, though we naturally sort of mythologically reify those into “meanings” (and there is nothing wrong with that, it makes communication possible for limited creatures).
But if our disagreements seem so intractable that we don’t see any point in continuing the conversation, one of the ways to just stop talking to each other is to give up on the agreement to agree on meaning. But then this gets expressed in terms of the mythology of meanings.
I think something almost exactly similar goes on in philosophy when one party to a disagreement accuses the other party of misunderstanding. Correct interpretation of a text is normative and to some extent mythical.
And this really ties to your point about how to read philosophy. Leibniz absurdly said that he never read falsehoods. But the deep truth of this is that he was going to use whatever he read to try to get him closer to the truth.
I don’t know though. I don’t want to go to far with this. Harman is in part refreshing because he’s willing to say not just “Here’s where Heideggerians go wrong,” but also “Here’s where Heidegger goes wrong.” But somehow when he does it I feel like his ability to do that is part of why he has so much insight into what is philosophically important about Heidegger! So to get at productive truth in Heidegger requires disagreeing with Heidegger in parts.
That is Harman has to say what he takes Heidegger to mean in order to motivate an interesting view which is Heideggerian, but disagrees with Heidegger in important ways. I don’t know if this commits me to a stronger notion of textual meaning than the normative/mythological one I’m getting from Rorty. I hope not!
Independent of the validity of the Rortyan point, I think there are analogous issues with respect to the Kant arguments and your work. . .
April 23, 2009 at 4:10 pm
Certainly, but I wouldn’t just throw everyone in the same ditch here – some people need heroes and some don’t, don’t you think that by swinging the whole in the opposite direction of critical non-worship of non-heroes you are basically going to end up in the same place? Why can’t we just let people do whatever they want in their respective fields? Don’t like to argue, well, don’t – I mean what is up with all these suggestions on how to improve philosophy? It’s been like that since Plato, it’s clearly not going to change, why not just enjoy whatever little joy is left and not bother with hero-worship or textualism or whatever?
April 23, 2009 at 4:13 pm
Seriously though, why are we still talking about this? All that #$@# crap is nice but really you can just put my name in, I’m not that sensitive, if I go too far, I’m always first to admit it, it’s something I’m passionate about, clearly – I think we do need civility and all, but sometimes things get out of control and guess what? it’s not a big fucking deal, I think – you know?
April 23, 2009 at 4:16 pm
Sorry about the flurry of comments, I’m only allowing myself a short break from whatever it is I am doing so must cram it all:
What kind of graduate school did you go to where they pay you? I mean I had a full scholarship and a stipend but I had to work part-time to pay my bills – it would be nice congregating with interesting people and being paid for it, that’s why everyone wants to become a professor, right?
April 23, 2009 at 4:51 pm
Yeah, I should say some of us learned fair amount from the Kant disagreements between M#$@#L E*&#@**v and Levi. Also, when things got heated on all sides the pulling back into civility was a model of how one should do this in internet debates (I almost posted on Anonymous philosopher telling the Personalist dude to take a lesson from you guys).
Hey, I just read my earlier post and realized that “Another great post Levi!” sounds really horribly condescending in a “good job!” kind of way. I didn’t mean that. I just meant that I enjoy thinking about the stuff you raise, and enjoyed this one.
Just as after a bout of lots of teaching you can end up lecturing friends and family members accidentally, after a bout of playing with your kid you can get stuck in expressing yourself as if you take yourself to be praising from above.
April 23, 2009 at 5:52 pm
Jon, thanks for what I perceive to be a compliment – I think it’s easy to get into passionate arguments that escalate into nastiness, but it’s sometimes difficult to “reset” and continue – I think because over time it’s been established that it is indeed about issues and not persons, it’s easy to take even the meanest personal stabs, not that I’ve been on a receiving side much, but clearly I’ve distributed some. Ultimately, it’s about arguments, I hope…
April 26, 2009 at 4:07 pm
I didn’t follow the debate in question but I’ve experienced the conversational power play that says “you claim to disagree but really you misunderstand” a lot. I left the first grad program I was in (in comp lit, now I’m in history) in part because that kind of thing was rampant and intellectually stifling. The worst was when it would happen in a way that seemed to me to overlook important textual evidence – “you misunderstand”, often coupled with an appeal to a text that only the person speaking the power play had read, as an excuse to not actually deal with counter-evidence and engage in textual interpretation.
That said, there *are* continental philosophers who engage in real argument (as everyone here knows, I just feel compelled to make it clear I’m not anti- the genre in its entirety).