Okay, I wanted to write a wizbang post on this issue and probably will in the future when my thoughts settle a bit more, but in the tradition of Nate who has sadly been rather absent lately due to his paternal bliss, I have to ask, what in the hell is up with French continental philosophy’s obsession with the subject. Now please understand, when I ask this question I’m not asking it seriously. I know that the question of the subject has somehow come to be seen as the crucial and burning question of how change is possible. But to be quite honest, after going through all my Lacanian, Zizekian, and Badiouian escapades, I have to confess that I’m left scratching my head as to how the question contributes anything to producing change beyond providing a sort of pep rally for demoralized leftists living in a neoliberal world.
What sort of theory produces theoretical change? When I reflect on this question the answer seems to be cartographic theory or that form of theory that either provides the tools to or that actually do map collective assemblages. Here I have in mind work like that of Foucault, Marx in Capital, Latour, various feminist thinkers, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello. The point is that it’s very difficult to do anything if you don’t have a map of how things are put together, and it’s very difficult to strategize action without knowing the basins of attraction that tend to pull human bodies into particular patterns. It’s difficult to see what the category of the subject really contributes to any of this. And indeed, it seems that preoccupation with the subject actively draws attention away from such work.
Larval Subjects . 
March 30, 2010 at 1:49 am
Of course I can’t answer your question. But it occurs to me that there must be a history of “the obsession with the subject” in French continental philosophy. Would historicizing the obsession go some way towards answering your question? And, assuming that you are right when you say that “preoccupation with the subject” is not a fruitful way to provide tools for change, would that history perhaps explain how/why that matters/doesn’t matter?
March 30, 2010 at 2:08 am
As I said it wasn’t a real or genuine question, just more an expression of exasperation at a trend in contemporary theory that I believe to be asking the wrong sort of questions. Good points about the history of the subject in France, though. When I read Badiou, Lacan, and Zizek I think I’m probably in the minority, finding what they have to say about the subject to be the least interesting aspects of their thought.
March 30, 2010 at 1:33 pm
I don’t know, I would assume that questions about the subject are simply questions about the nature of subjectivity. Such themes have been popular in philosophy for many hundreds of years, especially in the modern period starting with Descartes. Is it really that surprising then that philosophers are interested in what it means to be a subject? Surely this is still an important topic in contemporary philosophy as well.
March 30, 2010 at 2:00 pm
The category of the subject as it functions in political theory does not refer to minds or individual persons, but rather subject-groups. The accent is on the subject of history as in the case of Marx where the proletariat is the subject and where subject-groups are treated as the active motor of history and change. In other words, these discussions aren’t about philosophy of mind, which is not what I’m objecting to.
March 30, 2010 at 4:51 pm
Well, in terms of Badiou, I think one could argue that the count-structure is a metaphor for human psychology, and thus falls into the realm of philosophy of mind (and phenomenology), albeit with a radical reworking of what a phenomena is, and how subjectivity and objectivity are constituted. Badiou says that subjects are “[finite] local situated configurations”. That sounds like an agent to me, albeit disguised in Badiouian jargon. Being and Event is more than just a book about group events; truth is realized within the local individual. On my reading, Badiou rightly accounts for both the individual and the subject-groups in his theory of subjectivity.
March 30, 2010 at 5:17 pm
Well, then, isn’t the obsession then possibly something on the order of “since – obviously, now – the proletariat is **not** the subject of history, what is? There must be a subject of hsitory, … mustn’t there? … mustn’t there?” (followed by a silence that’s deafening)
It seems to me that the French were utterly traumatized by WW2 and Algeria, in ways that are incomprehensible to the rest of us.
March 30, 2010 at 5:24 pm
Badiou is quite explicit on these points. Both of these suggestions would be a thorough misreading of his philosophy. Badiou is quite explicit on all these points. While there are no subjects without human bodies in Badiou’s philosophy, the subject is not a human mind or mentality. The reference point here is Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason where the distinction between subject-groups and subjected-groups is introduced. In many respects, Badiou’s account of the subject can be seen as a reworking of this Sartrean conception. So while yes subjects are agents for Badiou, they aren’t minds or phenomenological subjects. Again, I refer you to the example of the proletariat which, for Marx, is the subject of history. Here the subject isn’t an individual mind but a particular group configuration. Likewise with Badiou’s subject of science, his subject of art, and his subject of love. In love, for example, the subject isn’t you or your beloved but the Two. In all of these cases we’re talking about collectives. Badiou is quite disdainful of any psychologization of the subject, thoroughly denouncing it. This is part of what allows Badiou to claim that the subject is immortal. It is not you or me, for example, that are immortal. Like any animal bodies (the sort of term Badiou uses to refer to minds or humans; cf. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil) we die. What lives on are these collective subjects. Throughout his work Badiou is deeply hostile to anything like the phenomenological subject as a ground of philosophy. This point holds for the count-as-one as well. The count-as-one is not something that takes place through a subject or mind (as Badiou explicitly states and even more clearly articulates in Logics of Worlds). Rather, the count-as-one is an operation of being itself, regardless of whether any minds exist. In Logics of Worlds, for example, he develops an account of appearance without that appearance appearing to minds, phenomenological or transcendental subjects, etc. There’s a huge mystery in Badiou’s work as to just how to think about this. And, of course, one of the key points of Badiou’s theory of inconsistent multiplicity is that it is radically at odds with any phenomenality or manifestation. In short, there’s just no question of psychology here for Badiou.
March 30, 2010 at 5:58 pm
You could make the same argument about Heidegger and say “Heidegger never had anything to say about psychology and anthropology because he explicitly said that his philosophy didn’t have anything to say about psychology and anthropology.” But I don’t buy into any interpretation that says Heidegger didn’t have something to say about human psychology or anthropology, however abstract. And similarly with Badiou, if you say that for him, “the subject is not a human mind or mentality”, I would respond that the subject is not the human mind or mentality as traditionally conceived. If there are no subjects without human bodies, and bodies are the foundation of agenthood, then Badiou has something to say about embodied minds (agents). I would also say that Heidegger was a bigger influence on Badiou than Sartre. Badiou might have been against Cartesian psychology, but I don’t think he would have any problems with a Heideggerian psychology.
Also, I never said anything about the phenomenological subject being the *ground* of Badiou’s philosophy; I merely said that in some respects his philosophy makes implicit claims about the nature of human psychology. And one can develop a theory about appearance independent of humanity while also talking about how humans approach and encounter that appearance, given humans live on a structured planet.
March 30, 2010 at 6:14 pm
I’m just repeating what Badiou explicitly argues. You’ll have to take it up with him. He is entirely clear in his rejection of the subjectivist turn in philosophy.
March 30, 2010 at 10:05 pm
I’m not sure the analogy quite holds up, but the focus on the subject somewhat reminds me to the focus on fundamental particles for the eliminative materialist: each is the thing-that-isn’t-reducible at the bottom of everything, so there’s great intellectual interest in the “so what is it, really?” question. That despite mapping structures being more helpful in both cases (probably even a particle physicist would admit that materials science or chemistry are more relevant to doing things with matter than is the nature of the Higgs-Boson).
March 30, 2010 at 11:05 pm
“There’s a huge mystery in Badiou’s work as to just how to think about this.”
This mystery is only a mystery to those already steeped in the phenomenological tradition. To anyone familiar with mathematics there is nothing peculiar about the idea of an “operator” without anyone actually “doing” the operating.
Similarly, computer software design is shot through with notions of objects interacting with the outside world via an interface that is more-or-less independent of its innards, ie an “appearance” in a world that does not presume anyone to “appear” to.
Re your wider point about the return of the subject, I can’t say I agree much. The notion that examination of the subject is some sort of distraction from important “cartographic” work strikes me as glib. You may as well complain that the time we spend walking draws attention from chewing gum.
March 30, 2010 at 11:30 pm
I don’t think it’s glib at all, bat. First, I don’t see what analysis of the subject in Badiou’s sense contributes to situations at all. The subject is a difference that really makes no difference and therefore is a distraction. Second, and more importantly, I don’t see the sort of cartographic analysis in Badiou that I’m calling for. In fact, I see it as almost entirely absent from his thought and from the thought of those deeply influenced him. What you get is endless discussion of the subject and truth-procedures without ever getting to the vital cartography. In fact, Badiou’s denunciations of sociology actively encourage an absence of deep analyses of situations. And let’s not forget Badiou’s rejection of the importance of political economy. Badiou represents yet one more discursivization of political questions to the detriment of anything non-semiotic. Ergo it very much seems that Badiouians have difficulty chewing gum and walking. Indeed, they don’t seem to walk much at all. Ultimately I just think Badiou’s subject is more or less irrelevant. I’ll side with Marx over Badiou here.
As for your point about operators, first your point about mathematics really misses the point insofar as we’re talking about what’s adequate to ontology. Second, what’s mysterious is not the idea of an operator without someone doing the operating, but rather the question of how this takes place at all regardless of whether or not a subject is involved. How does being pass from inconsistent multiplicity to consistent multiplicity? Badiou really has no answer to this question beyond some handwaving about the count-as-one and the transcendental. I just think Badiou is deeply underdetermined on these points and suspect that there’s a hidden idealism at work in his thought regardless of his descriptions of his position as a materialism. All that aside, you seem to have missed the fact that my posts to Gary were criticizing his subjectivist understanding of Badiou, not giving a phenomenological account of Badiou. Gary was the one proposing that mind effects the count-as-one, not I. I was actually praising Badiou for having conceived the possibility of an appearance without anyone to appear to and an operation without an someone doing the operating. I merely think that Badiou conceives the possibility without giving the account of how this works. For that you’d have to turn to someone like Deleuze and his account of individuation.
March 30, 2010 at 11:55 pm
By your own reckoning there’s no shortage of cartographic analyses knocking around. But clearly cartohgraphy per se doesn’t seem to deliver all that. If anything it tends towards fatuous detachment, which is invariably supplemented by an idiotic moralising hyperactivism (“enough theorising, we must DO SOMETHING!”).
As to what the “point” is to Badiou’s insistence on the subject – his whole philosophy is geared towards the question of how something radically new can emerge, whether that be a political, artistic or whatever innovation.
One answer is these innovations just occur naturally, cos of the Infinite Fecundity of Becoming or some such. Badiou takes the opposite position – the instantiation of something new is thoroughly unnatural and alien, it requires something at odds with the existing order of things to carry it through and sustain it. That’s what he calls a subject.
Of course this “subject” is highly abstract and there’s a question over whether anything meaningful can be said about what-there-is-in-common between the “subjects” of politics, art, science and love. But that’s what Badiou is trying to do.
I don’t think this is meaningless. I don’t think it’s all that successful either. But I prefer it to the pretence that there’s nothing there to think about – which is where I think your insistence on cartography leads.
March 31, 2010 at 12:29 am
Bat,
Yes, I understand what Badiou is attempting to do and how he’s proposing to do it (you might remember me from the Badiou list that I founded), I just don’t think the theory of the subject does what he wants to do. When we look at the history of political thought that’s actually produced change it always comes from cartographic analyses that allow us to understand the lay of the land and what needs to be responded to within those situations. In my view, Badiou’s approach encourages and cultivates abstraction completely divorced from concrete situations (regardless of what he says about the attachment of events to situations). When I refer to abstraction I am not referring to his use of mathematics. In a context of Continental philosophy characterized by mathophobia, I think this is to be thoroughly commended. Rather, I am referring to the manner in which his thought encourages ignoring the structuration of concrete situations and how they’re put together. Things have gotten a bit better since Logics of Worlds but not much. I just think that if you’re really interested in changing things, thinkers like Badiou and Zizek aren’t the place to look. I also think you’re setting up a bit of a strawman opposition between “natural becoming” and Badiou’s subject. I don’t know of any philosopher that holds that political and social change just occurs naturally of its own accord. While Deleuze certainly develops an ontology of becoming, this is a mischaracterization of his political thought. Active engagement in situations is what produces such change. But for that to take place it’s necessary to know how situations are put together. I don’t know why we need to insist on the subject to explain this. There’s not a whole lot that’s mysterious here. Oppressive situations are painful for the agents that dwell in them. There’s no need to evoke some conception of the subject as in the case of Badiou to account for why folks might want to struggle against the conditions in which they find themselves.
March 31, 2010 at 12:58 am
The solution to meaningless, juvenile babble about “the subject” is…. cartography?
“Marx in Capital”
is cartography?
Here I was thinking that it was economics.
I find it humorous that lefties will do just about anything to avoid learning a bit of math. Actually it’s not humorous — it’s just depressing.
March 31, 2010 at 1:05 am
By cartography I mean a mapping of the structure of situations and how they’re actually organized. Marx is a cartographer of capitalist economics. Understanding how capitalism is structured allows us to effectively respond to it. That requires mapping. Personally I find Badiou’s celebration of mathematics to be among the most attractive and fascinating aspects of his thought. If you explore this blog you’ll find a lot of engagement with category theory and set theory, and that comes directly out of Badiou. Where in this post did you find rejection of Badiou based on his engagement with mathematics? Or is this just what you assume when you encounter anyone who has a problem with Badiou? I just think his focus on the subject is misguided.
March 31, 2010 at 1:37 am
Sorry, I should be clearer about where I’m coming from on this.
“Understanding how capitalism is structured allows us to effectively respond to it. That requires mapping.”
No. That requires understanding economics.
“Personally I find Badiou’s celebration of mathematics to be among the most attractive and fascinating aspects of his thought. If you explore this blog you’ll find a lot of engagement with category theory and set theory”
That’s not really what I meant. I’m not talking about mathematic theory, I’m just talking about the bare minimum of stats, calc, algebra, and economics theory necessary to discuss economics.
My point is that what I view to be pretty worthless, masturbatory philosophy is syphoning off the energies of the smartest young lefties. Despite being disappointed with the consistently worthless results (ex. “subject” theory, endless pompous conferences, no rapport with the actual poor and working class) they just keep going back to philosophy.
For everyone that is looking for actual real answers, a strong way to challenge neo-liberalism, motivate the people, etc.: economics is the way. It’s not all right wing, or liberal. Check out Kalecki or something like that.
March 31, 2010 at 2:44 am
Friedrich,
While it may seem surprising, Levi’s a harsh critic of philosophy at it’s most masturbatory moments. And while I cringe more or less instinctively at the phrase “economics is the way”, please believe me when I say your point is well taken. It’s true, the post-structuralist Left is plagued by a wholesale antagonism to the social sciences and the natural sciences, as well as to scientific method and practice itself. The relentless focus on the Subject is a symptom of this antagonism. And it is precisely this always-too-anthropomorphic notion of Subject that the realisms espoused here are struggling to overcome.
Whether you think that’s a worthwhile pursuit is another matter altogether. I think it’s a crucial pursuit. As is economics. And also the collection of garbage. All crucial.
Rest assured, your point is well taken.
March 31, 2010 at 4:02 am
I don’t mean to dismiss it entirely. I was mainly responding to this:
“I’m left scratching my head as to how the question contributes anything to producing change beyond providing a sort of pep rally for demoralized leftists living in a neoliberal world.”
I doubt that continental philosophy as a whole contributes anything to producing political change. I don’t doubt that it is worthwhile, or crucial as you say, but this expectation that it can ever produce real political and economic change is, in my opinion, misplaced.
March 31, 2010 at 4:48 pm
If you want to project positive “change” and attempt to be as effective as “subjects” like warlords, colonialists, enterprises and explorers, the answer is yes.
However in the past the “subject” ( i.e. a progressive social force ) was itself a project and it was successfully synthesized, together with its revolutionary attractors, by at least two political-philosophical movements, namely that of enlightenment and that of socialism. It wasn’t only important what could finally be technically achieved but how we are morally, economically and intellectually transformed.
April 3, 2010 at 5:54 pm
Hi Levi,
Will OOP have something to say about love at some point…?
April 16, 2010 at 12:50 am
but wait: doesn’t Badiou’s focus on set theory become the model in a sense for the work or task of the Subject. That is to map the set, name the void, etc. (and further i think we have to be clear that in his work the “Subject” and the “subject” are not the same thing. The capital letter Subject has been transformed by the Event, and is involved in a truth procedure. It’s not a pyschological or phenemenological subject. Its a body active in truth development, loyal and more or less dilligent to the particular cause (i.e. evolution, or for two in true (evental) love: their love, etc.). Does his thinking on the Subject neccesarily lead to abstraction? One danger is that it could lead to a kind of polemical quasi-socratic proto-activism, while waiting for Godot, and perhaps most disturbingly renouncing various horizons and hybrid developments of movement… waiting to see if the True Event has happened or not….
that being said, and tho you are not serious, the focus on the subject (small s) is not without value. Even if the subject is but one nodal point among many other agents of flux/stability, etc., it — the human body/mind collective or otherwise — is nonetheless a pretty impressive ‘node’, shall we say… not to get all midieval…
no seriously: why>?
well because the theory is that perhaps the subject’s freedom of passion/thought/desire, etc. can be harnessed to make change…
and yet we know, from Marx to Althusser to Freud to Deleuze, that its not so simple.
but why?
it seems to be political-historical. After all, uprisings were a plenty during slave/indentured servitude days (see Howard Zinn on this). Not to mention all the bombings in the early 70’s in the U.S. alone. That both of these possibilites (whether good or bad is not the point) are about as off-the-radar in the ‘developed world’ as a supersonic passenger airplane now, is because there is not only a different ‘cartography’ now, but a different subject. A neo-liberal subject. This too needs to be mapped, no? and isn’t that what Zizek and others are in part busy de-coding?
no?