Larval Subjects .

Over at Now-Times, Alexei has written a post on materialism, arguing that materialism is a variant of idealism. In honor of my friend Alexei, whose philosophical acumen and precision drives me to distraction, and frustration while also filling me with admiration, I will call this the “Alexei-Hypothesis” or the “A-Hypothesis”, although I am aware that this is an argument that has a long and venerable tradition in the history of philosophy. Hopefully I will not be doing the A-Hypothesis too much injustice– inviting the unpleasant experience of being boxed about the ears by a Russian or Slav, the nationality of which I strangely seem to attract –if I summarize it as follows: The philosophical position of materialism stands in contradiction with itself insofar as it purports to ground the world in matter (whatever that might be) which is absolutely other to mind, while nonetheless requiring a concept of matter to operate. Insofar as materialism is premised on a concept of matter to delineate the contours of its object, it is an idealism. I hope Alexei will forgive me my simplification as I cannot write an extended and nuanced post this evening as I have 17 more student essays to grade.

As stated, I think that the Alexei-Hypothesis presents a powerful argument that is essentially right. So long as materialism operates from a concept of matter it necessarily falls into the correlationist circle, as matter is, as it were, being “constituted” by thought, in advance. Consequently, if the materialist is to get around the A-Hypothesis, it is necessary to operate without a concept of matter.

In certain respects, this is a conclusion I had already arrived at prior to Alexei’s post. In dust ups with Graham Harman over the evils of conflating materialism with realism, I noticed that Graham’s arguments always seemed to proceed on the basis of highly specific and historical concepts of matter. For instance, Graham will argue against materialism on the grounds that “there is no such thing as un-formatted matter” (i.e., matter without structure). Here matter is treated as a sort of pure hyle without any form or structure. Yet who claimed that matter is un-formatted or pure hyle? Plato and Aristotle. This certainly isn’t the notion of matter operative in contemporary science where we find structure everywhere. Likewise, one might object to Democratus’ or Lucretius’ concept of matter on the grounds that it admits only of mechanical transfers of force between the so-called atoms, that these atoms are conceived purely in terms of shape as points of infinite density that cannot be divided, etc. Yet why should we today adopt this hypothesis? These sorts of considerations led me to a declaration similar to that of Spinoza’s with respect to the body. Just as Spinoza famously declares that “we do not yet know what a body can do!” (and probably, we can add, we never will as bodies can enter into infinite relations generating new affects or capacities to act and be acted upon), the materialist realist is committed to the thesis that “we do not yet know what matter is!”

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The time is quickly approaching for me to order Fall semester books for my Intro to Philosophy courses. Next Fall I would like to shake things up and rather than teaching texts exclusively from the history of philosophy, teach more contemporary texts. So far I am thinking about Catherine Malabou’s wonderful little book What Should We Do With Our Brains? and Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. I would like to do something on the intersection of contemporary physics and philosophy, but try as I might, nothing comes to mind beyond Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World and DeLanda’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (the latter, I think, being a bit too complicated for first time undergrads). Do readers have any suggestions?

Whatever else one might think of his ontology, two major claims animate Badiou’s conception of philosophy. On the one hand, Badiou argues that philosophy itself produces no truths. For Badiou truth always comes from elsewhere, from the domain of praxis. Where one conception of philosophy has it that philosophy is to think the ultimate nature of reality, for Badiou it is always other fields of engagement, or praxis, that think these things and produce these truths. In this connection, it is science (though science largely gets short shrift in his thought), math, love, politics, and art that produce truths. Love, for example, is the encounter of the Two. His favorite examples in this connection are the encounter between Abelard and Heloise or Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. In their encounter, it is a difference that is encountered, and an entirely new way of thinking the non-relation, the difference, between the Two; a non-relation that produces a new language. The deep ontological truth Badiou sees in the encounter of the Two or their difference is the logic of the “not-all” or that the “whole” is not, for what we find between the Two in their relation of non-relation, are incommensurable universes communicating with one another. The Two does not become a fusional One, but rather this incommensurability becomes the impetus of their relation, perpetually renewing itself not through its sameness, but through its difference.

If philosophy does not produce truths, then what is the vocation of philosophy, according to Badiou? Philosophy, according to Badiou, does not produce truth, but rather thinks truth. In this thesis there is a deep connection between time or history and philosophy. Badiou contends that the vocation of philosophy is to think our present. The thinking of the present consists in the thinking of the truths that populate our world in the present and striving to think them in what Badiou calls their “compossibility”. The term “compossibility”, of course, comes from Leibniz. One way of fruitfully thinking “compossibility” would be as “co-possibility”. Leibniz argued that there are an infinity of possible worlds that could have existed. In speaking of a possible world we are talking about worlds that are “incompossible”. What Leibniz was trying to get at with his idea of compossibility was the idea of interdependence among events. Thus, for example, my existence, my possibility, is dependent upon a whole host of other possibilities. In this world I have brown hair (that is quickly turning grey). The world in which I have blond or red hair is incompossible with this world because the browness of my hair is related to a set of all sorts of other conditions such as my genetics, when my parents conceived me, the time of their meeting, the evolution of the human species, etc., all of which are necessary for me to have brown hair. For Leibniz our universe is a web of interdependencies in which all things depend upon one another.

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It could be argue that the debate between the realists and the anti-realists revolves around a set of basic paradoxes, or perhaps antinomies, arising from our contemporary state of knowledge today. It will be recalled that Husserl claims that Nature cannot be the condition for Consciousness because Consciousness is the condition of Nature. With this claim, Husserl reveals the inner logic of correlationism. If correlationism is to be an internally consistent position, then the transcendental subject upon which it is based must be rigorously separated from the knowledge that it is to ground lest it fall into a paradox or contradiction. Like Russell’s set of all sets that are not members of themselves, this sort of self-membership to the object is grounds must be excluded.

Yet within our current state of knowledge or within the scope of our best working hypotheses, this thesis generates a set of paradoxes or apparent absurdities:

1) Consciousness is to ground knowledge, yet neurology strongly supports the claim that consciousness is grounded in the brain. How can something that is simultaneously constituted by consciousness, Husserl would put it, also be constituted by that which constitutes it? We seem to get a vicious circle here that is not at all of the virtuous or hermeneutic kind. Moreover, the research in neurology indicates that we do not get a nice one-to-one mapping between neural and cognitive states and what phenomenology purports to teach us about the nature of consciousness. Often the phenomenological analysis is mistaken. Thus, for example, we can imagine a phenomenological analysis of attraction or allure and our experience of another person being friendly or approachable. The cognitive analysis of this phenomenon, based on empirical research, indicates that experiencing someone as friendly and approachable has much to do with the degree to which their pupils are dilated. It is highly unlikely that this would ever be caught in a phenomenological analysis.

2) Again, consciousness purports to be the ground of Nature, yet evolutionary theory tells us that evolution is the ground of consciousness. Again, we find ourselves in the same circle. How are we to simultaneously think consciousness constituting nature and being constituted by nature?

3) Perhaps the most challenging case is quantum mechanics. By now most are familiar with Heisenberg’s uncertainty and the thesis that there’s a fundamental epistemic limit to what we can know at the quantum level. To all appearances, the researcher “constitutes” the observed. Unlike classical physics– and even relativity physics which is still susceptible to a realist interpretation –where the observation had no effect on the observed, in quantum mechanics this is not the case. Many quantum physicists concluded that our observations of quantum phenomena are just observations of communicable experience, and we have no idea what the reality in-itself might be behind these phenomena. Just as Ptolemy’s physics is perfectly serviceable as a description of planetary movements in a large number of cases, the thesis is that it is enough for the equations and predictions to work out, without raising the question of whether what is described in these equations refers to properties that belong to quantum “entities” themselves. But here again we find ourselves in the paradoxical circle. Quantum phenomena are to function as the grounds of the world yet they are constituted by us, the observer.

I do not know how to resolve these apparent paradoxes but I do not think they can be swept under the rug as so many correlationists would like to do. When Ben, in comments to my “Naturalism” diary describes an encounter between a supporter of Jean-Luc Nancy claiming that science is identical to faith and a Kantian claiming that science is pure speculation and therefore irrelevant, it seems to me that he describes an attitude of willful ignorance endemic in Continental philosophy whereby it is fought that one both maintains a position of superiority with respect to science, knowing a deep and fundamental (grounding) truth not known by scientists, and that therefore they can simply ignore our present or what we have found in these fields. This position of willful ignorance strikes me as being based more on a defensive posture than anything else. At some point, however, lest this entire form of philosophy eventually become entirely irrelevant, those coming from the Continental tradition will have to follow the lead of thinkers like Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze and stop denouncing these sciences as merely dogmatic or outside of philosophy and start taking them seriously as things that demand to be thought and which demand a critique of a certain way of doing philosophy itself.

When I reflect on the debates that have recently unfolded surrounding epistemology, ethics, Kant, correlationism, and realism, I think they all spin on whether or not the philosopher begins from a naturalistic perspective. The Kantian and correlationist positions are basically descendants of Descartes’ philosophical methodology. Even though, for example, they don’t begin in the way Descartes did in the first two meditations, the implicit thesis is that we share an immediate and therefore apodictic or certain relationship to our consciousness, and therefore must begin with the analysis of consciousness prior to any claims about the world. Since our relationship to external objects consists of representations in the mind, and since hallucinations are always possible or we could be dreaming, we cannot begin by simply jumping haphazardly into claims about the nature of the world because we could be mistaken or merely making speculative claims.

The position of the linguistic correlationist is similar. Rather than treating consciousness as the immediate, the linguistic correlationist begins from the premise that since our relationship to ourselves, others, and the world around us is mediated by language, we must first begin with the analysis of language. Thus, for example, were Paul Churchland to point out to Lacan certain phenomenon pertaining to the brain with respect to schizophrenics (for example that they have much higher concentrations of dopamines), Lacan would respond by pointing out that in order for Churchland to investigate the brain he must frame his observations, experiments, etc., in signifiers. Again, the structure of the argument is the same. In both cases, the case of the correlationist that begins with consciousness and the case of the correlationist that begins with language, something is asserted as immediate and something else is posited as being mediated and therefore uncertain. Since the latter is categorized as uncertain by virtue of its status as mediated, it thereby is excluded from philosophical discourse such that it can no longer function as a ground.

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I promise this series of diaries will come to an end soon, but for the moment I soldier on.

One of the most striking moments in the first chapter of Meillassoux’s After Finitude occurs when he equates correlationism with the philosophical equivalent of young earth creationism. Given that it is very likely that the vast majority of philosophers take a very dim view of young earth creationism, this comparison cannot but seem like a rhetorical low blow. Yet is there something to it? Is there validity in this comparison.

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Over at The Accursed Share Nick, responding to one of my remarks with his usual pith and insight, sums up the difference between speculative realist and anti-realist orientations. In the context of a discussion of d’Espagnat’s interesting looking book, Physics and Philosophy, I wrote,

What amazes me is how they [anti-realists] seem to think that we can simply sidestep any analysis of neurology and psychology in these discussions, that we can just do it all from the armchair and not fall into a crass folk-psychology, and that the findings of empirical science couldn’t possibly shed light on or refute some of these claims.

Nick beautifully sums up the fundamental differences in orientation:

I think, in part, this sheds light on the big divide between SR and anti-realist positions – for the latter, it’s knowledge and thought that are prior and important before anything else. Hence, studying the conditions of knowledge becomes the first thing to do. Whereas, for SR, if thought is secondary, then the epistemological question necessarily has to extend beyond the circle of thought – i.e. it can’t be answered solely by examining our own thought processes. And science, somehow, seems to be the only method we have for approaching this. I don’t know whether this divide between the positions is an insurmountable differend or not…

The anti-realist fundamentally accepts the Cartesian position. That is, they begin from the premise that we only have direct access to our consciousness. Consequently, we must begin with a self-reflexive analysis of our own consciousness prior to making any claims about the world lest we fall into dogmatism. For example, the anti-realist will point out that in order to investigate a particular domain of the world we must first have a concept of that thing, which is something belonging to thought. Therefore thought necessarily precedes our relation to the world.

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Epistemology has been a scourge, even a holocaust, for philosophy in the last three hundred years. In the last one hundred years it has contaminated every orientation of philosophical thought, rendering us all but blind to the world. When you read Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Spinoza, and Leibniz, you get the sense that epistemology is a side-question, a sort of clean up work, that you do after your speculation. Yet now questions of epistemology saturate everything. On the one hand, epistemology represents the will to power, the desire to know before we know. If we can engage in a transcendental analysis, if we can engage in a phenomenological investigation, then we need not engage in the difficult work of reading articles or investigating the world because we already know the basic structure of truth (which is inherently without surprise and coherentist). The transcendental philosopher tells us that “of course he isn’t opposed to science, but is merely grounding science.” Yet this alone is sufficient, in his secret thoughts, to absolve him of any obligation to know what science or mathematics is actually doing. Why? Because he already knows. He knows before he knows, and therefore need not acquaint himself with anything. Since he has already created the police state of what can and cannot be known, and since that police state, like the mental ward that gives a lobotomy in the name of the patient, is done for the sake of grounding the science and grounding its certitude (as if the scientist has asked for certitude), he can rest content in the belief that there’s no possible contradiction between what he is claiming and what we are discovering. Indeed, he will point out that after all, the transcendental subject does not “exist”, but is merely a “condition” for the subject of science. And so it goes, Zeus is the origin of lightning.

Of course, this desire to know before we know is premised on narcissism or to be above the fray as the desire for certainty always is. Philosophy suffered a major blow towards the end of the 19th century when natural philosophy became natural science (in Greek, of course, science is one of the words for knowledge), effectively detaching itself from the philosophers, asserting its autonomy, and succeeding remarkably. Philosophers, no doubt, were miffed that this new breed of beasts, the natural scientists, did not seem to place much stock in their questions or epistemological conditions, but had their own “crass” epistemology and rough and ready methodology. From there legions of students that were spawned, birthed on the halycion memory of the golden age where they were “knowledge”, and have been bitter ever since. The phenomenologists, for example, came to code the term “science” as synonymous with “dogmatism”, and consoled themselves in the belief that they knew the “truth behind truth” or the ultimate grounds in consciousness or the transcendental subject and intentional lived experience prior to any empirical investigation. This would lead Husserl to claim that the natural world cannot be a condition for consciousness as consciousness is a condition for nature, thereby revealing his dualistic and idealistic superstitions or his crypto-theology. In the meantime, those descended from Kant, the so-called “Critical Theorists” (who were anything but critical but who were certainly reactionary) would talk endlessly about how concepts precede any investigation of the world, while the rest of us, having learned our lessons well from Husserl who was right about some things, would scratch our heads wondering just what the hell a concept is and how one could possibly arrive at the idea that we think conceptually. In the meantime, being too polite to be argumentative, we would conclude that all this talk of concepts and whatnot was like trying to do neurosurgery with a butter knife, giving us a folk-psychology about as accurate as explaining a tsunami by reference to Poseidon. In other words, “concepts”, “conditions”, the “transcendental”, had become the new Zeus and Dionysius, explaining respectively lightning and the harvest. But it certainly sounded impressive!

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From Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns.

But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous prize, and find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after: and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom. (“On the Different Species of Philosophy”)

“Abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon mixed up with popular superstition”, saying exactly the same thing as that superstition, but clothed in fine fabrics in much the same way that a con artist disarms his mark through a nice suit and a plainly displayed crucifix.

This morning I had a rather disturbing thought from the standpoint of my professional identity and what I love: What if philosophy was completed 2100 years ago? That is, what if, 2100 years ago, or if you prefer, 2500 years ago, we produced the “true” philosophy and philosophical methodology? In dating the completion of philosophy at 2100 – 2500 years ago, I am, of course, referring to the materialist hypotheses of Lucretius and Democritus. Lucretius, of course, got a lot of things wrong in their details. He was mistaken about the nature of atom and often about the nature of mind.

When you get right down to it, no other ontological hypothesis has ever been as successful as materialism. Materialism has allowed us to unlock many of the secrets of motion, both here on earth and in the heavens. It has revealed an astonishing world of subatomic particles and forces, significantly transforming our folk-metaphysical understanding of matter and motion, abolishing the primacy of mechanical motion as transfer of force (the billiard ball model of motion). Materialism increasingly has unlocked the secrets of biology or life, revealing the wondrous process of ontogenesis ranging from genes to proteins to cells to the organism to the environment all working in bi-directional feedback loops producing endlessly novel creations both at the scale of the individual and at the scale of species through evolution. Materialism has allowed us to increasingly predict the weather, to understand climate, to discover the movement of tectonic plates. Materialism, in just the last thirty to fifty years, has shed tremendous light on our neurology, how we think, how we feel, and why we think and feel as we do. In many cases it has unlocked secrets in the domain of social organization through sociology. It has led to massive advances in medicine. The list could be multiplied endlessly.

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