Yuri di Liberto has published an article on my machine-oriented ontology and DeLanda’s work.  It can be found here.  Here’s the abstract:

One of the developments in recent literature on speculative realism has been Levi Bryant’s work on MOO (Machine-Oriented ontology), which is a particular type of the more general Object-Oriented philosophy. Given that in Bryant’s account the ultimate entities of a world are machines (in Deleuze’s terms) and that, more importantly, machines are defined by their powers and what he calls “virtual proper being”, I will try to draw some philosophical conse- quences about the key notions of virtual, machine, and their relationship to that of attractor. I’ll try to suggest that these very notions are crucial for a realist and speculative account of what there is. More specifically, the concept of ‘virtual’ could be explained via that of ‘attractor’. I will thus conclude that both Bryant’s and DeLanda’s accounts point to the idea of a substance conceived as something intrinsically dynamic.