I sometimes get the sense that when I make remarks about flat ontology and collectives of human and nonhuman actors the points I’m making are so simple, so vulgar, so obvious that others are often confused as to what I might even be referring to. Ghost, for example, remarks,
I’m sure I’m not the only one who’s grateful for all the time you’ve spent explaining this stuff. I’m beginning to get a handle on it, but as you describe the differences between a flat ontology analysis and something Zizek might do, for instance, I realise I need to see this ontology in action. A detailed flat ontology analysis might dissipate the feeling for me that the old nature/binary is still there, but now together in a new container.
No doubt I’ve exacerbated the problem because I’ve developed a somewhat abstract vocabulary with mysterious expressions like “there are no differences that do not make a difference”, “there is no transportation without translation”, and “nothing is either reducible or irreducible to anything else”, all situated in terms like “objectiles”, “actors”, “exo-relations”, “endo-relations”, “attractors”, “phase spaces”, “endo-consistency”, and so on. Faced with this infantry of terms and expressions, it’s difficult to determine what I might be getting at. A good deal of this has been my fault as I seldom give very elaborate examples to develop my claims. Hopefully I can rectify some of this today through the question “how did Caesar cross the Rubicon?”
read on!
If crossing the Rubicon was significant, then this was because there was a long-standing Roman law that forbid any Roman legion from crossing the Rubicon. In crossing the Rubicon on January 10th, 49 B.C.E., Caesar underwent what Deleuze and Guattari call an incorporeal transformation. In other words, nothing had changed in Caesar’s body, in his corporeality, but nonetheless he was completely transformed. He had shifted from being a Roman general at this point, to being a renegade at war with Rome. Moreover, this incorporeal transformation was irreversible.
However, it is important to note that despite the fact that we are all familiar with the expression “Caesar crossing the Rubicon” or simply “Crossing the Rubicon” to signify an irreversible, incorporeal transformation or a historical event, it is worth noting that it was not Caesar who crossed the Rubicon. Had it simply been Caesar that crossed the Rubicon, there would have been no issue. Rather, the issue was not that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, but that Caesar crossed the Rubicon with a Roman legion. It was this that threw Rome into a civil war. At the outset, therefore, we should say that the incorporeal transformation that took place and plunged Rome into a civil war was a multiplicity, and a paradoxical multiplicity at that. Employing Bogost’s vocabulary we can, on the one hand, treat this event as a unit in its own right, but it was also a unit composed of all sorts of other units.
We can “blackbox” this unit, closing up its interior complexity, and reducing it to the event or object “Caesar crossed the Rubicon”, or we can open up this blackbox and let all of the other units come swarming out like so many spiders fleeing from their egg sack. When we open up the blackbox of the “crossing the Rubicon” unit, out scurry horses, soldiers, their equipment, officers, Caesar, women, carts, donkeys, supply lines, children, cooks, bits of clothing, the river, its temperature, the weather conditions, the terrain, and so on. In other words, something that looked very simple, like an atomic unit, now is seen to be composed of all sorts of actors or objectiles. And this is where my question emerges. If I am able to ask “how did Caesar cross the Rubicon?”, then this is because this unit, this event, is a multiplicity composed of a multiplicity of actors. Seen in this light, the question becomes that of how these actors come to conspire together in this event.
The most obvious answer, of course, is that Caesar gave the order for this band of soldiers to cross the Rubicon. And this would not be wrong. He certainly did. Under this construal, our question might become “why did the soldiers obey?” Here we might become Althusserians, speaking of ideological interpellation, arguing that the soldiers recognized themselves in the hail, thereby becoming ideological subjects. This would not be wrong as well. However, there would still be additional problems here. Generals cannot occupy themselves with every little detail involved in the execution of an order. So how is it that the General’s speech act gets translated through a series of mediations to the officers and the soldiers and the relation of the soldiers to the horses, and the relations of the legion to the supply lines, the cooks, the women, the children, etc.? In other words, such an account gives us only a very small portion of what is going on. Moreover, it does not capture the manner in which the horses and soldiers must be fed, the soldiers must maintain their equipment, and so on and so forth. Finally horses, equipment, soldiers, officers, carts, swords, armor, supply lines, and so on are not simply docile bodies that jump to action like a television changes channel when a button is pushed. No. No body is ever a perfectly formed content, but rather there is always an element of friction whenever putting-in-form takes place. It takes quite a bit of work to hold a multiplicity together, as anyone who has ever done administrative work knows all too well.
We might also ask how it is possible for the simple act of crossing the Rubicon to become an event. Presumably Caesar’s army had crossed many rivers, but very few of these crossings were incorporeal transformations in the sense that crossing the Rubicon was an incorporeal transformation. Here, again, we might fall back on discursivity, examining Roman law, its oppositions, its structures, and how these come to be intertwined with a geography, rendering an event in the sense of an incorporeal transformation to become possible. Again, this analysis wouldn’t be mistaken either.
Finally, we have the engineering problem. How does a legion with its supply lines get across the river? Was there a reason the army chose this particular site rather than another? Did the weather conditions on January 10th play a role? What role did the mountainous territory play? In the event of crossing the Rubicon, a whole swarm of differences play a role in the production of the event. We get everything from the biological bodies of the soldiers and horses, the weather conditions, the fitness of the supply lines, the relationship between the foot and a stirrup, the geography of the shores, signs, legal systems, the circulation of orders from Caesar to his officers to the troops, and so on. While some of these differences play a larger role than others, we cannot say that one of these differences makes the event the event that it was. Rather, when we open our blackbox we have to look at how these differences related together, conspired together, to produce the particular event that took place.
The key point to note is that only a subset of these differences are human. We of course have signs, Roman law, ideological interpellation, orders, and so on. But we also have all sorts of nonhuman actors ranging from the types of equipment used, the river, the weather, the horses, the carts, the terrain, and so on. In transporting the human order, all sorts of mediations or translations must take place among these competing media. Now one might respond, “yes!, yes! this is all obvious!” I said as much at the beginning of this post. However, look at how much opening up the black box expands our various strategic possibilities of engagement. Suppose you’re another Roman general plotting to take Caesar on. The discursivist will focus, perhaps, on undermining the ideological identifications the soldiers maintain with Caesar. And that’s not a bad strategy. However, in drawing attention to terrain, supply lines, etc., new possibilities for engagement emerge. We can cut off supply lines. We can lure the legion into a bottleneck where they can be easily dispatched. If we’re really ruthless we can poison their water, and so on. The point is that these other non-signifying difference make a difference.
I have often suggested that social theorists try their hand at SimCity. The reason for this is that SimCity teaches the importance of a road– yes, a single road! –in the subsequent way in which the city comes to organize itself. Like a cell undergoing cell division, the absence or presence of a single road can have a profound impact on how the social system comes to organize itself. A poorly placed road that generates too much traffic suddenly rewards you with angry citizens screaming about deadlock and long drive times, as well as a decrease in productivity that generates all sorts of tax problems. A poorly placed electric plant generates shortages throughout the city, shutting down factories and homes, and spews pollution throughout a residential district leading to heightened sickness that puts a strain on the healthcare system. And so on and so on. The point is not that roads and power-plants are the “true” explainers. They are elements or units in a network, not the ground of the network. The point, however, is that the differences introduced by these sorts of things are non-discursive differences that nonetheless have very real discursive effects. In drawing attention to how networks are actually put together, in refusing to restrict oneself simply to discursive differences, our possibilities of action are increased. As aleatorist once put it to me, the reason protest movements don’t produce any effects anymore is that they don’t shut down highways. Shutting down a highway is not itself a discursive difference, but shut one down and I suspect you’ll encounter very profound discursive effects. What we need is a mode of analysis that simultaneously recognizes the importance of meaning, the signifier, law, and so on, while also thinking these nondiscursive differences qua nondiscursive differences. This is what object-oriented ontology is striving to think at a very abstract level. If programmers, ecologists, critical animal theorists, media and technology studies theorists, etc., are excited about it, then it is because they daily face “engineering” problems that simply can’t be thematized in terms of meaning-effects, the play of the signifier, ideology, and so on.
July 27, 2009 at 12:19 am
[…] July 27, 2009 LARVAL SUBJECTS ON CAESAR AND THE RUBICON. […]
July 27, 2009 at 1:00 am
[…] start singing “are you down with OPP” whenever I say this?), Graham expands on my post about Caesar. I’m having tremendous difficulty articulating what I’m trying to get at […]
July 27, 2009 at 1:28 am
Dear Levi,
Aren’t there in fact two different crossings (real and symbolic) occuring that overlap yet have a certain amount of autonomy from each other? Aren’t there many possible differences at the real level that would have made no difference at the symbolic level (made no difference in the sense that, at the formal level of Roman law, the same act (‘crossing the rubicon’) would have occured)?
I’ve read your latest post on the pumpkin, and I do otherwise understand what you’re driving at with regard to the affordances and constraints offered by particular technologies, and in this particular instance, by geographical, atmospheric etc. conditions. This is a consistent feature of my work. Many thanks.
July 27, 2009 at 1:49 am
Hi Ghost,
I’m certainly not making the claim that all differences are symmetrical, though I’ve toyed with this idea in the past. When I talk about a symmetrical relation among differences, I’m talking about a relation in which the two objects interacting both modify each other. There are relations among objects that are symmetrical in this way, but many relations that are asymmetrical as well. Thus, for example, the relationship between myself and many readers of this blog is asymmetrical. I produce some sort of difference in them, but the converse doesn’t occur because the vast majority of readers never post anything or contact me in email. Note that in saying my posts make a difference I am not saying that it is an important difference (I’m sure my posts are fairly often received with indifference after being read for a few sentences) or a difference that I would like. The thesis that there is no difference that does not make a difference is a properly ontological thesis, in the sense that all it claims is the minimal criteria for counting as real is that something makes a difference, nothing more. It doesn’t claim that the difference is important difference, nor that it makes a difference to any other being (it could be a completely isolated entity just busily being its differences without interacting with other differences), nor does it specify what differences the object makes.
I think the sort of observation you make here gets at the interesting issue. That is, if we concede that the ontic principle secures the deflationary move of not worrying over how we reach the “really real” because now we’ve concluded that everything that makes a difference is, we can get on to more interesting questions such as “what are the operative differences and their relations among a particular network of actors?” “How are they related?” “Are their hierarchies of influence where some differences overturn others, functioning as key nodes in the network, etc?” For example, clearly the brown of the Roman soldier’s leather flaps (I’m not sure what the flaps of their skirts are called) constitute a difference, but this brown does not seem to be a difference that is operative in any sort of important way in the context of Caesar crossing the Rubicon. By contrast, the various plumes, helmets, and insignia the different soldiers wear are operative differences in that network as they serve a function in sorting and ranking the bodies in the command structure. I think you’re right to point out that the mechanics of how Caesar crossed the Rubicon is asymmetrical with respect to Roman law in the sense that so long as he crossed it. However, you’ve also shifted the issue. My question was not what would change Roman law or what differences sustain Roman law?, but “how did Caesar cross the Rubicon?” For the question of Roman law we would need a different analysis, examining how Roman institutions, their police forces, the senators, etc., sustain the law as an ongoing reality.
July 27, 2009 at 2:12 am
Yes, I understand what you’re driving at. I think I initially misunderstood your ‘how’. Thanks for the clarification.
July 27, 2009 at 10:22 am
Hi Levi,
I really enjoy reading your posts and I must say they’ve helped me tremendously when it comes to getting a better grip on what the engagement with Deleuze and Speculative Realism/Materialism really means. I’m not really “there” yet myself (I’m starting from a more Zizekian position, but am intrigued by Kordela’s Lacanian Spinozism), but since I’m struggling with understanding and trying to get a critical grip on a contemporary Neomaterialist tendency here in Sweden, it’s all very useful. My problem with this Swedish reading of this Deleuzian field (which doesn’t seem to be catching on to Speculative Realism in any form, at least not yet – though it closely follows DeLanda) is that it clearly aligns itself with a rather “bourgeois” political position. For all its obvious critique of the Kojévian philosophy of history (which it calls Hegelianism – all of its insights into Hegel stemming from Deleuze), it doesn’t seem to be very keen on distancing itself from the Neofunctionalist ideas of Social Engineering that were obvious in the political career of Kojéve. This may be linked to the fact that this reading takes place within circles closely aligned to the Green party that contains a large number of disillusioned liberals (these being disillusioned by the sharp turn right taken by Swedish parliamentary liberalism during the last 15 years). In Sweden, Deleuze is therefore (quietly) sort of turning into a point of theoretical reference for Green Social Liberalism.
For me, the references to Sim City have a peculiar likeness (or rather: it has the potential to be read along these lines) to this tendency. That the physical structure of cities has political significance is obvious. It’s been obvious what this insight can be used for ever since Hausmann rebuilt Paris to make the putting down of riots and revolutions easier. I know that there’s been a lot of muddy accusations against the Speculative turn within contemporary Materialism about complicity with Neoliberalism against the Speculative turn within contemporary Materialism, but this is not at all what I’m getting at. Rather, my question (after this rather all-too-long ideological report from the frigid North) regards how to think about the overturning or change of social conditions. How to distance the political implications of OOP and Speculative Realism from Social Engineering (which is turning into a buzzword among the Green Deleuzians here, however bizarre this may sound) and make room for social movements? Or is it even an issue in your eyes? Am I making a false dichotomy here? Maybe the position of the engineer should be adopted by the activist?
Sim City does feature the subject position of a player. In connection with your position this would seem to actualize Kordela’s use of the Lacanian Gaze within a Spinozist framework (I haven’t been able to locate any deeper discussion of her “$urplus” – is this the expression of a silent critique of her work?). The question of “who plans?” seems to return implicitly from the use of Sim City as an example of the politico-practical aspects of OOP. Or is there something here that I don’t get?
July 27, 2009 at 3:25 pm
I wonder whether the ‘failure to understand’ isn’t in fact a resistance (that may have nothing to do with a desire to destruct or hinder) that stems from something to do with losses and gains; a question about what is lost in all the ‘gain’ – the ‘more’ – that is being offered (‘you get to keep the old stuff, but your get more’…) A sense, perhaps, that what is lost is a certain ‘force’. I’m not necessarily defending this ‘force’, for clearly it’s an idea that also has possible negative connotations.
July 27, 2009 at 9:45 pm
I’m not sure if a dissection of “Caesar crossing the Rubicon” was the best example to use, as I still don’t grasp the particular value OOP/SR brings to the table when all of the modes of analysis above are possible without dissolving the Kantian limit on epistemology(or, why they are obvious).
Another way to put this would be to say that a particular difference (say, language) could make most of the difference (because honestly, I’ve never heard anyone defend that a certain difference makes ALL the difference, at least in my experience of the Continental tradition), and I’d still get all the same toys.
What am I missing?
July 27, 2009 at 10:31 pm
Benoit,
I’m not sure what to say. It seems to me that you can open nearly any book of Continental thought from the last hundred years and you find it almost entirely focused on either the analysis of meaning or intentionality (phenomenology), or the analysis of language and texts (Derrida, Lacan, Zizek, Gadamar). Exceptions are few and far between (Deleuze and Guattari, Latour, Serres). If that’s not immediately evident from even the most superficial review of Continental thought, then I don’t know what else is. The point is that there is a certain focus at the heart of Continental thought that systematically leads to research and questions being posed in a particular way. I mean, c’mon, the thesis that Continental thought has almost exclusively been focused on meaning and language isn’t controversial. The upshot is that even though, as you rightly point out, no one says a certain difference makes all the difference they proceed in practice as if it does.
I think the issue with Kant is that he instituted philosophical analysis as self-reflexive analysis. That’s the whole point behind the critique. Rather, than analyzing the objects as we did in pre-critical philosophy we now reflexively investigate the structure of the mind perceiving the objects. This mode of analysis comes to pervade all subsequent philosophy, taking the form of reflexive analysis of language, living experience, etc., etc., etc. (we get hundreds of variants). As a consequence, we never get to an analysis beyond that of the reflexive medium.
July 27, 2009 at 11:24 pm
>The upshot is that even though, as you >rightly point out, no one says a certain >difference makes all the difference they >proceed in practice as if it does.
This theory/practice split is where things become hairy for me in attempting to understand the value of your proposal and returns us to my original question, to the heart of it really. In fact, we can set aside the question of whether the Continental tradition has overly invested itself in self-reflexive analysis because it has no bearing on what I was primarily inquiring into.
So following the distinction you make, I would like to hear more concerning the mutual exclusivity, in theory, of the possible varieties of analysis you example here between OOP/SR and non-realism. If the problem lies in mere philosophical practice, then it seems questionable to me whether one requires a (not so)new theory to bear the fruits of the kinds of analysis you’re interested in. Or is grounding my question in this distinction itself flawed?
If all of this appears horribly misguided, then at least one product of my inquires is a measure of just how much you have to bang people over the head in order for them to “get it” ;)
July 27, 2009 at 11:28 pm
Excuse me: not ‘mutual exclusivity’, but of the one against the other
July 28, 2009 at 12:12 am
[…] Realism, Speculative Realism Leave a Comment Benoît of Idios raises questions as to whether Caesar crossing the Rubicon was the best choice of examples for illustrating object-oriented ontology. In the course of his […]
July 28, 2009 at 4:32 am
I was wondering how OOP woudl engage with the ‘incorporeal materialism’ of events, and this question has basically guided how I have read Graham’s book.
You talk of ‘blackboxing’ the ‘unit’ and I think this means grappling with the mulitiplicity of the Caeser-crossing-the-Rubicon event so it is condensed to an intelligible simplicity. I have wondered how such a decision is made, which elements of the multiplicity are blackboxed? Part of it is a question of the elegance of one’s research. For example, most of Latour’s analyses are derived from case studies where the ‘cartography’ of stakeholders is pre-defined in some way. Similarly, Foucault’s work in the archives was necessarily limited to ‘discourse events’, but through which Foucault created a method for engaging with non-discursive power relations.
I think it was Paul Patton in the Deleuze Reader who talked about this being the ethical decision, which events? Which is another way of asking, where to limit the multiplicity? (Deleuze would add, am I worthy of the events that befall me?)