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November 23, 2009
Bhaskar Again: The Real, the Actual, and the Empirical
Posted by larvalsubjects under Epistemology, Object-Oriented Philosophy, Ontology, Realism, Speculative Realism[8] Comments
Larval Subjects . 
November 23, 2009 at 2:25 pm
Useful distinctions clearly stated.
November 23, 2009 at 5:15 pm
Except, the last column should be labeled the Domain of the Sensory. Here we find, for example, the 3-year-old boy I saw in the grocery store pointing to a bin of pommegranates and saying, “Look, Mommy, more apples?” Any empirical scientist, on the other hand, is clearly observing the domain of the actual, over time, trying to find patterns and regularities reflecting the real mechanisms.
November 23, 2009 at 6:04 pm
I think this is a useful framework for discussing different takes on relations and relata. A good original response to Bhaskar’s long and complex trail (what works do you emphasize?) would take more time, but I am interested in how you play this taxonomy against Grant’s version of Schelling which worries about many of these distinctions but with different answers. (BTW Grant’s is not my position but raises questions that are important to me.)
November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm
Dan,
So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m still reading it and trying to figure out what exactly he’s arguing. I should add that I don’t necessarily advocate Bhaskar’s particular ontology. What’s important to me is the form of his argument for transcendental realism. I think there’s a lot of room for debate where the ontological questions are concerned. Nonetheless, I think the distinctions between the real, the actual, and the empirical are useful for situating object oriented ontology. Graham has problems with Bhaskar’s ontology– particularly with respect to his thesis that objects possess unactualized powers or potentials –but I think the ontology actually meshes nicely with Harman’s ontology. Harman’s theory of objects could be located at the level of generative mechanisms, while the actual could be treated as the level of the sensuous (in his specific, non-humanistic, sense). Whether or not Harman agrees with me here, this sorting undercuts the common criticism wherein it’s claimed that the object-oriented ontologists naively treat the objects of human experience as being identical to real objects. The former belong to the domain of the empirical and may or may not exist at the level of the real or generative mechanisms.
November 23, 2009 at 7:02 pm
Thank you. That was helpful, and while this may not seem so, here is another response, from Dickinson.
The Drop, that wrestles in the Sea —
Forgets her own locality —
As I — toward Thee —
She knows herself an incense small —
Yet small — she sighs — if All — is All —
How larger — be?
The Ocean — smiles — at her Conceit —
But she, forgetting Amphitrite —
Pleads — “Me”?
November 23, 2009 at 7:11 pm
“Whether or not Harman agrees with me here, this sorting undercuts the common criticism wherein it’s claimed that the object-oriented ontologists naively treat the objects of human experience as being identical to real objects. The former belong to the domain of the empirical and may or may not exist at the level of the real or generative mechanisms.”
No, I agree with you here completely. That was always a weak criticism against my position, though it does have some force against the early Latour’s.
November 24, 2009 at 3:50 am
[…] while “expression” can be understood as the manner in which the actant has “actualized” itself qualitatively at a particular point in time. In Harman’s language, content can […]
November 24, 2009 at 1:34 pm
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