I’ll make these questions brief as I haven’t eaten yet today, am coming down with a cold, and am generally worn out. The model of objects I’ve been working with recently has basically focused on very simple physical objects where the attractors inhabiting the virtual dimension of the object are relatively fixed. Here I think it’s important, however, to distinguish between what, for lack of a better word, might be called recursive objects and non-recursive objects (if someone has a better term for what I’m trying to get at, let me know). When I refer to recursive objects, I have in mind objects whose outputs evoked by inputs (i.e., local manifestations) have the peculiar property of, in turn, functioning as inputs for subsequent states of the object. In addition to the outputs of these objects functioning as inputs for new objects within the endo-relational structure of the object, these objects are historical in the sense that not only do they have a past, they reflexively relate to that past. Thus all objects have a past, no matter how brief that past might be, but not all objects reflexively relate to that past such that that past can function as an input for subsequent states of the object.
I can think of no better representation for this sort of object than Bergson’s famous “cone of memory” from Matter and Memory (depicted to the left above). The point of Bergson’s cone of memory can’t really be represented in a diagram, because what the cone expresses is not simply that there’s a past that trails out behind an object, but that the object perpetually relates to different strata of that past. In the diagram above “S” can be taken to represented the most contracted point of time or the specious present (what I would call the most instantaneous of local manifestations). The cone itself represents the past.
read on!
Within the cone it will be noted that there are different rings, planes, plateaus, or levels (A-B, A’-B’, A”-B”, etc). These might be thought of as “fields” of the past for a particular object. Thus, for example, when an object such as myself hears a particular song like REM’s Its the End of the World as We Know It or smells a particular perfume, it is not simply, as Hume would have it, that associations to other particular things in the past (though this happens too), but rather a plateau of the past (say A’-B’) is contracted into the present. Like layers of celluloid film superimposed over one another, that entire strata of the past is contracted with the present.
In many instances this contraction or superimposition might be unconscious. Thus, for example, when my sister (she’s two years younger than me) and I both visit my parents in their home at the same time, we often end up fighting like cats and dogs. Yet this does not occur when she visits me here in Texas or when I visit her in Ohio. Why this difference? One plausible explanation is that like Proust’s famous madeleine cake, something about this context leads to the contraction of a strata or plateau of the past into the present, leading to the actualization of our childhood patterns, affects, conflicts, etc. with one another and our parents. This is not like an echo in a train tunnel. The point to keep in mind here is that just as we don’t note that two images have been superimposed on one another in the celluloid overlays, when my sister and I are fighting we don’t register these fights as reenactments of the past. The fights revolve around conflicts in the present– usually very stupid things –and around things that pertain to us now. They seem utterly convincing. Yet nonetheless this virtual dimension or strata that has been contracted over the past functions as an organizing space for these conflicts. The case is similar with the REM song. Suddenly, in an inexplicable fashion, when hearing this song all sorts of affects come to inhabit my being-in-the-world which seem to be related to nothing I am currently experiencing or dealing with. What is happening here, I suspect, is the actualization of a plane of the past pertaining to the first time I heard this song in junior highschool.
Clearly these objects relate to the past in a way fundamentally different from that of other objects. While it is certainly true that a particular rock may have undergone such and such an interaction in its remote past and that this interaction selected subsequent trajectories of the becoming of the rock, it strikes me as unlikely that rocks can contract plateaus of the past in the present in this way. No, this relationship to the past seems unique to living objects, social systems, and perhaps certain technologies. Additionally DNA seems to be structured in this way and perhaps ecosystems are as well.
Now if objects that maintain a relationship to their past are of particular interest in the context of questions about the individuation of objects within the framework of onticology, then this is because systems such as this are evolving systems or systems that are capable of developing new attractors or powers. These types of objects are learning objects. We can clearly see that the ever-expanding cone of memory resulting from the growth of experiment generate new attractors or powers. In learning a particular mathematics my power of acting is increased. There’s a new attractor that inhabits my being. However, interestingly, it is not simply that the growth of experience (the formation of new traces and plateaus of in the past) generates new attractors in these systems, but rather the activity of thought, and its equivalents for social systems (perhaps communication?) and certain technological objects, itself generates new powers or attractors within an object. These would be reflexive and endogenous transformations in the endo-relational structure of an object. Here we might think of an artist who, through her experimentation, develops a new style or power of producing. In this case, the new power or attractor is a mutation or transformation brought about by the object itself and by the object acting on itself.
So I suppose the question I’m asking myself here is that if objects are individuated not by their local manifestations but by their powers or attractors, is an object that evolves or develops a new attractor or power the same individual or not? There’s an important sense in which we might be inclined to say that the person that has learned mathematics is still the same substance and that New York as a village and New York as a sprawling metropolis is perhaps the same substance (or maybe not, the verdict is out for me). A third possibility would be that these sorts of objects remain the same substance within limits despite developing new attractors, but that there are threshold points where either so many attractors are lost or the structure or constellation of attractors is so transformed (as in Cronenberg’s The Fly) that there is a genuinely new substance that has come into existence. For these systems, then, memory or the past would be a crucial component in the individuation of the entity or in what makes the entity this entity.
Okay, I guess the post wasn’t short after all.
February 4, 2010 at 10:31 am
What is that film screenshot from please?
February 4, 2010 at 1:02 pm
Dear Levi, first off thanks for your always thought-provoking blog. As to the topic at hand: It seems to me that the questions you raise at the end of the post point to a very real difficulty for object-oriented positions, namely: whether they can resist collapsing into process-oriented positions a la Grant or Deleuze–and your Bergsonian example here is central to the question, it seems. While I think that the treatment of objects qua objects is an important undertaking, you seem to be circling around a set of reasons that would speak in favor of a synthesis of object-oriented and process-oriented positions (such as Shaviro has recently entertained). I for one find the idea of such a synthesis a positive goal, not a sign of “backsliding” from an object-oriented ontology.
February 4, 2010 at 3:04 pm
Val,
Honestly I’m not sure. I did a web search for “celluloid film superimposed images” and that was among the images that came up.
February 4, 2010 at 3:14 pm
Shane,
For me objects have always been processes. This is why I talk about the proper being of objects or its substantiality in terms of structure or system. I nodded to this last year when I first began developing these claims:
https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2008/12/21/objectile-and-agere/
While I endorse the thesis that objects are processes, I also think it’s really important to note that like anything else process philosophies differ significantly from one another. Here I think Harman is right to argue that there’s quite a difference between Deleuze, Bergson, and Grant on the one hand, and Whitehead on the other. Deleuze, Bergson, and Grant all see the virtual domain as a “one-all” populated by singularities and see objects as mere effects of this domain. Grant goes so far as to refer to this as the fallacy of “somatism”. Whitehead sees the world as composed of discrete objects, events or actual occasions that form what he calls “societies of actual occasions”. Both sides are variants of process philosophy, but both make very different claims about the being of being that can’t be substituted for one another. In this connection, I’m closer to Whitehead than I am to Deleuze, Bergson, and Grant. There is no “one-all” in the framework of the ontology I’m developing that is then segmented up into discrete bodies at the level of objects. The domain of the virtual that I’ve been outlining is composed of discrete structures that are independent of one another.
This also gets at Joe’s question. I still need to develop all this, but yes I think objects cease when their attractors are destroyed and that objects come into being when new constellations of attractors come into being. In other words, I don’t think attractors are eternal but see them as events that come to be. I don’t, however, think I’m proposing a mathematical ontology. An equation is a model or description of an attractor, not itself an attractor. This is why I referred to the analogy as metaphorical.
February 4, 2010 at 5:31 pm
I have always wondered what shape Deleuze’s philosophy would have taken if Whitehead, rather than Bergson, would have served as one of his principal philosophical influences. Also, what if Deleuze was a Leibnizian rather than a Spinozist?
February 5, 2010 at 2:19 am
I’m trying to make sense of most of the theory here, so excuse me if I got anything wrong. After reading this post I’ve got to say that most of it is way out there for me, I still don’t get how exactly does an illustration of a cone fit with the idea of contraction, especially with planes there in between. This might be my sloppy reading though. Can I play the idiot who asks naive questions in the philosophy class?
What I wanted to say is that what struck my eye here is the last paragraph. It looks to me, from a naive standpoint, to be some kind of a pseudo-problem, or at least not a problem that would be specific, or even relevant, to this situation. The problem of identity? Isn’t that the kind of a question that would be raised in a high school philosophy class? Or even resembling a wondering child asking “is water still water when frozen”? I’m sure there’s a philosopher I haven’t read lurking in history that went and took this question, build a twelve foot book shelf, and put all of his writings about it inside.
February 5, 2010 at 10:03 am
Levi,
Thanks for your reply, which was very helpful for me in terms of understanding where you’re coming from (and possibly where you’re heading as well).
I think the reference to Whitehead is especially important here, and it points to some work I’ve got to do in order fully to understand the relations between what you’re doing, what Graham Harman’s doing, and what Steven Shaviro’s doing (among other people).
Related to this, however, I’m not sure if Bergson’s not getting the short end of the stick here, and whether this isn’t due to some subtle transformations done to his metaphysics by Deleuze. I’m thinking particularly of a critique of Deleuze’s reading (specifically as laid out in _Cinema 1_ and _Cinema 2_) put forward by Mark Hansen in _New Philosophy for New Media_. According to Hansen, Deleuze has radically reduced the scope of affection’s functioning by subordinating it to (Bergson’s) perception, by means of which transformation technical framings such as the cinema’s become paradigmatic for the relations by which living beings perceive and individuate objects. But Bergson himself treats affection as categorically different from perception, namely as a creative or inventive faculty related to (as Hansen puts it) the concrete life of the body. The relevance, as I see it, is that the body of the living being must already be individuated as an object. The collapse of all situated being back into flux (and therefore the extinction of objects) that Deleuze flirts with is based, then, on ignoring the (so to speak) originary object status of the body.
This kind of Bergsonian (not Deleuzian) metaphysics would then also speak against calling “somatism” a fallacy, as Grant does. (I have to admit that I have not read Grant’s book, and so I’m not sure if I understand his claim…) It would also speak against the strict distinctions being drawn between Bergson and Whitehead.
Having said all this, it’s not my intention to start any kind of scholarly-interpretive debate (what Bergson really said, what Deleuze really said, etc.) but instead to point to a possible starting point to what I was commenting on originally: namely, the possibility of synthesizing process-oriented and object-oriented ontologies.
As always, interested in hearing more…
February 5, 2010 at 5:05 pm
WARNING THREAD HIJACKING-
Levi, I did a post on Brandom and Hegel concerning pantheism and skepticism today that concludes with speculations about how you and Graham would situate the argument with respect to object oriented philosophy.
It’s not a long post, but it represents how I finally worked through a mental cramp that I’ve been stuck with since Summer; so it would be great if you shed whatever light you have time to on the issue. Anyhow, the post is at http://drjon.typepad.com/jon_cogburns_blog/2010/02/idealism-pantheism-skepticism-or-quietism-in-brandoms-hegelianism-hat-tip-andrew-johnson.html . Thanks tons.