I’m always suspicious of theory that doesn’t make use of a rich reservoir of examples; not because this is a mark of good writing in that examples assist readers in understanding the concepts, but because I worry that the theory is unmoored from anything in the world, that it bears no responsibility for explaining anything in the world (which might also function as a ground from which to contest the theory), and that the theory might instead just be a castle in the air. What is an epistemology, for example(!), that gives no concrete examples of knowledge production? We are told all about knowledge without ever being given a single example of what the author sees as an instance of knowledge. How are we to know, in these instances, of whether or not this epistemology maps on to anything that takes place in the world of knowledge production among scientists, doctors, lawyers, craftsmen, psychoanalysts, etc? A theory that sought to conceptualize literature without speaking of any instances of literature would be strange indeed.
An example is not a simple ornament, but is that to which the theorist bears responsibility in their theorizing. In this regard, I think that it’s noteworthy that prior to the twentieth century, so many philosophers were not first and foremost philosophers. Descartes, for example, was a mathematician, scientist, and soldier. Leibniz was a mathematician, diplomat, engineer, and many other things besides. Spinoza was a lens grinder. Locke was a physician. For all of these thinkers there was something else, a sort of “matter”, that introduced a little bit of the real, a little bit of alterity, and which constrained their speculation. Would the postmodern (I hate that term) idea of a universe composed entirely of flowing signifiers that construct reality however one likes have ever been possible prior to the age of the professional theorist, the professional academic, that isn’t attached to any matter like the body as in the case of Locke or the obstinance of the matheme as in the case of Leibniz?
However, the example is also important for another reason. The example says a great deal about just how a theorist thinks about a certain type of thing. Deleuze repeatedly suggests that we ask not “what is it”, but rather “who?”, “which one?”, “how many?” Speaking of mathematics, Kant continuously evokes the example of 7 + 5 = 12. Is this a good or representative example of mathematics? I think both Badiou and Deleuze rightfully chastise this choice for the conception of mathematics it reflects. How about Harman? His favorite examples are fire, cotton, and hammers. How might these archetypal examples inform his entire conception of objects? Would that theory be different if one chose a flower or waves or a factory? When a theorist wishes to write about architecture and uses the home as their go to example, how does that example come to inform their entire theory of architecture? Examples express intuitions about the nature of broader categories like “being”, “knowledge”, “truth”, “normativity”, etc. They are not secondary, but are at the core of theoretical work.
July 27, 2016 at 11:58 pm
Suspicion is probably good even with examples, for the examples often enough show where the author lacks. Yet, without examples then we are to consider that the thoery itself is already an example, and possibly not lacking then. No?
July 28, 2016 at 11:03 am
The master craftsman is not the one who is proficient in making, but whom is proficient in seeing.
When l climb the wall I am caught in the movement of my limbs, my success is my surprise when lo and behold l stick to the wall. The expert climber can anticipate, visualize the climb before it happens. The sweet spot in climbing is when it is challenging, when one is caught between falling and mastery.
In indoor climbing, the holds are clear to see. Potential is already revealed for you, it is a question of whether you can use it. This can be contrasted with ‘natural’ outdoor climbing where the climber must reveal the potential in the rock.
The postmodern theorist failure clearly does not reside in not working on an object of sensation, as seemingly that would rule out abstract nouns as a topic of study. It is in reducing objects to that of human freedom, but isn’t that how we relate to the world today? Nature, that which can be traded on the free market? Or the ‘gamification’ of exercise, Pokemon Go, which serves up footfall for retail and service stores. Who sees and who is blind?