This semester I have been teaching Spinoza’s Ethics to close out the course. Although I have had bad experiences teaching the Ethics and Leibniz in the past, this year, for some reason, it has been a pure pleasure. Once you are finally able to penetrate the propositions and their supporting arguments, a beautiful structure begins to emerge, where each proposition builds on the previous proposition, gradually building to greater and greater complexity and taking the reader from truths that are almost self-evident and hardly in need of proof (e.g., “Substance is by nature prior to its affections or qualities”), to surprising and disturbing conclusions (that nature and God are identical; that God is not a sovereign ruling over nature and preferring one set of beings over another, but that instead God creates everything that God can create by necessity; that values and morals are not intrinsic to things, but products of how our bodies relate to other bodies in terms of benefit; that there are no purposes or ends to nature, only efficient causes; that God cannot be compelled or persuaded to act, but only acts according to the necessity of his own being; etc). One by one, Spinoza challenges the root claims of traditional theology and organized religion, showing how these claims are in contradiction with God’s essence. In developing these arguments he institutes a thorough-going immanent naturalism sans any dimension of transcendence or vertical being.
Spinoza is crafty and devious. What makes his arguments so ingenious and devious is that unlike the materialistic atheist that simply denies the existence of God on materialistic grounds, Spinoza works within the theological tradition, drawing on definitions inherited directly from Aristotle and Medieval Jewish and Christian theology, painstakingly demonstrating that when these definitions and axioms are followed through logically, they entail these conclusions and no others (granting, of course, that his arguments are sound). In other words, Spinoza shows that it is theology itself that leads to these conclusions. As a result, there is something of the uncanny in Spinoza. Just as Freud’s unheimlich is a sort of effect of the heimlich, the homely, the familiar, such that what is familiar suddenly presents itself in a completely unfamiliar way– for example, your image in a mirror begins speaking to you and moving about when you are not –Spinoza takes the familiar concepts of theology, retains them, and completely inverts them in a way that renders them thoroughly unfamiliar, unheimlich, and even a bit terrifying.
Not surprisingly, a number of my students immediately gravitate towards questions of morality in relation to Spinoza’s thought. If, as Spinoza argues, God does not reward nor punish a person for living a moral life, and if, as Spinoza argues, values are a matter of the relation of our body to other bodies in terms of whether these other bodies increase or diminish our power of acting, and if, as Spinoza argues, God has no preference for what is or is not, for how we live our lives, then how can Spinoza have any place for ethics or morality? For example, God creates Jeffrey Dahmer and Dahmer’s existence follows from God’s nature as one of the modes that can exist following from the attributes of extension and thought. Insofar as Dahmer can exist, he therefore must exist by virtue of God’s absolute infinity and the fact that God’s activity is limited in no way. God has no preference for Jesus, Mother Theresa, or Dahmer, but creates all of these modes as they are possible variations of particular attributes (the essence of substance). Any preference for one mode over another arises not from God’s will or desire, but from relations among modes themselves. In other words, one calls Dahmer bad because he diminishes your power of acting by drilling holds in your head and eating your flesh. In short, Dahmer diminishes your power of acting.
Read on
Spinoza’s ethical philosophy is thus closer to a branch of medicine or health sciences than to a deontological ethical theory based on normative principles. In this connection, everything follows from his concept of conatus: “Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being” (Part III, Prop 6). Just as I do not eat barbecue three times a day despite the fact, as my students say, it is delicious (and therefore good in some respect for my body), because it causes me to gain weight, threatens heart disease, and makes me fatigued, I strive to act ethically in relation to others because doing so enhances my power of acting and preserves my conatus. In other words, eating well and exercising, while guaranteeing nothing, increases the probability that I will be healthy and increases my body’s capacity for acting. Pursuing knowledge and understanding of true causes diminishes my fear (by freeing me from superstition) and increases my ability to control my circumstances. And treating others well increases the probability that others will treat me well in return (though it doesn’t guarantee this), and therefore creates more opportunities for me, more harmonious relations with others, and a greater control of my existence.
As Spinoza will say, “By virtue and power I mean the same thing; that is (Pr. 7, Part III on conatus), virtue, in so far as it is related to man, is man’s very essence, or nature, in so far as he has power to bring about that which can be understood through the laws of nature” (Def. 8, Part IV). The term “virtue” comes from the Latin virtus and “virtutem“, referring to moral strength, manliness, valor, excellence, or worth. It is a translation of the Greek concept of “ἀρετή” or “arete, referring to “excellence”. Thus, far from being a set of prohibitions or limitations, virtue is instead potency or power, an excellence. The ἀρετή of an eagle, for example, is its keen sight, its swift flight, its prowess hunting, etc. The question is thus what is ἀρετή for a human being?
For Spinoza this is, of course, an open question as “the human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or diminished; and also in many other ways which neither increase nor diminish its power of activity” (Post. 1, Part III), and “…nobody as yet has determined the limits of the body’s capabilities; that is, nobody as yet has learned from experience what the body can and cannot do…” (Prop. 2, Schol.). In other words, there is a sort of Olympian athleticism to Spinoza’s concept of virtue or power, involving the exploration of the body’s power or what it can do (something that would be explored through art, science, reason, politics, friendship, love, engineering, sport, etc.). At the very least, however, social relationships will necessarily be a part of human ἀρετή. As Spinoza puts it,
…nothing is more advantageous to man than man. Men, I repeat, can wish for nothing more excellent for preserving their own being than that they should all be in such harmony in all respects that their minds and bodies should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should endeavor as best they can to preserve their own being, and that all together they should aim at the common advantage of all. From this it follows that men who are governed by reason, that is men who aim at their own advantage under the guidance of reason, see nothing for themselves that they would not desire for the rest of mankind; and so are just, faithful and honorable. (Prop. 18, Schol.)
One need only watch Cast Away with Tom Hanks or an episode of Survivorman with Les Stroud, to see the truth of this. Les, for example, spends the vast majority of his time searching for food, often failing, leaving little time for anything else. Thus, as I argued in “Towards a Critique of the Politics of the Void“, perhaps the burning question of political philosophy is not that of how a subject of the political is possible, but rather that of how it is possible to form a collective assemblage is possible. This question becomes especially crucial in an age of commodity fetishism, where our relations to others are masked or recede into the background (like Heidegger’s “worldhood of the world”) and take on the appearance of being relations to things or objects, thereby generating a sense of abstract individualism where we experience ourselves as being independent of collective relations. The question here is one of freedom and bondage, or what increases my power of acting and what diminishes that power. Collective relations are, in this connection, crucial to promoting the possibility of ἀρετή.
Much to my delight, the student (who is quite bright) who raised these concerns immediately responded with the exclamation “But that is socialist! Humans are sinful by nature and capitalist!” Here, I think, we encounter one of the fundamental ideological maneuvers in America. In The Usual Suspects Verbal remarks that the greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he doesn’t exist. This is certainly the case with arguments for capitalism and against socialism in the United States.
The unspoken premises of this claim are clear. Setting aside the fact that Spinoza lived in Amsterdam during the flourishing of the early rise of capitalism (and, as Negri points out in The Savage Anomaly, appearing to whole-heartedly endorse this economic system), the stark alternative the student is drawing is between altruism as a motive of action on the one hand and egoism or self-interest on the other hand. The claim that humans are, by nature, egoistic is the claim that they only act on behalf of their own personal self-interest, are therefore naturally competitive, and are therefore naturally prone to corruption and deceit. On the one hand, the position seems to be that socialism is impossible because humans are naturally prone to corruption. It is odd that this argument is made again and again, despite the fact that, as Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine aptly demonstrates in spades (everyone, really, should read this book), neoliberal economic policies again and again lead to rife corruption and brutality, contrary to democracy, despite protestations to the contrary. The idea is that the only thing that could compel me to live ethically is a fear of punishment or damnation by God, thereby leading me to the conclusion that moral life is in my own selfish self-interest. Virtue cannot be, as Spinoza argued, “blessedness”, where “blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. We do not enjoy blessedness because we keep our lusts in check. On the contrary, it is because we enjoy blessedness that we are able to keep our lusts in check” (Prop. 42, Part V). On the other hand, the argument seems to be that since humans are not altruistic, our only alternative is “healthy” capitalism.
However, if there is one thing the free market ideologues in the United States have never understood or admitted, it is that socialism never was and never has been about altruism, but has always been about self-interest. One does not pursue regulated economies, re-distribution of wealth, worker management, collective struggle, unionization, etc., out of some special love or selfless altruism directed at one’s fellow humans, but precisely out of the desire to maximize the conatus or ἀρετή of one’s own being. Nothing is more beneficial to humans than other humans. And through combining my body with the bodies of others, I am able to form a collective assemblage, a common, that enhances both my own power of acting, and our power of acting. My freedom is therefore deepened and enhanced. It is enhanced through a distribution of labor that frees up time for all those involved so that other ends might be pursued. It is enhanced through increased protection from those more powerful than I, who would exploit me and the system to their own benefit. It is enhanced through companionship through which I build with others, explore ideas, and with whom I create.
What Spinoza presents is thus not an altruism, but an enlightened egoism… An egoism that is cognizant of our complex relations to the world and others as both constraints and conditions for our freedom and power. Far from the abolition of individualism and freedom, collective assemblages are the condition for individualism and freedom insofar as the create the space and time whereby it might become possible for me to cultivate and develop myself according to the virtual singularities or tendencies of my own conatus or essence, and by protecting me from my fellow man who might exploit and oppress me. My freedom or power is grounded in an increased mastery of my world around me which can only be achieved collectively through reason. Does it come as any surprise that an ideology like neoliberal economics, that produces a squalorly life for so many and such limited freedom and opportunity for the majority, can only sustain itself by filling the heads of the multitudes with superstitious mythologies, and convincing them that what is in fact in their interest is instead a matter of an implausible altruism that would be contrary to their interest? As Spinoza remarks, “…he who seeks the true causes of miracles and is eager to understand the works of nature as a scholar, and not just to gape at them like a fool, is universally considered an impious heretic and denounced by those to whom the common people bow down as interpreters of Nature and gods. For these people know that the dispelling of ignorance would entail the disappearance of that sense of aw which is the one and only support for their argument and for the safeguarding of their authority or power” (Part I, Appendix).
November 19, 2008 at 9:33 pm
But dr. Sinthome, the most banal remark one could make is that since REASON is not the only force driving the human beink, dr. Spinoza was ignoring our ”darker impulses” in making his socialist conclusions. And besides we already tried this enlightened egoism – you had it in Holland as well as in Yugoslavia – and you still have remnants of it in Holland keeping the medicare system relatively sane – but it bombed under neoliberalism. Why did it bomb, if it was so rational and enlightened? (I don’t want to hear the Communist response – ”because capitalists ruined it”; that just isn’t true, because Communists themselves ruined it) Doesn’t one need to intervene in human nature as such to bring about change, instead of trying to ”organize things”?
November 19, 2008 at 9:45 pm
Actually, Spinoza devotes parts 3 and 4 of the Ethics to a rich and nuanced analysis of the human emotions, arguing that reason is impossible so long as we don’t understand the mechanisms by which our emotions work and how they tend to create a set of illusions and confusion. The aim is not, of course, to get rid of the emotions, but to transform passive affects generative of bondage and sad passions, into active affects. Spinoza is singular among the rationalists in taking seriously the role that emotions play in our cognition and in showing how they are a crucial element of thought and life. Whatever else one might think of Spinoza’s metaphysics or theology, his account of the emotions is an extremely rewarding read… During Lacan’s teenage years he actually had a map of Spinoza’s Ethics on his wall. One can speculate that much of his understanding of the imaginary and specular identification arose from meditation on Spinoza’s account of the emotions. One could say that Spinoza applies reason to the study of the emotions, showing the rationality that underlies them (the logos by which they’re governed) and discovering much of the unconscious as a result. At any rate, if the system you describe was “rational and enlightened” yet bombed, it must not have been very rational and enlightened. This is not reason’s fault, but the fault of those who do not cultivate reason. We see precisely the same thing happening with contemporary capitalism… A system eating itself due to irrational practices.
November 19, 2008 at 9:49 pm
Or, put a bit differently, my point isn’t that humans always live rationally or do what is in their own interest (rather they do what they believe to be in their interest), but rather that collective action is a form of self-interest, not a saintly altruism. That’s quite a different proposition. Does that mean collective action will necessarily lead to rational results or results that actually benefit those involved? Of course not. As you point out, there are all sorts of illusions that inhabit thought (hence the interest of psychoanalysis, ideology critique, etc). What it does mean is that the argument that capitalism is based on self-interest while collective action is not is a distortion of what is, in fact, taking place.
November 19, 2008 at 9:58 pm
What it does mean is that the argument that capitalism is based on self-interest while collective action is not is a distortion of what is, in fact, taking place.
Yes dr. Sinthome I honestly READ your article, however what do you want to do with this argument? If self-interest enabled by collective praxis to some kind of a positive/enlightened outcome existed before, and it did, but failed miserably, my question was, don’t we need to now take things one step further, and discover what chemistry/psychology/Devil IN THE HUMAN BEINK causes them to falter that is to say succumb to their irrational and negative strivings? Your argument seems to be shifting the locus of controlae to the social sphere, as if it’s just an issue of organizing things better, following some rational dictum…
November 19, 2008 at 10:15 pm
Dejan, if you’ve been following my posts you’ll note that I’ve already anticipated your points here. In particular, the thread I’m developing in “Murky Thoughts: From Name-of-the-Father to Sinthome” deals with precisely this point, arguing that French thinkers turned towards psychoanalysis to explain why certain collective formations led to such dire results.
With that said, I think your argument here is based on a faulty premise. You seem to be suggesting that it is intrinsic to the nature of collective formations that they lead to horrific outcomes such as those encountered in the Soviet Union or during the cultural revolution. This is a non-sequitor. Suppose we put your argument in the form of a syllogism.
Premise: Yugoslavia was the result of collective praxis.
Premise: Professor Sinthome is defending collective action.
Conclusion: Therefore Professor Sinthome advocates outcomes like those of Yugoslavia.
Now, this conclusion clearly does not follow from these premises, for, in the second premise, it does not follow that collective action is restricted to formations like those of Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union. Draw a Venn Diagram and see for yourself.
Your error thus lies in the suggestion that somehow all collective action and all collective assemblages necessarily lead to these results. Why is that the case? This would be like arguing that all religion necessarily leads to the Inquisition, witch burnings, persecutions of homosexuals, and phenomena like those we find among fundamentalists. Second, you are implicitly making the case that somehow capitalism does not lead to dire and horrific results, whereas collective assemblages do. Well, history suggests the contrary. Capitalism has produced as many, if not more, atrocities and varieties of human suffering as certain types of collective assemblages.
My position is thus as follows. All things being equal, when face with a choice between a system that benefits only a select few while generating poverty, lack of freedom, suffering, exploitation, and war for the rest, versus social formations that allow many to organize and create better working conditions for themselves, a better standard of living, more services, more freedom, more control over one’s existence, etc., the second choice is a no brainer. The second choice is in my self-interest, while the first choice is not. Unless I harbor a fantasy like Joe the Plumber, believing that somehow I will someday be among the chosen few, it makes sense for me to work with others in order to have a greater share of control over my labor conditions. That said, I fully agree that we must study and seek to understand why certain types of collective assemblages led to certain horrible outcomes. I do not share the thesis that all collective assemblages necessarily lead to horrific outcomes.
November 19, 2008 at 10:30 pm
Dr. Sinthome I don’t see where in my correspondence I said that 1) all collective assemblages lead to disaster and 2) that all socialist assemblages (including the one in Yugoslavia) led to ONLY disaster, so your lesson in logic is perfunctory (although as you know I do like a bit of rough fucking with you always). I was taking the premise, for the sake of the argument, that the ”rational collective assemblage” of socialism collapsed at least to the extent that it didn’t deliver on its premise of providing a good/functional system for most of mankind to live in, while the capitalism, with all the negativities you list, survived somehow, or survived longer (without this necessarily implying that it allowed manking to survive WELL).
I did not follow the last few postings but now that I see them, I realize you’ve already opened the issue of the functioning of desire. And in this respect my thoughts always go towards the ”aura” surrounding the petit objet a, what you’d religiously designate as greed: why do we always want more, why is the grass greener on the other side of the fence, why is that commodity aura so attractive (cf. Shaviro’s aestheticization), and what generates the illusion of Lack/makes the Oedipal structuration so popular or dominant?
November 19, 2008 at 10:37 pm
Addendum: I put serious question marks on the idea that what is collapsing right now is neoliberalism-as-capitalism, because I feel that neoliberalism deploys strategies learned in the self-managing phase of socialism, for example, the softly-totalitarian control it exerts by means of political correctness (the laws against smoking, the ”embrace” of minority groups, and the ethos of equality being preached in companies even as the salary gap increases, et cetera). I argue it is precisely this socialist facade which allowed neoliberalism to take on, and believing as I fully do that Yugoslavia was a social engineering project from the very start, know that this was the theoretical and practical testing ground for what we are experiencing today. Even the credit crunch as the bursting of a virtual bubble resembles very much the disintegration of the self-managing economic system.
November 19, 2008 at 11:00 pm
Very nice post. You might be interested in the work of an early twentieth-century devotee of Spinoza named Constantin Brunner. Brunner, a German of Jewish extraction, makes the distinction between the natum and the cultum, respectively primal egoism and enlightened egoism. There is an English language digest of Brunner’s work entitled Science, Spirit, Superstition, with the political theory on pp. 513-515.
November 19, 2008 at 11:06 pm
[…] of Cultural Parody Center asks how I respond to the worry that collective assemblages lead to disasters such as some of those that […]
November 19, 2008 at 11:09 pm
Many thanks for the reference Barrett!
November 19, 2008 at 11:17 pm
Dejan, I don’t at all disagree. Neoliberal practices has formed an extremely strong network system that defends itself in a variety of ways. My thesis is rather modest. It is not that neoliberalism has been undermined or is facing its imminent implosion, but that due to recent failures that are the direct result of these policies and economic strategies, new possibilities have become available at the level of the plane of expression, collective assemblages of enunciation, or discourse that at least allow the premises of this sort of economic system to be questioned (cf. my post “Of Games and Rendering Alternatives Available” on November 17th). Prior to the last few years (in the States), I do not think these alternatives were publicly available outside of the academy or marginalized leftist anti-globalization activists. What is surprising is that they are now becoming topics of discussion among establishment media and politicians. This minimal opening opens the possibility of forming more effective collective assemblages that might begin to enact new types of economic practices, legislation, states, etc. Nothing is guaranteed, but things are a bit brighter in the sense that 45 degree fahrenheit day is a promising sign during an ice age.
November 19, 2008 at 11:50 pm
http://parodycentrum.wordpress.com/2008/11/19/dr-sinthome-in-why-does-capitalism-work/
Dr Sinthome I wrote in relation to dr. Jodianne Fossey’s Obamamania recently that indeed the good thing about his victory was the American people’s inspiration to try something different, to change, and when I said that I was operatin’ from the same structural/psychoanalytique premise that you explained in that post. But also, on the way things changed in Serbia when people stopped believing in the patriarchal figure of the Savior that was Slobodan Milosevic for about a decade. He was only overturned when people stopped investing libidinally in his personality etc. realizing that the rules of the game behind it are corrupt. And if you go by that example, then I agree that yes I think change is now totally possible, and probable.
But you know when you’re fucking me without paying much attention to my jouissance it would be nice if at least I didn’t know that you came before I did because I turned you on, not because you had to avoid GRADING THE FACKING PAPERS!
November 20, 2008 at 12:01 am
Ha, well I had to come up with some silly excuse for my post! Of course, you’re aware that I’ve devoted a lot of digital ink here to critiques of the discourse of the master and libidinal identification for precisely the reason you mention, among others.
November 20, 2008 at 12:09 am
Dr Sinthome it is precisely because of your attempts to subjectively destitute global audiences that I always praised you amongst my readership as an extraordinarily clever cat who despite his tight collar and a criminal color sense deserves to be promoted. Nothing like that nefarious Lacanian bitch dr. Psychoanalytic Field, who took the Parody Center off the blawgroll just because Clysmatics did.
November 20, 2008 at 11:45 am
Regarding Spinoza’s relationship to Dutch mercantilist capitalism, one might also reflect upon his critique of Calvinist theology (something I’m not really well read enough to do, but it just crossed my mind that this might be an interesting field for further questions on Spinoza’s relationship to Capitalism).
Anyway, I also came to think of Machiavelli and his concept of virtú, which of course is close to Spinoza’s concept of virtue. Do you have any thoughts on the relationship between these two thinkers, especially regarding ethics and politics? I know Althusser was very interested in Machiavelli.
November 21, 2008 at 5:04 pm
Larval Subjects,
What a beautiful rendition of Spinoza. It must be a clear and engaging class. Two small points which may enhance your position on Spinoza. In your pursuit of Arete, an old Greek professor of mine used to tell me that to correctly see this word, one must understand that it is related to the name of the Greek god Ares, perhaps the cultural buck-stopping point of the derivation of the word’s concept. The arete of Homer’s Iliad is the Ares-ness of each and every man, the apperitional force of each. When a man in homer’s Epic appears god-like, it is the manifestion of their capacity to act. At bottom, this is Spinoza’s view of Being. Each thing as it increases its ability to act acquires greater Being and perfection. In a sense it solidifies through agency. Instead of god-like, it becomes more Substance-like (one could say). Ares, the god of action, is beneath this.
Related to this is your response to your student who viewed Capitalism as driven an inherent selfishness of human beings, what some ideologically read as profoundly anti-social. This stems from Hobbes’ mythical assumption that human beings left to their own devices would produce a war of all against all, of course. Upon such a primoridial scene much has been established.
Etiene Balibar in his short but brilliant Spinoza and Politics lays out rather convincingly Spinoza’s rebuttal to Hobbes. Hate and envy are not fundamentally anti-social affects. Rather, they already are inscribed in the social, and thus even in their tension work to bind society together. This primary sociability for Spinoza comes from the “imitation of the affects””
“If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect (EIIIp27)”
We cannot hate or envy unless we have already epistemically undergone an sense that others (even others we hate) are like us. There is no contract that fundamentally binds the warring atoms of human beings. Rather there is ontological and epistemic glue that runs through each and every perception. For Spinoza, it is only a question of each community. And this is essentially an incorporative task, due to the nature of Substance/Nature/God and modal expression. Once the ideological underpinning myth of anti-selfishness is removed from Capitalism, much changes for what is possible for its future.
http://kvond.wordpress.com/
November 21, 2008 at 6:06 pm
Krigstid; “Regarding Spinoza’s relationship to Dutch mercantilist capitalism, one might also reflect upon his critique of Calvinist theology (something I’m not really well read enough to do, but it just crossed my mind that this might be an interesting field for further questions on Spinoza’s relationship to Capitalism).”
Kvond: The religious (and political) landscape of the new Dutch Republic was intensely complicated at this time as the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church sought to reactionarily stablize society in the sudden absence of a monarchy, a still heavy Catholic population to the south with loyalties to Spain, and a rise of a mercantile class amid apocalyptic expectations and plague. Spinoza’s critique of church power fell then at what he felt was the root of its institutional force, Biblical Authority. His Theologico-Political Treatise is an adventure in Biblical hermenuetics (some say the first of its kind). If the imaginary relations that made up much of biblical interpretation were made clear, then much of force of Church authority would be undone.
But in terms of Spinoza’s relation to Captialism, one must keep in mind that Spinoza as a Jew of Amsterdam was a merchant’s son (his father was a moderate to successful trader with high standing, and the entire community of Jews, rabbis included, was rather deeply enmeshed in the sugar colony of Brazil), and even ran the family buisness for a short time. Spinoza knew first hand the dirty buisness of Capital (and the products of human slavery). The rise of Capitalism in the Dutch Republic paralleled the transfer of wealth to a historically brutalized people, european Jewry.
It is unclear what triggered Spinoza’s renounciation of his role in the family buisness (the Portuguese retaking of the Brazilian colony of Recife and the collapse of Dutch sugar investments there may have been a cause, as might have been an onset of tubuculosis, not to mention any other crises of conscience in the wake of his father’s death), this has been much debated. But what is to be understood is that Capital was not merely an abstract idea for Spinoza. It was the very real relations which had lifted up his community which had only the generation before been subject to serious and long-established Inquisitional pressure and torture. The freedoms of Capital for Spinoza mirrored the freedoms of Democracy. This was a personal experience.
This is not to say that he did not have serious misgivings as to the human costs of Capital, his “Caliban dream” (as Negri puts it) stands as an interesting symptom, given that with the rise of sugar trade came the rise of african and indigenous slavery. The Sephardim connection to the African Slave trade is one of huge historical ambiguity. But both his brother and his sister would later move to sugar/slave colonies.
Here is a Sugar Trade time table compiled around events in Spinoza’s life, just to give some sense of the historical context:
And some musings on these connections: