It looks like I’m writing a lot of posts responding to others today, but I can’t express how helpful these comments are in assisting me in the development of my own thoughts. In response to my last post, NrG writes:
First, I would love to read something other than Lacan for our groups. And second, I would enjoy it even more if it were Graham’s new book! So, to answer your question, I’m definitely on board.
Now, to my (seemingly unending series of) questions. When you comment that:
“Rather, the body is an endo-relational unity anterior to whatever matter might compose it, wherein the elements related interdepend on one another through time.”
Could you possibly describe the differences between a sum, a composition, and a unity? As I see it, there seems to be more to a composition than a simple sum, but in what way(s) does a unity differ from either or both?
Also, I am struck by the fact that there seems to be something “anterior” to the object-whole. I’m not disagreeing with you, per se, but am intrigued by this notion that before multiple objects become a whole, there seems to be a preset or pre-constructed form by which the objects (eventually, but not always) come to take.
My favorite example is the two garages, one with a pile of parts and the other with a similar pile but fully constructed into a working motorcycle. Now, you’re right; for if the whole was merely the sum of its parts, then the pile would be the same object as the working motorcycle. However, there is something quite drastically different between the two. It is only because the parts are composed in such and such a way that the working motorcycle comes to be. Parts can be replaced, but only if the new parts maintain the same function in the composition. (Another example would be that given the sentence, “Bob wrote a paper.” I could easily replace the word Bob with the pronoun he, with little to no change in the sentence’s meaning – “He wrote a paper.” Yet, the more complex the sentence/object, the harder it is to make such replacements.)
What most fascinates me about form, then, is that it seems to exist as part of the object-whole, but is not essentially a proper part in the sense that it, itself, cannot be taken as an independent object. For, what object is “the body”, or “the motorcycle” minus all of their respective parts?
First things first: I am absolutely stoked at the prospect of readings Harman’s Prince of Networks for reading group. In my view it is his finest work to date, though this might just be a function of my abiding affection for Latour. It would be terrific to start sooner rather than later, i.e., over the Summer. Maybe we could send something out to the group list this week with the proposal and see when folks are available.
Now onto more metaphysical issues. I think NrG’s intuitions concerning the difference between sums and compositions are similar to my own. I take it that a sum is a collection in which the parts do not depend on one another. A sum can thus be thought as a simple set. The elements of a set have no relations of dependency with respect to one another defined merely by membership in the set. Proof of this can be seen in the fact that we are authorized to take the sub-multiple of any set without that multiple being changed in any way as a result of its subtraction from the set. For this reason I’m inclined to say that sets aren’t objects. I think Badiou comes to realize this himself in the trajectory of his thought from Being and Event to Logics of Worlds. If he comes to the conclusion that we require category theory to think objects and worlds, then this seems to be because he recognizes that you don’t get an object or a world out of a mere set extensionally defined. I differ from Badiou on this point in rejecting the thesis that objects are necessarily indexed to a world and a transcendental, and in my distinction between endo- and exo-relations. If I reject Badiou’s thesis that objects are necessarily indexed to a world, then this is because I am committed to the independent substantivity of objects. I confess that I might be unfair to Badiou on this point as Badiou does argue that objects can move from world to world while remaining the same object in Logics of Worlds.
read on!
When I use the term “composition” I am simultaneously playing on the sense of composition as sub-multiples belonging to a multiple or parts composing an object, the unity of that composition (co-positing), and the sense of musical composition. In my view, a composition differs from a sum or a set in that it has an endo-consistency in which there is an interdependent unity of notes or properties presiding over the continuance of the entity in time, regardless of how brief that time is (Zubiri). At present I have only made some rather vague gestures of just what this endo-consistency is, referring to the affects that characterize an object and which I understand as a function or product of the endo-structure of an object. When I say this endo-consistency is anterior to the parts of the object, I am not referring to a temporal priority where the structure pre-exists its parts, but to a logical priority.
My hunch is that genuine objects emerge from their parts, but are irreducible to their parts. If the endo-consistency of an object is irreducible to its parts while nonetheless being dependent on its parts, then this is because the parts can be replaced while the endo-consistency remains the same. Moreover, for a number of objects, the emergent endo-consistency exercises downward causation on its parts, regulating the parts in a variety of ways, limiting their own capacity to act.
Looking ahead, I plan to divide my next book into three parts: Objects (endo-relations), Networks (exo-relations), and Genesis. The third part on genesis will deal with questions of how objects emerge from other objects or the conditions under which we move from a disjunctive multiplicity of objects to an emergent object that has attained closure, composition, consistency, or unity. Here I differ from Harman in that I do not endorse the thesis that every relation constitutes an object (though Graham might eventually convince me otherwise).
For the part on endo-relations or endo-consistency, I am planning on reworking Deleuze, DeLanda’s, and Protevi’s work on the virtual, manifolds/multiplicities, attractors, and emergent systems in terms of Zubiri’s account of individual essence. Where Deleuze sees virtual multiplicities– fields of differential relations and their singularities –as being in excess of objects, I will instead argue that virtual multiplicities constitute the endo-consistency or essence of a particular object. There is, actually, some textual evidence in chapter 4 of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition for this thesis. At any rate, I will reject the thesis that virtual multiplicities constitute a pre-individual in which everything is interconnected, belonging to a “one-all”. Rather, virtual multiplicities constitute the endo-consistency of an individual object or simply are the individual essence of an object or its persistent unity through time.
The concept of virtual multiplicity or a network of differential relations and singularities then allows me to distinguish between the qualities of an object produced in processes of translation and the essence of an object as an endo-consistent enduring unity. Qualities turn out to be actualized singularities presided over by attractors belonging to a virtual multiplicity. I won’t get into all the different types of attractors there are (point attractors, periodic attractors, etc), but minimally we can say that an attractor is a particular state towards which a system tends under certain conditions. These states of a system are known as the “phase space” of the system. Take a simple dynamical system composed of a bowl and a marble. When you roll the marble down the side of the bowl this system has roughly three attractors: the high point of the other incline of the bowl up which the marble rolls, the high point of the initial side of the bowl to which the marble rolls when returning, and the bottom of the bowl to which the marble comes to rest. In other words, the phase space of a dynamical system consists of those states through which the system can pass.
My thesis is that the qualities of an object are actualized states of an objects phase space presided over by the object’s attractors. These qualities can be generated either by the endo-structure of the object (dynamic variations in its ongoing autopoiesis independent of its environmental conditions) or by the exo-relations an object entertains with other objects. Take any colored object you might like. For example, blood. We are inclined to say that blood is red or that red has the property of being red. But this is not true. Rather, the redness of blood is the actualization of a point in phase space under exo-relational conditions. These exo-relational conditions might pertain to relations with oxygen (blood is blue inside our bodies), or it might be an exo-relational interaction with light. Thus, for example, in Red Dragon Hannibal Lector suggests that the serial killer looks for homes in secluded areas so that he might look at the blood of his victims under the moonlight. Under these exo-relational conditions blood takes on an appearance akin to oil.
The point is that the qualities an object actualizes are a function of its endo-consistency or its endo-structure, often as that endo-structure is exogenously related to other entities. Part of the “cash-value” of this relationship between endo-consistency, attractors, and actualized qualities, I think, is that it allows us to envision those conditions under which new objects emerge from other objects and conditions. In other words, through fluctions of energy in a system the phase space attractors of a system can become chaotic, no longer behaving in the stable way they once did, generating structurally different systems. The concept of attractor, then, not only allows us to understand the variety of qualitative states through which an individual object can pass, but also those conditions under which new endo-consistent orders emerge with very different phase spaces.
Larval Subjects . 
June 30, 2009 at 3:57 am
How does withdrawal work with endo-relations? If, 1) every object has something substantial leftover that withdraws from every relation and cannot be reduced to its relations, and 2) every object is made up of an inner structure of other objects, does this mean that the whole can withdraw from its parts? Does a body withdraw from blood, which in turn withdraws from the body? All the while the blood somehow IS the body at the same time. Yet if a body is the composition (would it be right to say expression?) of its endo-relations, the essence of the body still cannot be reduced to those relations?
I’m sorry if I’m butchering this badly. Even though I find these posts very interesting and read them multiple times, I still feel like I’m only half getting them. I really can’t wait to see how these ideas solidify into their final form.
And I too would be interested in a “Prince of Networks” reading. I’m about 100 pages in right now.
June 30, 2009 at 4:12 am
Thanks for the comment, EHNT. “Withdrawal” is really Harman’s term, rather than my own; though we do arrive at similar conclusions. For Harman all objects withdraw from all relations. For me the issue is somewhat different. I hold that all inter-ontic or inter-object relations involve processes of translation. Here I have in mind something similar to the operational closure of a dynamic system. For the autopoietic theorists, systems are operationally closed in the sense that the organization of the system constitutes its own information. By “constitution of information” the autopoietic theorist means that there is no such thing as a one-to-one or isomorphic relation between a stimulus and information, but rather the organization of the system transforms the perturbation or stimulus into information according to its own internal organization. This transformation of a difference issued from another object is what I call “translation”. Because every inter-ontic relation involves translation, it follows that objects “withdraw”, as it were, from one another. The difference “sent” is different from the difference received. A previous example I gave was that sunlight as translated by my skin (i.e., my tan) differs from sunlight qua sunlight. The manner in which that sunlight is translated will be a function of the endo-relations (differential relations and singularities) defining the composition of my skin, synthesized with selective singularities belonging to the sunlight.
June 30, 2009 at 6:53 am
This discussion on endo-, exo-relations and deleuzian virtuality seems to be relevant only if you actually manage to reject the thesis that virtual multiplicities are pre-individual. What is your argument against it?
I would like to think that as long as virtuality is understood as the genetic conditions of a becoming, this field of pure differential relations can account for both change and hold even if endo-relations are necessary to consider in discussing any actual/actualized object.
(I hope my concerns get through: English is neither my first, nor my professional language…)
June 30, 2009 at 7:38 am
hi levi,
In your previous post you interpret Lacan as suggesting:
“Not only are there distinct objects outside of an object, but there are distinct objects within objects.”
Above, partially as a development of Deleuze’s argument regarding virtual multipliticities, you write:
“The concept of virtual multiplicity or a network of differential relations and singularities then allows me to distinguish between the qualities of an object produced in processes of translation and the essence of an object as an endo-consistent enduring unity.”
I have a simple question regarding perspective. Both the theses regarding parts of objects being ojects and an endo-consistent object essence there would need to be a *privileged perspective* that can apprehend the dynamic relations of translation while at the same *time* not be involved in translation. Time is important of course as there are upper and lower horizons of human perception whereby the frequency of change cannot be perceived. For example, with your bowl and marble, on a cosmic scale there is also the Earth and its gravitational attraction that makes the marble move in the first place. But then there is the Sun and the imperceptible movement of the solar orbit, etc. all the way out to the expanding universe. On the flip side, there are the nanoscopic frictional losses that dissipate energy from the moving-marble system; instead of the smooth surface of the marble and bowl there is a sea of ridges on either surface that gradually uses up the potential energy of the marble-height gravity system.
My general point is that an object as such will always need to be perceived as an object. Will there be provision for perspective in your new work?
June 30, 2009 at 4:42 pm
Glen,
I’m not entirely sure I understand your question. When you remark that an object always needs to be perceived as an object, I think this is entirely true. The endo-consistency or unity of an object is a property of the object itself, not something that descends from elsewhere via a unifying act of perception on the part of a perceiver. In other words, the endo-consistency has nothing to do with the human. My example of the bowl and the marble is strictly offered to provide a straightforward illustration of what attractors are. It is not proposed as an example of endo-consistency. With that said, the issues you raise about the role that the gravitational attraction of the Earth, the sun, the stars, etc., all pertain to the exo-relations this system entertains with other objects. In part the actualized attractor states of the system are a function of its exo-relations. Put differently, the reason the marble comes to rest at the bottom of the bowl is, in part, due to its exo-relations to the earth and other stellar bodies. Consequently, I would say that a number of possible attractor states are not actualized by a system because of the exo-relations it entertains to other objects in the world. For example, my coffee mug is a deep crimson red at this particular point in time rather than black or fire-engine red because of its exo-relations to current lighting conditions in my office. When the lights in my building are turned out another attractor state is actualized. However, none of these attractor states would be possible without the endo-consistency of that coffee cup.
June 30, 2009 at 4:49 pm
Marcus,
I take it that when Deleuze treats virtual multiplicities as pre-individual he is getting mixed up. Deleuze rightfully wants to argue that the endo-consistency or essences of objects does not consist of their qualities. It is only in this way that he thinks he can avoid the model of representation and recognition (i.e., correlationist humanism) in his ontology. The mistake he makes lies in treating the actualized qualities of an object as the individual. This forces him to claim that the endo-consistency or virtual multiplicity is pre-individual. The problem is that once he makes that move he loses the very thing he was aiming at: an account of individuation. Paradoxically the treatment of virtual multiplicity as pre-individual which was designed to account for the individuation of objects ends up de-individuating objects. Instead, I argue that the endo-consistency of objects is not their qualitative actuality (because that can change and vary), but their virtual multiplicities presiding over the ongoing adventure of the object. There is actually some evidence for this in Deleuze’s own work. For example, in chapter four of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze talks about virtual multiplicities as being a real half of the object. He thus vascillates between treating virtual multiplicities as being the endo-consistency of objects throughout variations and as treating them as pre-individual tendencies in a one-all/whole. I think my account will ultimately be much cleaner, retaining a good deal that is attractive in Deleuze’s intuition without other problems it falls into. I should add that when I refer to objects I am referring to processes or events (I sometimes use the term “objectile” to capture this sense in which objects are dynamic processes). In this respect, there is a unity of becoming that is the endo-consistency of the object.
June 30, 2009 at 9:10 pm
Hi Levi,
Put simply, I am curious about the limits of endo-consistency and the capacity to perceive an object as consistent. The consistency of an object seems to be dependent on the affects of the perceiver.
On another point, I think you have summarised in your comment to markus what I find so interesting in the conceptual vocabulary you are developing. I need more time to think about the challenge you pose to at least my conception of deleuzian philosophy by shifting the ‘individual’ into virtuality.
July 1, 2009 at 7:55 am
I agree with Glen: Your project is extremely intresting! And it goes straight to the problems you might find in deleuzian ontology, an ontology still well worth the cleaning up and fine tuning.
For myself I’ve been trying to work out an understanding of how the actual resonates in the virtual. Deleuze is not all too clear on this…
I believe that at least some of the issues you adress and try to resolve by “shifting the ‘individual’ into virtuality”, as Glen put it, might be resolved via a more explicit resonance-theory. However, your approach might in the end be better… :-)
July 6, 2009 at 1:28 pm
[…] this observation that led the structuralists to their anti-humanism. Insofar as a social system has attractor states of its own, it has an autonomous dynamic stability that is in many respects impervious to […]